
Vol. XVI] MAY—AUGUST, 1959 [Parts 3—4

THE JOURNAL OF THE GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE



ALLAHABAD

Vol. XVI] MAY—AUGUST, 1959 [Parts 3—4

THE JOURNAL OF THE GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE



ALLAHABAD

Published by
The Honorary Secretary,
Ganganatha Jha Research Institute
Allahabad

Printed by P. L. Yadava
at The Indian Press (Private) Ltd.
Allahabad

// JOURNAL
OF THE
GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Vol. XVI, Pts. 3—4

MAY—AUGUST, 1959

CONTENTS

JOURNAL
OF THE
GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Vol. XVI] **MAY—AUGUST 1959** **[Parts 3—4**

STUDIES IN INDIAN HISTORY & GEOGRAPHY BASED ON EARLY GREEK ACCOUNTS

By Dr. B. C. Law

The accounts left by the early Greek historians and geographers regarding India are very valuable. The prominent among them may be mentioned. Flavius Arrianus of Nicomedia in Bithynia, (born about A.D. 96),[1] who lived during the reigns of Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius, was the author of the *Indica* containing a description of India in the Ionic dialect including the voyage of Nearchus intended to be a supplement to the *Anabasis*, *Periplus of the Euxine*, an official account written for the Emperor Hadrian, etc. Alexander's expedition to India produced a large number of narratives and memoirs relating to India. But all these works are lost and their substance is found in brief in Strabo (60 B.C.—19 A.D.), Pliny (a naturalist, 23—79 A.D.), and Arrian. Much more information can be gathered from Diodorus (100 B.C.—100 A.D.), Curtius (A.D. 100), and Justinus (not later than 500 A.D.). Megasthenes (305 B.C.), who stayed for a long time in India, gave us an interesting account of India. Before Arrian and Megasthenes Hecatoeus of Miletus (500 B.C.) helped Herodotus (484—431 B.C.) much to know about India and

[1] Some say that he lived in 200 A.D. while others are of opinion that he lived up to 172 A.D. (R. K. Mookherjee, *Chandragupta and his times*, p. 6).

the Indians. Hecatoeus was the first Greek geographer who knew the two continents of Europe and Asia. Ktesias of Knidos (Ctesias of Cridus, 398 B.C.), who was the physician and historian at the court of the Persian Emperor Artaxerxes Mnemon and a contemporary of Xenophon, gave us an account of India less accurate than that of Arrian. The accounts of India given by Megasthenes and Eratosthenes (about 240 B. C.) were used by Arrian while giving a general description of India. The account of the voyage made by Nearchus the Cretan from the Indus to the Pasitigris given in the second part of Arrian's *Indica*, is mainly based on the narrative of the voyage written by Nearchus himself.

The account of the Asiatic expedition of Alexander the great, given by Arrian, who was the best of Alexander's historians, is no doubt remarkable for the accuracy of its narrative and the perfect purity of its style and clearness. Ancient India as described by Ptolemy is very useful in studying the early geography of India.

An attempt has been made in this article to reconstruct the history and geography of Ancient India based on the writings of the early Greeks.

From the time of Dionysos to Sandrakottos the Indians counted 153 kings and a period of 6042 years but among these a republic was thrice established. Dionysos,

Alexander and Indian kings

according to the Indians, was earlier than Herakles by fifteen generations, and no one excepting him made a hostile invasion of India. Not even Kyros, son of Kambyses, made any hostile invasion, although he undertook an expedition against the Skythians and showed himself the most enterprising monarch of Asia. Alexander came and overthrew in war all whom he attacked and would have conquered the whole world, had his army been willing to follow him. An Indian king, on the other hand, was prevented by a sense of justice from making an

attempt to conquer beyond the limits of India.[2] Rapson says that this assertion on the part of Arrian certainly seems true for the earliest times.[3]

Megasthenes did not travel much over India, though he saw more of it than those who came with Alexander, the son of Philip. He resided at the court of Sandrakottas, the greatest king in India, and also at the court of Poros. Megasthenes also informs us that the Indians neither invaded other men nor other men invaded the Indians. For Sesostris the Egyptian, after having overrun the greater part of Asia and advanced with his army as far as Europe, returned home. Idanthyrsos the Skythian subdued many nations of Asia and carried his victorious arms even to the borders of Egypt. Semiramis, the Assyrian queen, took in hand an expedition against India but died before she could execute her design. Thus Alexander was the only conqueror who actually invaded the country. Regarding Dionysus many traditions are current that he made an expedition into India and subjugated the Indians before the time of Alexander. Tradition does not say much about Herakles. The Nysaeans joined Alexander's party.[4] Of the expedition led by Bakkhos the city of Nysa[5] was no mean monument, while the mount Meros[6] was yet another. There were but few memorials of Herakles who was unable to take the rock, Aornos,[7] which Alexander seized.

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[2] *Indica*, 9, 12.

[3] *Cambridge History of India*, I, p. 321 f. n.

[4] *CHI*, I, 354

[5] It was a Greek colony long before the advent of Alexander to India (Chinnock, *Arrian's Anabasis* p. 399). Holdich points out that the lower spurs and valleys of Koh-i-Mor are where the ancient city of Nysa once stood (*Gates of India*, p. 122). D. R. Bhandarkar says that Nysa was situated between the Kophen (the Kabul river) and the Indus (*Carmichael Lectures*, 1921, p. 32; Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, p. 154, f. n. 4).

[6] It is called Mar-Koh near Jalalabad in the Punjab visited by Alexander (McCrindle, *Invasion of India*, p. 338).

[7] Vide McCrindle, *Invasion of India by Alexander the Great*, p. 39.

Alexander while leaving India established the new order of things. He appointed Spatembas, one of his companions to be the king of the country. When Spatembas died, his son Boudyas succeeded to the sovereignty. The father reigned over the Indians for fifty-two years and his son, twenty. Kradeuas, the son of Boudyas, duly inherited the kingdom and thereafter the succession was generally hereditary. When failure of heirs occurred in the royal family, the Indians elected their sovereigns on the principle of merit. Herakles[8] was really an Indian. He was held in high honour by the Sourasenoi,[9] an Indian tribe,

[8] The dress which he wore resembled that of the Theban Herakles. He had many male children but one daughter whose name was Pandaia. She received from her father 500 elephants, a cavalry of 4000 strong and an infantry of one hundred and thirty thousand men. According to some Indian writers, when Herakles was going over the world and ridding land and sea of whatever evil monsters which infested them, he saw in the sea an ornament for women which was eagerly bought and carried away to foreign markets. It was the sea-pearl known as Margarita. Herakles appreciated its beauty and caused it to be brought to India that he might adorn his daughter with it. (McCrindle, *Ancient India*, p. 206).

[9] The Sourasenoi or the Śūrasenas were among the tribes who occupied a rank in Indo-Aryan Society, second only to that of the small population of the narrow strip of Brahmāvarta. Therefore they must have belonged to the Vedic people, though probably they had not acquired sufficient political importance in very early times to find a mention in the *Ṛgveda* or the subsequent Vedic literature. They must have occupied the Muttra district and possibly some of the territories till farther south according to some (*Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, p. 316). Rhys Davids says that they lived immediately southwest of the Matsyas and the west of the Jumna with Madhurā as their capital (*Buddhist India*, p. 27). The capital of the Śūrasenas was Mathurā on the Jumna included in the Agra division of the United Provinces. It lay on the upper Jumna about 270 miles in a straight line north-west of Kauśāmbī. The Greek historians make mention of Mathurā. It was noticed by Arrian on the authority of Megasthenes as the capital of the Śūrasenas and Ptolemy also mentions it. The Greek writers also make mention of another city of the Śūrasena country named Cleisobora (Kṛṣṇapura, Brindāvana). Lassen transcribes Chrysobara as Kṛṣṇapura (*Indische Altertumskunde*, I, p. 127, n. 3). He locates it at Agra. Cunningham identifies it with Keśavapura mahalla of Mathurā (*ASIR*., XX. p. 45). Some suggest that Gokul on the left bank of the Jumna five miles south south-east of Mathurā, may be identified with it (Cunningham, *Ancient Geography*, S. N. Majumdar's Ed., p. 707). According to the Greeks Methora (Mathurā) was situated on the banks

who had two large cities, Mathora and Cleisobora,[10] through whose country flowed a navigable river called the Jobares.[11] It was asserted that a cave in the dominions of the Parapamisadai, was taken to be the cave of Prometheus the Titan, in which he had been suspended for stealing the fire.

No difficulties could daunt the courage or defeat the skill of Alexander.[12] Alexander divided his forces leaving Krateros, the man most faithful to him and whom he valued equally with himself.[13] Kleophis, the consort of the slain chieftain and her infant son were captured and it is said that she subsequently bore a son to Alexander. Arrian in his *Anabasis*[14] speaks of the mother and daughter of Assakenos. According to Arrian[15] Kleophis must have been the widow of the chief slain in the siege. Arrian supplies an account of the death of Boukephala.

Alexander crossed the Akesines (Chenab) near the foot of the hills. The passage of the river was difficult by reason of the rapid current of the stream, and of the large rocks with which the channel was bestrewn, and on which many boats were wrecked.[16] Arrian in his *Anabasis*[17] says that these particulars clearly prove that the Akesines (the Chenab river) was crossed near the foot of the hill, some 25 or 30 miles above Wazirabad. Arrian further says[18] that the fleet when descending the Hydaspes (Jhelum) from

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of the Jumna higher up than Agra from which it was 35 miles distant. This city was situated to the south of Indraprastha (*Mahābhārata*, Sabhāparva, XXX, 1105-06).

[10] Cleisobora (Clisobora) has been identified by some with Mahāvana, six miles to the south of Mathurā on the opposite bank of the Yamunā (Growse's *Mathurā*, p. 279). It has been identified with Brindāvana according to Cunningham (*Ancient Geography*, p. 429).

[11] The Yamunā river (modern Jumna).

[12] Arrian, *Anabasis*, vii, 15.

[13] *Ibid.*, vii, 12.

[14] iv. 27. [15] v. 20.

[16] Smith , *Early History of India*, 4th Ed., p. 77.

[17] v. 20. [18] *Anabasis*, vi. 2.4.

Nikaia, the town of the battlefield, reached the capital of Sophytes, king of the salt range, on the 3rd day. According to Cunningham the capital of Sophytes was at Ahmedabad. The battle of Hydaspes was fought after the summer solstice, that is to say, later than 21st June. Not satisfied with the vast empire he possessed, Alexander wanted to lead an expedition to Arabia. He made a voyage down the Euphrates and began the construction of a dockyard at Babylon. Suddenly in the midst of his preparations he was stricken with fever. He became speechless and died at an early age of 32 in the height of his fame and the splendid plenitude of his power.[19]

Some Indian Tribes

The four tribes, namely, Isari, Cosyri, Izgi, Chisiotosagi and the Brachmanae were located somewhere in Kāsmere or its immediate neighbourhood. The Isari were probably the same as the Bysari according to Pliny. The Cosyri are to be identified with the Khasira mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* as the neighbours of the Daradas and Kāśmīras. The Izgi are mentioned by Ptolemy under the name of the Sizyges as a people of Serike. The Chisiotosagi or Chirotosagi are probably identical with the Chiconae. The Prinas were probably the Tamasā or Tonsa mentioned in the *Purāṇas* as Parṇāsā.[20]

The Sibai,[21] an Indian tribe, wore skins. Relying on this fact it was declared that they were descended from those who belonged to the expedition of Herakles. The

[19] Sykes, *History of Persia*, I, p. 300.

[20] McCridle, *Ancient India*, p. 135 f. n.

[21] There can hardly be any doubt as to the identity of the *Ṛgvedic* Śivas with the Sibai or Siboi of the Greeks (Arrian, *Indica*, V. 12; Diodorus XVII, 96). When the army of Alexander, says Arrian, came among the Sibai, an Indian tribe, and noticed that they wore skins, they declared that the Sibai were descendants of those who belonged to the expedition of Herakles and had been left behind; for besides being dressed in skins the Sibai carried a cudgel and brand on the backs of their oxen. It seems reasonable to suppose from the description of

Sibai carried a cudgel and brand on the backs of their oxen, the representation of a club, wherein the Macedonians recognised a memorial of the club of Herakles. Arrian says that if anyone believed all this, this must be another Herakles not the Theban but either the Tyrian or the Egyptian or some great king who belonged to the upper country lying not far from India.

Political motives prompted king Abisares at first to seek Alexander's protection but later he was inclined to resist the invader by joining his forces with those of Poros.[22] The region occupied by the Glauganicians lay in close proximity with the kingdom of Poros according to Arrian.[23] The country occupied by them is said to have been the most populous with numerous cities.

The Abastanoi were the same as the Ambaṣṭhas according to Arrian.[24] In Alexander's time they were settled on the lower Akesines (*Asiknī*) and had a democratic government. They had an army of 60,000 foot, 60,000 cavalry and 500 chariots.[25] They eventually submitted to Alexander.[26] They were called by Ptolemy as Ambastai who settled in the east of the country of the Paropanisadai, which was a collective name for the tribes that were located along the southern and eastern sides of the Hindukush.[27] The Ambaṣṭhas were the same as the Abastanoi (Arrian), Sambastai (Diodoros), Sabarcæ (Curtius), Sabagræ (Orosius) of Alexander's historians.[28]

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of their dress and weapons that the tribe belonged to a racial group not distinctly Aryan. They are said to have had forty thousand foot soldiers at the time of Alexander. During the time of Alexander's invasion the Siboi or Sibai are said to have dwelt between the Indus and the Akesines or the Chenab., For further details vide Law, *Indological Studies*, Pt. I, pp. 24—26; Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, pp. 82 ff.

22 Chinnock, *Arrian's Anabasis*, p. 276. 23 *Ibid.*, p. 276.

24 McCrindle, *Invasion of Alexander*, 292. 25 *Ibid.*, p. 252.

26 *Cambridge History of India*, I, p.376.

27 McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, pp. 311-12.

28 McCrindle, *Invasion of India*, pp. 292 ff.

According to Arrian the Brachmans or the Brāhmaṇas seemed to have been very influential in the principality of Mousikanos[29] comprising a large portion of modern Sind.[30] They are said to have been the main agents in bringing about an uprising of the people against the Macedonian invader. At last they had to submit to Alexander. A city of the Brāhmaṇas had to be stormed while the operations against Sambus were going on.[31]

What Megasthenes tells us that the Indian tribes were one hundred and eighteen in number, does not seem to be true. He further tells us that the Indians in ancient times were nomadic. Like the Skythians they did not till the soil but they roamed about in their wagons from one part of Skythia to another, neither dwelling in towns nor worshipping in temples. Similarly the Indians had neither towns nor temples of the gods. They were so barbarous that they wore the skins of such wild animals as they could kill and subsisted on the bark of trees. These trees were called *Tāla* in Indian speech. They also subsisted on wild animals caught by them, eatng the raw flesh before Dionysos came to India. Dionysos when he came and conquered the Indian people, founded cities and gave laws to these cities and introduced the use of wine among the Indians, taught them to sow the land, himself supplying the seeds for the purpose. It is also said that Dionysos first yoked oxen to the plough and made many of the Indians cultivators instead of nomads and supplied them with implements

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29 The territory of the Mousikanos was we l-known to Alexander's historians. Alexander took them by surprise and they had to submit to him (*CHI.*, I, p. 377). According to Strabo (Hamilton & Falconer's Tr. III, p. 96) they used to eat in public and their food consisted of what was taken in the chase. They made no use of gold or silver. They employed youths in the flower of their age instead of slaves. They studied the science of medicine with due attention. They never liked to go to law-courts by creating constant disputes.

30 Chinnock, *Arrian*, p. 319.

31 *Diodoros*, XVII, 103. 1; *Arrian*, VI, 16.5,

for agriculture. The Indians worshipped gods with cymbals and drums as taught by Dionysos who also taught them the satyric[32] dance. Dionysos instructed the Indians to let their hair grow long in honour of the gods and to wear the turban. He also taught them to anoint themselves with unguents, so that even upto the time of Alexander, the Indians were marshalled for battle to the sound of cymbals and drums. Towards the north beyond the Himālayas the Uttarakuri were the people who dwelt enjoying long and happy life.[33] The Gangaridai were a nation having a vast force of the biggest sized elephants. Alexander did not make war with them knowing that they had 4000 well-trained elephants and that they were fully equipped for war.[34]

Arrian mentions two cities belonging to the Aspasians (Iranian name *Aspa* corresponding to Sanskrit *Aśva*) named Andaca and Arigacon.[35] Massaga (Maśakāvatī[36] or Massaka or Mazaga or Masoga),[37] which was the capital town and the Assakenian stronghold in eastern Afghanistan, was stormed by the troops of Alexander. When the town capitulated, a large number of mercenary troops, who were assembled there, agreed to join the army of Alexander. At night they secretly planned to escape. At this the Macedonians spared none of them to live till morning.[38] One of the ascetics was per-

Cities & Towns

[32] Satyr—Greek wood-god.

[33] *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, p. 23.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

[35] Chinnock, Arrian's *Anabasis*, pp. 230-31.

[36] It was the capital town of the Assakenoi according to the Greek writers. It was the kingdom of king Assakenos (*CHI.*, Vol. I, p. 353; Law, *Indological Studies*, I, pp. 2-3; Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, pp. 180 ff.).

[37] Smith, *Early History of India*, 4th Ed., p. 57 f. n. 1.

[38] *Arrian*, IV, p. 27; *Diod.*, XVII, 84; *Cambridge History of India*, I, p. 353.

suaded by the king of Taxila to become a companion of Alexander. He was called by the classical writers as Kalanos who was a disciple of Dandamis.[39] Alexander, when he arrived at Taxila, saw the Indian gymnosophists whose endurance he admired. The eldest of these sophists with whom the others lived as disciples having Dandamis as their master, not only refused to go himself but prevented others from going. Alexander did not put forth his hand to violence knowing him to be of an independent spirit. He is said to have won over Kalanos, one of the sophists, whom Megasthenes represents as a man utterly wanting in self-control.[40]

Lamghān, a small territory, lay along the northern bank of the Kabul river. Lambatai were its inhabitants. It was visited by Hiuen Tsang. It was known as *Lan-po* according to him.[41] *Souastene* designates the basin of the Souastos (i.e. the basin of the Swat river). It was known as Subhavāstu or Suvāstu. It was visited by Hiuen Tsang who called it the kingdom of U-Chang-na.[42] The *Daradrai* inhabited the mountain region which lay to the east of the Lambatai and of Souastene and to the north of the uppermost part of the course of the Indus along the north-western frontier of Kāśmīr. Strabo mentions them as Derdai and Pliny as Dardae.[43] They were also known as the Dardanoi. According to the *Mahābhārata* (Droṇaparva, Ch. 10, 18) they fought with the Kaurava forces in the Kurukṣetra battle and were defeated by Vāsudeva. The *Viṣṇupurāṇa*[44] and the *Matsyapurāṇa*[45] associate them with the Ābhīras and

[39] *Arrian*, VII, 24; *Strabo*, XV. c. 714 ff.

[40] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, pp. 116-17.

[41] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, 1927, Ed., 106.

[42] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, 1927, pp. 106-107.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[44] Wilson's Ed., II, p. 184.

[45] CXXI, 45—51.

Kāśmīras and link their country with Gandhāra, Śivapura, etc. *Kaspeiria* is identical with the valley of Kashmir. It is a contraction of Kāśyapamira (Kaspapyros, 'a Gandaric city'). *Kāśyapapura*, the city of Kāśyapa, is the original designation of Kāśmīr.[46] The Kulindas were the inhabitants of Kulindrine. According to Cunningham[47] *Kulindrine* is identified with Jālandhara. This is not accepted by St. Martin. The *territory of Kuluta*, which was formed by the upper part of the Vipāśā basin, is included in the Kulindrine or Kylindrine of Ptolemy.[48] It was visited by Hiuen Tsang who called it K'in-lu-to. *Goryaia* designates the territory traversed by the Gouraios or the Ghor river[49]. The Ghor river is an affluent of the Kabul river now called the Landai, formed by the junction of the river Pañjkora and the Swat river. Alexander passed through Goryaia and entered the territory of the Assakenoi after having crossed the river Gouraios. *Nagara* or Dionysopolis has been identified by Lassen with Nanghenhar, sanskrit Nagarahāra. Hiuen Tsang visited it, who called it Na-kie-lo-ho.[50] *Gandarai* is Gandhāra having two important cities of Takṣasilā (Taxila) and Puṣkalāvatī (Peukelaotis) or Puṣkarāvatī. Puṣkarāvatī is said to have been founded by Puṣkara, son of Bharata and nephew of Rāma.[51] It is called also Peukelai by Dionysius Periegetes. Takṣasilā (modern Taxila) is called Shi-shi-Ch'eng. It figures prominently in Buddhist and Jain stories.[52] The Chinese traveller Fa-hien distinguishes Takṣasilā from Gandhāra.[53] According to Strabo the country of the Gandarai, which he called Gandaritis lay between

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46 *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109. 47 *AGI*, p. 157.

48 Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, pp. 109-110.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 110. 50 *Ibid*, p. 113.

51 Wilson, *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, Vol. IV. Ch. 4.

52 *Dīpavaṁsa*, III, 31; *Jāt*, II, pp. 219—21; *Jāt* IV, p. 391; Law, *Historical Gleanings*, Chap. I; Law, *India as described in early texts of Buddhism & Jainism*, pp. 278, 280—282.

53 Legge, *Fa-hien*, pp. 31-32.

the Khoaspes and the Indus and along the river Kophes or the Kabul river.[54] Herodotus mentions the *Gandarioi*.[55] Herodotus describes them as being clad in cotton garments and bearing bows of reed and arrows tipped with iron.[56] *Arsa* represents the sanskrit *uraśa*, the name of a district which is to be identified according to Cunningham with the modern district of Rash in Dhantāwar to the west of Muzafarabad. It was visited by Hiuen Tsang[57] who places it between Taxila and Kashmere. It was called *u-la-shi* by the Chinese pilgrim.

Sāgala also called Euthymedia is the sanskrit Sākala, which has been identified by General Cunningham with Sanglawala Tiba. A fine description of Sāgala is given in the *Milinda-pañho*[58] which is an important post canonical Pali work. It is mentioned freequently in the *Mahābhārata* as the capital of the Madras. It lay to the west of the Ravi. Alexander visited this city on learning that the Kathaians and other warlike tribes occupied that stronghold for the purpose of opposing his advance to the Ganges.[59]

Labokla has been identified with Lahore, the capital of the Punjab.[60] *Ostobalasara*[61] has been identified by St. Martin with Sthāniśvara or modern Thaneswar. *Indabara* is ancient Indraprastha or modern Delhi.[62] It was the later capital of the Kuru Kingdom founded by the Pāṇḍavas.[63] It was surrounded by walls and moats.[64] It was 7 yojanas in extent according to Jātaka No. 537. There was a direct

[54] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 115.
[55] BK. III. c. xci.
[56] Rapson, *Ancient Iudia*, p. 87.
[57] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 118.
[58] Trenckner's Ed., 1 ff.
[59] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, 123.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 127.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 128.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 128.
[63] *Mahābhārata*, Ādiparva, ccvii, 7568—94.
[64] *Ibid.*, Ādiparva, 207 vs. 29—30.

route from Indraprastha to Vārāṇasī.[65] According to Ptolemy Hastināpura was 24 miles south-west of Dārānagara and 11 miles to the west of the present Ganges.[66]

Modoura has been identified with Mathurā in U. P., the birth place of Śrīkṛṣṇa.[67] The Yonas as Bactrian Greeks founded principalities in India establishing their suzerainty even over Mathurā (*Madhuram apayāto yavanarājā*). Modoura is situated on the banks of the Jumna, higher up than Agra from which it is 35 miles distant. It is said to have been founded by Satrugna, the younger brother of Rāma.

Gagasmira has been identified by Lassen and St. Martin with Ajmere.[68] St. Martin says that Kontā is probably Kuṇḍā on the left bank of the Jumna to the south-east of Saharanpur.[69]

Passala was a big town of Rohilkhand, 30 miles from Sambhal, towards the south-east and at a like distance from the east bank of the Ganges.[70]

Adisdara or *Adeisathra* is identified with Ahicchatra, an ancient city. It was the capital of northern Pancāla.[71] The form of the name in Ptolemy by a slight alteration becomes Adisadra which has been satisfactorily identified with Ahicchatra[72].

Banagara was the name of a town and a district that lay on the line of communication between Kabul and the Indus. It was visited by Fa-Hien and Hiuen Tsang.[73]

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[65] For a systematic history of Indraprastha vide B. C. Law *Hastināpura & Indraprastha in Ancient India published in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay*, New Series, Vol. 30, Pt. I, June 1955.

[66] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, p. 212.

[67] See Law, *Indological Studies*, Pt. III, Chap. III; Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 129.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 129. [69] *Ibid.* p. 130. [70] *Ibid.*, p. 131. [71] *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 161; vide, Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, p. 34.

[72] For a systematic account of Ahicchatra vide B. C. Law, *The Pañchālas and their capital Ahichchhatra*, *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 67.

[73] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, p. 141.

Barbarei[74] or the Barbaricum of the *Periplus of the Erythraean sea* was a great emporium of coal trade. The Barbaras according to the *Mahābhārata*[75] are associated with the Ambaṣṭhas, Kulindas etc. and also with the Yaunas, Kāmbojas, Gandhāras and Kirātas and are located in the Uttarāpatha (Northern-India).[76] According to some the country of the Barbaras was in the west or in the north western frontier of India stretching upto the Arabian sea. It was a market town and port situated on the middle mouth of the Indus and included in the Śaka country whose metropolis was Minnagar.

The territory situated between the Ravi and the Beas was occupied by the Khatriaioi.[77]

Kassida is Kāṣī or Vārāṇaṣī.[78] One of the Mahājanapadas of Jambudwīpa was Kāśī (modern Banaras) which derives its name from the river Varaṇāvatī. It is situated at a distance of eighty miles below Allahabad on the north bank of the Ganges at the junction between it and the river Varaṇā. The Varaṇā is a considerable rivulet which rises to the north of Allahabad and has course of about 100 miles. The Aśī is a mere brook. The ancient city of Kāśī was also known as Surundhana, Sudassana, Brahmavaḍḍhana, Pupphavatī, Ramma and Molinī.[79] This city occurs in the Vedic and Sūtra literature, Epics, Purāṇas, as well as in Buddhist and Jain literature. It was a centre of trade and industry.[80]

Sagoda is identified with Ayodhyā, capital of Kośala.[81] Ayodhyā also known as Vinītā was one of the seven holy

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[74] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, p. 148.

[75] Sabhāparva, Ch. 31, 199; Droṇaparva, Ch. 119, 14 .

[76] *Mahābhārata*, XII, 207, 43. The *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* places them in the Sindhu country (LVII, 39).

[77] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 157.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

[79] *Jātaka*, IV, 104, 119; V, 177, 312; VI, 131; and IV, p. 15.

[80] For a detailed study vide B. C. Law, *Ancient Indian Tribes*, 1926, p. I.

[81] *Ancient India* (Ptolemy) p. 228.

places of the Hindus. Fa-Hien calls it Sha-Che. It was also known as Sāketa, Ikṣvākubhūmi, Rāmapurī, and Kośala. It was an unimportant town in Buddha's time. It was the capital of the southern Kośala. It was situated on the Sarayū river identified with the Ghāgra or Gogra in Oudh about 6 miles from Fyzabad railway station.[82]

The *Ambaṣṭhas*[83] existed as early as the time of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*[84] in the Punjab but in later times they migrated to Bengal and Bihar. The *Mahābhārata*[85] mentions them along with the Sivis, Mālavas and other north-western tribes. In Alexander's time they were settled on the lower Akesines (modern Chenab). According to Ptolemy they were located along the southern and eastern sides of the Hindukush.[86]

The royal city of *Calingae* (*Gangaridum Calingaram regis*) was called Parthalis according to the classical writer Pliny, who further points out that over their king 60,000 foot-soldiers, 1000 horsemen and 7000 elephants used to keep watch and ward. According to the *Mahābhārata*[87] the Calingae proper or the Kalinga country comprised the entire tract of country lying along the coast of the Vaitaraṇī in Orissa to the borders of the Āndhra country. Mention may be made of Pliny's reference to three Kalingas in his time, namely the *Gangaridae-Calingae*, the Kalingas who lived conterminously with the *Gangaridae*; the *Macco-Calingae* or either the *Mekala-Kalingas* or *Muka-Kalingas*; and the *Calingae proper*.[88] Pliny thinks that these tribes must have been allied with the Kalingas proper.

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82 For details, vide Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, 67 ff.

83 Or Ptolemy's Ambastai, *Ancient India* p. 161.

84 VIII 21-3.

85 II, 52. 14-15.

86 McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, pp. 311-312.

87 III, 114.4.

88 Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, pp. 159-60; 162-63.

The country of the *Pandoonoi* is identified with the Pāndya country which formed the seat of the Pāṇḍavas of the *Mahābhārata* fame.[89] The Pāṇḍya kingdom comprised the great part of the modern Madura and Tinnevelly districts and also southern Travancore. Strabo[90] mentions an embassy sent to Augustus Caesar about 22 B. C. by a king 'Pandion' possibly a Pāṇḍya of the Tamil country.[91]

The *Pulindas* are located to the north-east of Kaccha, lying between the Khatriaioi in the north and Larike in the south.[92] The *Mahābhārata*[93] places the Pulindas in the Deccan along with the Āndhras, Śavaras, Madrakas etc. The *Matsya* and *Vāyupurāṇas*[94] describe them as dwelling in the Deccan (*Dakṣiṇāpatha-vāsinaḥ*) along with the Vaidarbhas, Daṇḍakas, Vindhyas, etc. The *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* supports this fact.[95] The *Bengali Rāmāyaṇa*[96] informs us that the Pulindas appear both in the south and in the north.[97]

The *Sabārai* of Ptolemy is taken by Cunningham to be the Suari of Pliny.[98] The *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*,[99] the *Mahābhārata*[100] and the *Matsya* and *Vāyupurāṇas*[101] place the Savaras (Ptolemy's Sabarai) in the south. Baiṭhān is Paiṭhān on the north bank of the Godāvarī in the Aurangabad district. Paiṭhān is Prastiṣṭhāna.[102] *Tagara*-Ptolemy places it to the north-east of Baiṭhān.[103] Tagara has been identified with Ter, 12 miles to the north of Osmanabad in Hyderabad state. Fleet has identified it with Ter, 95 miles south-east of Paiṭhān.[104] It has been ientified by some with Devagiri,

[89] *Ibid.*, 121.
[90] XV. 4, 73.
[91] *Cambridge History of India*, I, p. 597.
[92] *Ancient India*, (Ptolemy) p. 157.
[93] XII. 207.42.
[94] 114. 46—48; 45, 126,
[95] 57. 45-48.
[96] Kiṣkindhākāṇḍa XLI, 17; XLIV. 12.
[97] Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, 174-75.
[98] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 173; vide Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, p. 172.
[99] VII. 18.
[100] XII. 207.42.
[101] 144. 46—48; 45. 126.
[102] *Ancient India*, (Ptolemy) p. 177.
[103] *Ibid.*, p. 177.
[104] *JRAS.*, 1901, 537 ff.

by others with Junnar, and by R. G. Bhandarkar with Dharur in Hyderabad. Yule places it at Kulbarga lying to the south-east of Paiṭhān at a distance of about 150 miles.[105] *Hippokoura* lay inland and was the capital of the southern parts of Ariakes.[106] *Banaouasei* is Vanavāsī. It is identical with the modern Vanavāsī situated on the upper Varadā, a tributary of the Tungabhadra.[107] The Vanavāsakas were doubtless the people of the kingdom of Vanavāsī, a well-known region of the south in north Kanara.[108]

Modoura is now called Madura or Madurai on the banks of the river Vaigai, the capital of the south Pāṇḍyas.[109] *Malaṅga* was near Elur, a place some distance inland about halfway between the Krisṇā and the Godāvarī.[110] *Pityndra* was the capital of *Maisolia* which was probably Dhanakaṭaka now Dharaṇīkoṭa, about 20 miles above Bejwada on the Krisṇā.[111] *Taprobane*[112] is Tāmraparṇī. The country of Tāmraparṇī is placed below Pāṇḍya or Drāviḍa, and the mount Vaidūryaka is mentioned as its rocky landmark. The *Agastyāśrama* or the hermitage of the sage Agastya, and the Gokarṇatīrtha are located here.[113] *Tosalei* is Tosali.[114] Tosali or Tosala was the name of a country as well as of a city in south India. In the *Purāṇas* Tosala is always associated with Dakṣiṇa-Tosala and distinguished from Kalinga. According to Ptolemy *Karoura* was ruled by Kerobothros (Keralaputra).[115] Keralaputra is undoubtedly the Kerala or Chera country. The

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105 Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, p. 191.

106 *Ancient India* (Ptolemy) p. 179. 107 *Ibid.*, p. 179.

108 Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, p. 382.

109 *Ancient India* (Ptolemy) p. 184

110 McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, p. 186.

111 *Ibid.*, p. 187. 112 *Ibid.*, p. 251.

113 Vide my *Indological Studies*, Pt. I, p. 60 ; Law, *Early Indian Monasteries*, Bangalore, p. 6.

114 *Ancient India* (Ptolemy) p. 230.

115 *Ibid.*, p. 180.

Keralas were one of the earliest tribes of south India. Keralaputra is the country south of Kūpaka extending down to Kanneti in central Travancore (Karunagapalli Taluk). The Kerala country comprised Travancore, Cochin and the Malabar district. Its capital was originally Vañji (now Tirukarur on the Periyar river near Cochin) but later Tiruvañjikalam near the mouth of the Periyar.[116]

Ptolemy mentions Nāsika,[117] famous for its caves (*Paṇḍuleṇas*), situated about 300 ft. above road level.

Kanagora is Kānyakubja or modern Kanauj, situated on the bank of the Kāli-nadī, a branch of the Ganges, in the modern district of Farrakabad.[118] It was also known as Gādhipura, Kuśasthala and Mahadaya.[119] It was the birth place of Viśvāmitra.[120] It was visited by Hiuen Tsang who saw 100 Buddhist establishments.[121]

Abiria was the country of the Ābhiras lying to the east of the Indus, above the insular porton formed by its bifurcation. Abiria is Ophir.[122] According to the *Mahābhārata*[123] the Ābhīras were located in the western division of India. The Epic evidence is supported by that of the author of the *Periplus of the Erythraean sea*, a Greek record of commercial geography of the 1st century B. C. as well as by the Greek geographer Ptolemy who flourished in the middle of the 2nd century A.D. Later epigraphic evidence places them in the west but the *Purāṇas* seem to locate them in the north. A more definite location of them is provided by a śloka in the *Mahābhārata* which places them in west Rajputana

[116] Law, *Indological Studies*, Pt. I, 58-59.
[117] *Ancient India*, p. 156.
[118] *Ibid.*, p. 134.
[119] *Abhidhāna-Rājendra*, IV. 39-40.
[120] *Rāmāyaṇa*, Bālakāṇḍa.
[121] Vide B. C. Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, pp. 93-94.
[122] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, pp. 136, 139-40.
[123] *Sabhāparva*, Ch. 51.

Syrastrene represents the Sanskrit Surāṣṭra.[124] It is modern Surat in Kathiawar on the gulf of Kutch. Syrastrene extended from the mouth of the Indus to the gulf of Cutch.[125] The *Rāmāyaṇa* refers to Surāṣṭra.[126] According to the *Padmapurāṇa*[127] Surāṣṭra is in Gurjara. It is also mentioned in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* as a country.[128] Rājaśekhara assigns Surāṣṭra to the western division along with Bhrigukaccha, Ānartta, Arbuda, Daśeraka and other countries.[129] At the time of the *Mahābhārata* Surāṣṭra was ruled by the Yādavas. It appears from Kauṭilya's *Artha-Śāstra*[130] Surāṣṭra had a *saṃgha* form of Government. According to Strabo[131] the conquests of the Bactrian Greeks in India were achieved partly by Menander and partly by Demetrios, son of Euthydemos.[132]

Sousikana is a corrupt reading for Musikana, the royal city of Musikanos. Cunningham identifies this city with Alor which was for many ages the capital of upper Sindh.[133] The Mūṣikas (Mūṣakas) were a southern offshoot of the Punjab tribe known to Alexander's historians as the Mousikanos.[134] Pargiter is wrong in suggesting that they were probably settled on the banks of the river Musi on which stands modern Hyderabad.[135] A people called Mauṣikāra

[124] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 140.

[125] Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, p. 348.

[126] Ādikāṇḍa, Ch. XII; Ayodhyākāṇḍa, X and Kiṣkindhākāṇḍa, XLI; Cf. *Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya*, I. I. I. p. 31.

[127] 190.2.

[128] I. 10. 34; X. 27. 69; VI. 14. 10.

[129] *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, Gaekwaḍ Oriental Series, pp. 93-94.

[130] p. 378.

[131] Book XI, Sec. XI. 1; H & F, Vol. II, pp. 252-53.

[132] For a detailed study please refer to my *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, 297 ff and my *Tribes in Ancient India*, pp. 347-48.

[133] *Ancient Geography*, 295; McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, pp. 144-45.

[134] Cf. *C. H. I.*, I, 377.

[135] *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, 366.

occurs in Patanjali's *Mahābhāṣya*,[136] which appears to have some connection with the Mūṣikas. The Hāthigumphā inscription of king Khāravela of Kalinga refers to Mūṣikanagara which may have some connection with them.

Binagara is identified with Alor.[137] The *Periplus* points out that it lay in the interior above Barbarikon emporium mentioned in the *Periplus of the Erythraean sea*.[138] Barbarikon and Patala formed the two towns of the islands of the Indus delta.

Kouba is generally taken to be Goa or Gava, the capital of the Portuguese possessions in India.[139]

Larike or Lārdeśa was the early name for the territory of Gujarat and the northern Konkan.[140]

Barygaza, modern Broach, a large city, is situated about 30 miles from the sea on the northern side of the river Narmadā.[141] Bharukaccha or Bhrigukaccha or Bhirukaccha is identical with modern Broach or Bharoch. Modern Broach is Kathiāwād. In Ptolemy's Barygaza we have a Greek corruption of Bhrgukṣetra.[142] It was a sea port town. It was known as Po-lu-ka-Che-p'o at the time of Hiuen Tsang.[143]

Palimbothra[144] was the greatest city in India in the dominions of the Prasians, where the rivers Erannoboas and

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136 IV. I. 4.

137 Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 152.

138 Prob. *circa* 80 A. D.

139 Ptolemy, *Ancient India*, p. 181.

140 *Ibid.*, p. 153.

141 *Ibid.*, p. 153.

142 Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, pp. 153-54.

143 For further details vide Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, pp. 277 ff.

144 It was known to the Chinese pilgrims as *Pa-lin-tou*. It was the later capital of Magadha. It is modern Patna, the capital of Behar. It was originally a Magadhan village known as Pāṭaligrāma which lay opposite to Koṭigrāma on the other side of the Ganges. The fortification of Pāṭaligrāma was undertaken by two Magadhan ministers, Sunīdha and Vassakāra (*Dīgha*, II, 86 ff.; *Sumangalavilāsinī*, II, 540). It led to the foundation of the city of Pāṭaliputra (Palibothra or Palimbothra). King Ajātaśatru of Magadha was the real founder of this city. Pāṭali-

the Ganges met together. The Ganges was the greatest of all Indian rivers, and the Erannoboas[145] was perhaps the third largest of the Indian rivers. Megasthenes points out that the inhabited part of Palimbothra extended on either side to an extreme length of eighty stadia and that its breadth was fifteen stadia[146] and that a ditch encompassed it all round, which was six hundred feet in breadth and thirty cubits in depth. The wall was crowned with five hundred and seventy towers and had sixty four gates.[147] According to Megasthenes Herākles was the founder of this city. He fortified it with trenches of notable dimensions which were filled with water introduced from the river.[148] There was a royal route from the north-western frontier to Pāṭaliputra.[149]

Dr. Spooner, the excavator of the ancient city of Pāṭaliputra at Kumrahar, opines that the pillared hall of the Maurya pālace is strictly reminiscent of the Persian throne-room even in details and that its surroundings showed a parallelism to the Achaemenian side.[150] The pedestals at Pāṭaliputrà must have been of Persepolitan style. One big column discovered at Pāṭaliputra showing a mason's mark of peculiar type seems to be extremely

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putra was built near the confluence of the great rivers of Mid-India, the Ganges, the Son and the Gandak, but now the river Son has receded some distance away from it. This city was protected by a moat 600 ft. broad, and 30 cubits in depth. It was the capital of later Śisunāgas, the Nandas and also the great Maurya Emperors Chandragupta and Aśoka but it ceased to be the ordinary residence of the Gupta sovereigns after the completion of the conquests made by Samudragupta. For further details, vide Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, Ch. XLVI; Law, *The Magadhas in Ancient India*, *JRAS. Publication*, No. 24; Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, pp. 249ff.; *ASI Annual Report*, 1912—13, Pt. I.

145 The Yamunotri, which is eight miles from Kursoli, is identical with the Greek Erannoboas (Hiraṇyavāha or Hraṇyavāhu).

146 McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, p. 65.

147 *Ibid.*, p. 67.

148 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

149 Megasthenes, Frag. IV. 3.

150 *JRAS*. 1915, p. 69.

similar to a mason's mark familiar at Persepolis. The Columns of Darius are 10 Persian cubits apart and the Maurya columns are 10 Indian cubits apart. The Mauryan hall discovered at Pāṭaliputra and the hall of the Achaemenian type at Persepolis are almost similar. The Mauryan Porch corresponds with the porch at Persepolis on the northern side of the throne room.[151]

As regards the relation between India and Persia it may be pointed out that the earliest foreign notice of India is in the inscription of the Persian King Darius of Persepolis and Naksh-i-Rustam dated *circa* 515 B.C. Herodotus gives us valuable information as to the relation between India and Persia which supplements the less detailed statements of the inscriptions. The buildings of Persepolis commenced with Darius I. In 316 B. C. Persepolis built by Darius, situated 40 miles north-east at Siraj, not far from the place where the Pulwar river flowed into the Cyrus, was still the capital of Persia as a province of the Macedonan Empire. The city gradually declined but the ruins of Achæmenidæ bear testimony to its ancient glory. The gold coverings at Persepolis were like the gold domes of the Shi'ite Mashhads of Iran and Iraq. The mighty platform at Persepolis, which rises 40 ft. above the plain, forms three sides of a parallelogram. The splendid porch of the Palace built by Xerxes was the chief glory of Persepolis. The Hall of Xerxes, the palace of Darius, the magnificent hall of hundred columns are the finest examples of Persian architecture. It is well-worth quoting here the remarks of Sir Percy Sykes : "Persia borrowed and borrowed truly from the great nations with which she was brought into contact, from Babylon, Assyria, Egypt and Hellas but she did not copy slavishly. Even the Assyrian colossi take

151 *Annual Reports of the Archaeological Survey of India*, 1912-13, (1915); 1926-27 (1930); *Progress Report of the ASI*, Eastern Circle, 1912-13; 1913-14; 1915-16; Law, *Indological Studies*, Pt. III, Ch. IX.

a secondary place in the excellent palaces built by the architects of the Achæmenian monarchs. . . . . Even in its ruins the throne of Jamshid challenges our wonder and admiration." The wealth of architecture of Persepolis lies in the magnificence of the royal palace and sepulchres. It is conspicuous by the absence of any temple or religious sanctuary except perhaps the five altars near the royal tombs.

Tamalites represents the sanskrit Tāmralipti, the modern Tamluk, a town lying in a low and damp situation on the bay of the river Rūpnārāyaṇa, 12 miles above its junction with the Hughli mouth of the Ganges.[152]

According to Ptolemy *Barakoura* was Rāmu, a town lying 68 miles south south-east of Chittagong.[153] *Sounagoura* or Suvarṇanagara, now Sonargaon, is situated about 12 miles near the right bank of the lower Brahmaputra.[154]

Ozene is, Ujjayinī.[155] Ujjayinī was the capital of the Avantī kingdom or western Malwa situated on the river Śiprā, a tributary of the Cambal. It is modern Ujjain in Gwalior in Central India. According to Hiuen Tsang, it was about 6000 li in circuit. The produce and manners of the people were like those of Surāṣṭra (modern Surat). The population was dense[156] Ujjayinī is called by the Greeks as Ozene wherefrom every commodity for local consumption or export to other parts of India was brought to Barygaza (Modern Broach).[157] It was one of the seven sacred places of the Hindus, and astronomers recovered their first meridian of longitude from this place. The dramas of the celebrated poet Kalidāsa were performed on the occasion of the spring festival before the viceregal court of Ujjayinī

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[152] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, pp. 169, 170.
[153] Ptolemy's, *Ancient India*, p. 195.
[154] *Ibid.*, p. 228. [155] *Ibid.*, p. 154.
[156] Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, II. pp. 250-51.
[157] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, p. 155.

(C. 400 A.D.).[158] Ptolemy places Minagara (Minnagar) about 2 degrees to the south-west of Ozene.[159] Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar identifies it with Mandasore.

The Greek writer Megasthenes says that India possessed many large and navigable rivers which had their origin in mountains. Like Megasthenes and the Epic and Pauranic writers, the Greek astronomer and geographer Ptolemy groups the rivers of India according to the mountains and hill ranges out of which they have emanated. The position of mountains as given by him is hopelessly incorrect but one can get some clue to their identification when he describes the river issuing from each mountain. In fact he seems to have before him some old traditional list of Indian rivers which he made use of in his geography.

Mountains

Ptolemy enumerates the following mountain ranges of India: the Apokopa, Sardonyx, Quindion, Bettigo, Adeisathron, Ouxenton, Oroudian, Bepyrrhos, Maiandros, Damassa or Dobassa and Semanthinos. Of these the Apokopa (or the punishment of the gods) has been identified with the Aravalli mountain.[160] Quindion has been identified with the Vindhya, Bettigo with Podigei, the Tamil name of Malaya, Quxenton with the Ṛkṣavant, Adeisathron with the Sahyādri, and the Oroudian[161] with the Vaidūrya mountain.[162]

Ptolemy describes the Ṛkṣavant as the source of the Toundis, the Dosaran and the Adamas, and the Quindon as that of the Namadas and the Nanagouna. The Dosaran has been identified with the Daśārṇā of the *Purāṇas* and the Namdas and the Nanagouna with the Narmadā and the

[158] *Ibid.*, p. 154; Rapson, *Ancient India*, p. 175.
[159] *Ibid.*, p. 156.
[160] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, 1927 Ed., p. 355.
[161] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, 1927, pp. 75—81.
[162] *Ibid.* p. 356.

Tāptī respectively. According to Ptolemy the Dosaran is said to have issued from the Ṛkṣa. By the Ṛkṣavant he meant the Central region of the modern Vindhya range, north of the Narmadā, while the Quindon stands for only that portion of the Vindhya from where rise the Narmadā and the Tāptī.[163] The Vindhyapādaparvata is the mountain Sardonyx of Ptolemy. It may be identified with the Satpura range which is the source of the Tāpti.

According to Megasthenes and Arrian the Arbuda or the mount Abu is identical with the Capitalia, which, attaining an elevation of 6,500 ft., rises far above any other summit of the Aravalli range.[164] The Capitalia is the loftiest of the Indian mountains. The Mount Caucasus is called the Paropamisos.[165] The Parapamisos or the Paropamisos denotes the great mountain range now called the Hindukush. The mount Parosh or Aparasin of the *Zendavesta* corresponds with the Paropamisos of the Greeks. According to Pliny, the Skythians called the Mount Caucasus, Graucasis, a word representing the Indian name of the Paropamisos.[166] The Imaos is the Himalaya mountain. It is the source of the Ganges and the Indus as well as the Koa and the Swat rivers. The mount Maleus of the Greeks (Malla-parvata) may be identified with the Pareshnath hill in Choto Nagpur. The Mandāra hill known to Megasthenes and Arrian as Mallus in the Banka sub-division of the Bhagalpur District, is a mountain of Eastern India, worthy of notice.

Rivers

According to Megasthenes there were fifty-eight navigable Indian rivers. The *Ṛgveda*[167] contains a list of 19 rivers. The *Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa*[168] mentions some Indian rivers. All these rivers have their origin in the Himalayan region and

[163] *Law, Geographical Essays*, p. 109.
[164] McCrindle, *Ancient India*, p. 147.
[165] *Ibid.*, p. 143
[166] *Ibid.*, p. 186 f. n.
[167] X, 75.4.
[168] LVII, 30.

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they belong to northern India. The sacred rivers of Buddhist Midland are enumerated in the *Majjhima Nikāya* and the *Visuddhimagga*.[169] The *Milinda Pañho*,[170] an important extra canonical Pali work, speaks of 500 rivers of which ten are said to have been important, namely, *Gangā*, *Yamunā*, *Aciravatī*, *Sarabhū*, *Mahi*, *Sindhu*, *Sarasvatī*, *Vetravatī*, *Vitamsā* and *Candrabhāgā*. Megasthenes says that the Himalayan rivers of northern India belong to two main river groups or systems, namely, the Indus and the Ganges, the former being connected with northern and north-western division, and the latter with the Madhyadeśa (Midland). The fact is that the Indian rivers belong to two classes, namely, those which belong to distinct groups or systems and those which flow independently either to disappear in a desert or to empty themselves into a sea.

The accounts of some writers about the Indians as far as the Hyphasis (modern Beas or Vipāśā) are not unreliable in their description of India because they are connected with the expedition of Alexander. Arrian says that no real knowledge of the country can be had beyond that limit.[171]

The rivers of India, according to Megasthenes, stretch along the northern frontier, traverse the level country, and after uniting with each other fall into the Ganges.[172]

Arrian says that the rivers of India breed crocodiles like the Nile in Ethiopia and Egypt. Some of the Indian rivers have fish and monstrous creatures such as are found in the Nile except the hippopotamus. Onesikritos asserts that the Indian rivers breed hippopotamus also.[173] They are certainly the largest to be found in all Asia. The mightiest

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[169] *Majjhima*, I, 39; *Visuddhimagga*, P. T. S. p. 10.

[170] p. 114.

[171] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, p. 202.

[172] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[173] *Ibid.*, p. 203.

rivers are the Inddus an the Ganges. In the opinions of the classical writers the river Indus is rivalled by no other river than the Ganges. According to Megasthenes the Ganges is much larger than the Indus. A contradictory statement appears in McCrindle's *Ancient India*[174] that the Indus is almost of the same size as the Ganges. The Indus is perhaps the largest of all rivers in the world after the Nile.[175]

Megasthenes says that the rain fell in India during summer especially on the mountains called the Parapamisos[176] (the different form is Paropamisos, now known as the central Hindukush), the Emodos[177] and the range of Imaos (Himālayas). The rain also fell on the plains of India so that much of the country was submerged like Egypt. The river Nile was subject to similar inundation. The rain fell on the Ethiopia mountain during summer. The Nile swollen with the rains overflowed its banks and inundated Egypt.[178]

It should be borne in mind that many Indian rivers are sacred in the eye of the people. Numerous religious shrines and hermitages adorn their banks. Many of them still bear the living associations of the history and civilisation of the country. The *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa*[179] points out that all the rivers are sacred, all flow towards the ocean, all are mothers of the world, they are well-known to cleanse from all sins.

The Indus (Sindhu) is the greatest known river of the northern India after which the Indus group is named. In

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[174] p. 33. [175] McCrindle, *Ancient India*, p. 29.

[176] *Ibid*., 46; Cf. Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, 1927, p. 34

[177] The part of the Himalayan range extending along Nepal and Bhutan and onwards towards the ocean is meant by the Emodus. The other forms are Emoda, Emodon and Hemodes (McCrindle, *Ancient India*, p. 132 f.n.).

[178] McCrindle, *Ancient India*, pp. 202-203.

[179] LVII, 31

other words it lent its name to the country through which it flowed.[180] It speeded over the precipitous ridges of the earth and was the lord and leader of the moving floods. The Sindhu is also known by the name of Sambheda and Sangama both meaning the confluent. It is counted among the seven streams of the *Divyagaṅgā* or the celestial Gaṅgā. The Indus at the start is a united flow of two streams, one flowing north-west from the north-west side of the Kailās-parvata and the other in a north-westerly and then in a south-westerly direction from a lake situated to the north-east of the Kailās. From a certain point it follows a slightly serpentine and south-westerly course till it falls into the Arabian sea, forming two well-known deltas at its mouth below Karachi, the larger one called Prasiane by Arrian and the smaller one Patale[181] (Sk. *Prasthala*). It finds its way through the western Himalayan range midway between Gilgit above and the Nagnaparvata below.[182]

The Sindhu group as known to Pliny was formed by the Indus and 19 other rivers of which the most famous were the Hydaspes (Jhelum) with its four tributaries, the Cantabra fed by three tributaries, the Acesines (Chenab) and Hypasis (Beas), both of which were navigable. The Sindhu now known as the Indus skirted the frontiers of the Prasii.[183] It was generally regarded as the western and north-western boundary of India, though some writers viewed the river Kophes (Kabul) as its farthest limit.[184] It was nowhere broader than 50 stadia[185] or deeper than 15 paces. Its navigable stream turned westwards as if follow-

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[180] Cf. Beal, The Buddhist records of the western world, I, p. 69.

[181] Patala was the capital of Patalene which was a delta at the mouth of the Indus (Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, 1927, p. 139).

[182] Law, *Rivers of India*, p. 12.

[183] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*. p. 143.

[184] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

[185] One *Stadium* 600 Greek ft. or 606 ¾ English ft.

ing more or less the course of the Sun and then falling into the ocean.[186] The Sindhu (the Indus) was known to Arrian as the great river which like the Ganges, its only rival, spread out in many places into lakes with the result that where the country happened to be flat, its shores appeared far apart.

The classical writers differ as to the number of the tributaries of the Indus, it being 15 according to Arrian and 19 according to Pliny.[187] The Ganges had 19 tributaries.[188] The main tributaries of the Indus are said to be the Hydraotes (Rāvī), the Akesines (Chenab), the Hypasis (Beas), the Hydaspes (Jhelum), the Kophen (Kabul river), the Parenos (modern Burindu), the Saparnos (Abbasin) and Soanos (Svan).[189] The Tautapos is probably the lower part of the Sutlej (Śatadru). It is a trans-Himalayan river as its basin lies north of the Himalaya.[190] The Hydraotes which is identical with the Rāvī or the Irāvatī or the Airāvatī of the *Purāṇas*, flowing from the dominions of the Kambistholi (Kapisthala), fell into the Akesines (modern Chenab),[191] after receiving the Hyphasis (as known to Arrian and Diadoros), Hypasis (as known to Pliny and Curtius), Hypanis (as known to Strabo), and Bibasis of other classical writers (Sk. Vipāśā) in its passage through the country of the Astrybai as well as the Saranges from the Kekians (Kekaya country in the northern Punjab),[192] and the Neudros from the country

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[186] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, p. 144.

[187] *Ibid.*, pp. 45 & 143.

[188] *Ibid.*, p. 137.

[189] *Ibid.*, pp. 196—99 f. n.

[190] Pargiter, *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa*, Tr. p. 291 note.

[191] Pliny's Acesines, Vedic *Asiknī*, *Candrabhāgā* of the *Purāṇas* and the Pali *Apadāna*. Alexander thought the river Akesines to be the Nile on his first visit to this river (Strabo, XV. c. 696).

[192] The territory of the Kekayas lay beyond the river Vipāśā (Beas) and extended upto the borders of the ancient Gandhāra kingdom according to the *Rāmāyaṇa* (II, 68, 19—22; VII. Chaps. 113-114). For further details, Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, Chap. XIV.

of the Attakenoi (Aṣṭagaṇas, Aśvakas).[193] This river falls into the Sutlej or the Zaradros the most easterly of the five rivers.[194] The Hydaspes (the Bidaspes of Ptolemy. Sk. Vitastā, modern Bidastā, Behut, Jhelum) is the river which rising from the country of the Oxydrakai (Kṣudrakas) and bringing with it the Sinaros received in the dominions of the Arispai, falls into the Akesines (Chenab).[195] The Candrabhāgā, one of the sanskrit names of the Chenab (Akesines) is identified with the Sandabal according to Ptolemy.[196] The Akesines joined the Indus in the country of the Malloi.[197]

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[193] McCrindle, *Ancent India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, p. 196.

[194] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 91.

[195] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, p. 196.

[196] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 89.

[197] The Malloi or the Mālavas occupied the country below the confluence of the Hydaspes (Jhelum) and the Akesines (Chenab), that is, the country comprising the Jhang district and a portion of the Montgomery district (*JRAS.*, 1903, p. 631). According to McCrindle they occupied a greater extent of territory comprising the modern Doab of the Akesines and the Hydraotes (Chenab and Ravi) and extending to the confluence of the Indus and the Akesines, identical with the modern Multan district and a portion of Montgomery (McCrindle, *Invasion of India*, App. Note p. 357). Some locate them in the valley of the lower Hydraotes (Ravi) on the both banks of the river (Raichaudhuri, *Political History of Ancient India*, 4th Ed., p. 202). According to Arrian the Malloi agreed to combine with the Oxydrakai against Alexander but the conqueror had advanced so suddenly that their design was thwarted and they did not get any opportunity to unite against the common enemy (McCrindle, *Invasion of India*, pp. 150, 236 f. n. 1). The Malloi were certainly taken by surprise by Alexander's army and suffered a defeat which was not final. More than once the Malloi offered determined opposition from their fortified cities, which fell one by one to the sword of Alexander and his general Perdikas. The city-walls of the Malloi were razed to the ground and the citadel captured. But in the course of the heavy fighting Alexander was seriously wounded. He took revenge on the enemy by ordering all the inhabitants of the city including women and children to be killed. This city has been wrongly assigned by Diodoros and Curtius to the Oxydrakai. (*Ibid.*, p. 351, App. Note Q; Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, Ch. VIII). Both Arrian and Plutarch definitely state that it belonged to the Malloi and not to the Oxydrakai. Even after this defeat and massacre the Malloi do not seem to have been completely annihilated, for Arrian tells us that the leading men from the Malloi and Oxydrakai came to Alexander to discuss the terms of a treaty which was eventually concluded.

Augmented by its confluents the Akesines succeeded in imposing its name on the combined waters and retained it till it united with the Indus.

The Akesines (modern Chenab) was greater than the Ister and the Nile, where it joined the Indus after receiving its tributaries, the Hydaspes (modern Jhelum) and the Hydraotes (modern Rāvī).[198] The river Chenab or the Candrabhāgā belongs to the Punjab. It is the Ṛgvedic Asikṇī identical with the Greek Akesines. Sometimes the united streams of the Jhelum and the Chenab are known by the single name of Candrabhāgā, the Sandabaga or Sandabal of Ptolemy. The Chenab appears to flow just above Kishtwar as a confluence of two hill streams. Its course is southerly from Kishtwar to Rishtwar. It flows past Jammu wherefrom it flows in a south westerly direction forming a doab between it and the Jhelum (Vitastā).

The Akesines (Chenab) was crossed by Alexander near the foot of the hills. The passage of the river was difficult by reason of the rapid current of the flooded stream and of the large rocks with which the channel was bestrewn and on which many boats were wrecked.[199] Arrian in his *Anabasis*[200] says that these particulars clearly prove that the Akesines was crossed near the foot of the hills, some 25 or 30 miles above Wazirabad. Arrian further says[201] that the fleet when descending the Hydaspes (Jhelum) from Nikaia, the town of the battlefield, reached the capital of Sophytes, the king of the Salt Range on the 3rd day. According to Cunningham the capital of Sophytes was at Ahmedabad. The battle of the Hydaspes (the Jhelum or the Behut river

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[198] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, p. 190.

[199] Smith, *Early History of India*, 4th Ed., p. 77.

[200] v. 20.

[201] *Anabasis*, VI, 2.4.

according to Ptolemy) was fought after the summer solstice, that is to say, later than 21st June.[202]

The Bidaspes or Bedasta (Sk. Vitastā, Pali Vitaṃsā)[203] or the modern Jhelum river, the most western of the five rivers according to Ptolemy, drains the whole of the Kashmere valley and empties into the Chenab (Akesines). It was known to the Ṛgvedic Āryans by the name of Vitastā.[204] This river is known in Kāśmir under different local names.[205] On the left bank of this river Alexander defeated Poros and built the city of Nikaia in commemoration of his victory.[206]

The Rāvī or the Irāvatī known to the Greeks as the Hydraotis, Hyarotis, Adris or Rhonadis, appears first to our view at the southwest corner of Chamba in Kashmere as the confluence of the two streams. From Chamba it flows past Lahore and meets the Chenab or the united flow of the Vitastā and the Candrabhāgā between Ahmadpur and Saraisidhu.[207]

Ptolemy says that Arrian errs in assigning three tributaries to the Hydraotes e.g., the Hyphasis, the Saranges and the Neudros. We know it to be incorrect as the Hyphasis joins the Akesines below the junction of the Hydraotes.[208]

The river Beas (Sanskrit Vipāśā) is identified with the Vipāsis or Hypasis of Pliny or the Hyphasis of Arrian and Diadoros or the Hypanis of Strabo. It is a tributary of the Śatadru or the Sutlej. The Śatadru is the Zaradros of Ptolemy and the Hesydrus of Pliny. The *Mahābhārata*

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[202] *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 90.

[203] *Ṛigveda*, X, 75, 5; *Nirukta*, IX, 26; *Bhāgavatapurāna*, V, 19, 18.

[204] X. 75.

[205] Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, p. 135.

[206] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, p. 89.

[207] Law, *Rivers of India*, p. 13.

[208] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, p. 90.

refers to the origin of the river Vipāśā (modern Beas). Vaśiṣṭha, broken in heart due to the death of his sons at the hands of Viśvāmitra, wanted to commit suicide. He therefore threw himself into the river by tieing his hands and feet. But he was saved by the strong current of the river which threw him on its banks. According to the *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa*[209] the river Vipāśā issued from the Himalayas. Some hold that this river rises in the Pir Panjal range at the Bhotang Pass near the source of the Ravi. It is fed by a number of glaciers. From Chamba it flows in southwesterly direction to meet the Śatadru (modern Sutlej). Pargiter says, "In ancient times the Śatadru did not probably join the Beas, as it does now, but pursued an independent course to the confines of Sindh."[210] The river Sutlej flowed south-west from where it issued from the Himalayas into the Naiwal channel and then along the dry bed of the Ghaggar at a distance of 30 to 50 miles south of and more or less parallel to its present course.[211]

The Kophen or Kophes which is an affluent of the Indus is the modern Kabul river called as such by Pliny. It is also known as the Kophes of Arrian and Kophen of Pliny. The Kubhā of the Ṛgveda[212] is one of its names. It is apparently the same river as the Kuhu of the *Purāṇas*. It may be identical with the Koa of Ptolemy, which is described to have its source in the Imaos or the Himālaya (Himavat).[213] Ptolemy makes the river Koa join the Indus. Koa is no doubt a curtailed form. The Kubhā cuts a valley through the Sulaiman range. It flows into the Indus a little above Attock (Sk. *Hāṭaka*), receives at Prang a joint flow of its two tributaries called the Svāt[214] and Gaurī (Garroia of

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[209] LVII. 16—18.

[210] *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa*, p. 291 notes; *JASB.*, 1886, Pt. II, p. 332.

[211] *Pargiter*, *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa*, Tr., p. 291 note. [212] X. 75, 6.

[213] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 81.

[214] Soastos of Arrian, Sk. *Suvāstu*, *Mahābhārata*, Bhīṣmaparva, IX.

Arrian), identified with modern Panjkora, a tributary of the Svāt. The *Ṛgveda*[215] mentions the river Suvāstu. The *Vāyu and Kūrma Purāṇas*[216] refer to this river. The Gauraios of the Greeks united with the river Svāt formed the Landoi, an affluent of the Kabul river. According to Arrian Soastos and Gauraios are different rivers. Some have identified the river Suvāstu with the Subhavastu of Hiuen Tsang.[217]

The Kophen fell into the Indus having risen in Peukelaotis[218] and brought with it the Malamantos, (Kameh, Khonar, the largest of the tributaries of the Kabul river, identified by some with Arrian's Choes), the Soastos (Choaspes, Sk. *Suvāstu*, modern Suvad, Svat) and the Garroia (Sk. Gaurī, Garaea). According to Ptolemy the Souastene designates the basin of the Souastos (Svāt river).[219] The Parenos and Suparnos emptied themselves into the Indus as did also the Soanos (modern Svan), coming without a tributary, from the hilly country of the Abissareans (Sk. Abhisāras). According to Megasthenes most of these rivers are navigable.[220] Between the Khoaspes (Kunar) and the Indus and along the Kabul river (Kophes or Kophen) there existed the country of the Gandarai according to Strabo.[221]

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[215] Viii. 19, 37; Cf. *Nirukta*, IV. 15. [216] XLV, 95; XLVII. 27.

[217] *JASB.*, 1839, p.317 and 1840, p. 474.

[218] Peukelaotis by Arrian and Peukalei by Dionysius Periegetes may be identified with Puṣkalāvatī which was the capital of an Indian King named Hastī (GK. Astes) at the time of Alexander's Invasion (326 B. C.). It is represented by modern Prang and Charsadda, 17 miles north-east of Peshwar on the Svāt river (Schoff, *The Periplus of Erythraean Sea*, pp. 183-84). Arrian says that the Kabul river (Kophen) falls into the Indus in the land called Peukelaotis. The people of the surrounding region are referred to some times as the Astakenoi by classical historians. The reigning King at the time of the Alexander's invasion was Astes who was defeated and killed by Alexander's general Hephaestian (Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, p. 395).

[219] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, 1927, p. 106.

[220] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, pp. 196-97.

[221] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 115.

According to Megasthenes the Ganges at its source is 30 *stadia* broad flowing from north to south and emptying its waters into the ocean forming the eastern boundary of the Gangaridai.[222] Arrian observes that according to Megasthenes the Ganges is much larger than the Indus. Ptolemy's description of the Ganges is very meagre as compared with his description of the Indus. He mentions three of its affluents while Arrian[223] enumerates no fewer than 17 and Pliny 19.[224] In the case of the Ganges the number of its tributaries was known to Megasthenes as nineteen.[225] The Ganges, according to Arrian, had a breadth of 100 *stadia*, where narrowest, while in many places it spread out into lakes so that when the country happened to be flat and destitute of elevation, the opposite shores could not be seen from each other. The Indus presented similar characteristics[226].

Ptolemy refers to the mountainous region where the rivers Vipāśā (Beas), Śatadru (Sutlej), Yamunā (Jumna) and Gaṅgā (Ganges) have their sources. He also mentions the Śailodā river upon which the Kulindas[227] lived between Meru and Mandāra.[228] Six important cities existed to the east of the Ganges: Boraita, Korygaza, Kondota, Kelydna, Aganagora and Talarga.[229] Korygaza or Sory-

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[222] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, p. 32.

[223] McCrindle, *Ancient India*, p. 45. [224] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[225] *Ibid.*, p. 137. [226] *Ibid.*, p. 193—95.

[227] The country of the Kulindas called by Ptolemy as Kulindrine is identified by Cunningham with the kingdom of Jālandhara (Jullundar) but this is not accepted by St. Martin (*CAGI.*, p. 157). The Kulindas are located in the west Punjab along with the Mālavas, Yaudheyas, Ārjunāyanas, Udumbaras, Kulūtas and Uttamabhadras. They were probably identical with the Kunindas, a tribe known from coins (*CHI.*, I, pp. 528—29).

[228] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, p. 110; Vide also Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, Ch. XX.

[229] *Ibid.*, pp. 215—16.

gaza seems to have been situated on the Gaṇḍakī, perhaps between the Gaṇḍakī and the lower Sarayū. Kondota seems to be connected with the Gaṇḍakī[230]. Kelydna may be safely assumed to be a bad transcription into Greek of the Sanskrit Kālinadī (Kālindī).[231] Aganagora may be identified with Aghadip (Agradvīpa) on the eastern bank of the Ganges, a little below Katwa.[232]

Pliny says that according to some the Ganges rises from uncertain sources like the Nile and inundates the countries lying along its course. Some are of opinion that the Ganges rises on the Skythian mountains and has 19 tributaries. Others assert that it issues forth at once from its fountain and after tumbling down a steep and rocky channel is received immediately on reaching the level plains into a lake, wherefrom it flows out with a gentle current, being at the narrowest 8 miles and on the average 100 *stadia* in breadth and never of less depth than 100 ft. in the final part of its course which is through the country of the Gangarides[233] a very powerful people in the lower Gangetic valley.

Pliny mentions an island in the Ganges inhabited by the Macco-Kalingae and Modokalinga.[234] The Ganges was the boundary of the tribes known as the Calingae and the Mandei and the Malli.[235] The Ganges received as tributaries the rivers Kainas,[236] Erannoboas, and Kossoanos, which were all navigable. Besides it received the rivers Sonos, Sittokatis, and Solomatis, which were also navigable and also the Kondochates, the Sambos, the Magon, the Agoranis and the Omalis. The two added by Pliny are the Prinas and Jomanes.[237] The rivers Kommenases,

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[230] *Ibid.*, p. 230. [231] *Ibid.*, p. 215.
[232] *Ibid.*, pp. 215—16; Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, Ch. XXII.
[233] McCrindle, *Ancient India*, p. 137.
[234] *Ibid.*, p. 134. [235] *Ibid.*, p. 136. [236] *Ibid.*, p. 62.
[237] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, 1927, p. 97.

Kakouthis and Andomatis fell into the Ganges. The Amystis flowing past the city named Katadupa (Kāṭadvīpa, modern Katwa) and the Oxymagis from the dominion of a tribe called the Pazalai and the Errenysis from an Indian tribe called the Mathai united with the Ganges. Regarding these streams none of them was inferior to the Maiandros even at the navigable part of its course.[238]

The Kainas has been identified with the Kan or Kane or Kena which is only indirectly a tributary of the Ganges as it falls into the Jumna.[239] The Erannaboas represents the Sanskrit Hiraṇyavāha or Hiraṇyavāhu. It may be identified with the river Son, which formerly joined the Ganges a little above Bankipur. The Kossoanos may be identified with the river Kauśikī, modern Kośi, Kuśī.[240] This river seems to have largely shifted its course.[241] It flows into the Ganges on its north bank through the district of Purnea. The Sonos may be identified with the Son river joining the Ganges, ten miles above Dinapur. It has its source near the Narmada. At the time of the *Rāmāyaṇa*[242] the Son flowed by the eastern side of Rājagṛha (modern Rajgir). According to Ptolemy the mouth of the river Soa is the Sonos (Son) falling into the Ganges about 16 miles above Patna.[243] They are all navigable.[244] The Sittokatis, as St. Martin thinks, may be the representative of the river Sadākāntā mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* along with the Kauśikī, Sadānīrā[245] and

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238 McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, pp. 190—91.

239 *Ibid.*, p. 191 f.n.

240 *Rāmāyaṇa*, Ādi., 34; *Varāhapurāṇa*, 140.

241 Pargiter, *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa*, Tr., 292 note.

242 Ādi., Ch. 32.

243 Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 99.

244 McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, p. 137.

245 The Sadānīrā of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (i. 4, 1.14 ff). has been sought to be identified by some with the Gaṇḍak and by others with the Rapti. This river formed the boundary between Kośala and Videha (Law, *Geographical Essays*, p. 117; *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, 12, 125).

the Ātreyī. It is evident from this as Arrian thinks, that this river (Sittokatis) belongs to the northern part of Bengal. The Solomatis may be identified with the Sarayū, a tributary of the Ghogra, according to Cunningham.[246] The Kondochates is identified with the Gaṇḍak (Gaṇḍakī or Gaṇḍakāvatī). The Sambos may probably be identified with the Gumtī (Gomatī).[247] The Magon may probably be identified with the Mahānada now the Mohona, the principal river of Magadha, joining the Ganges not far below Patna (ancient Pāṭaliputra). This identification is doubtful. Due to lack of evidence it is difficult to identify it. The Agoranis may be identified with the Ghargharā or Ghogrā. The Omalis cannot be identified. The Kommenases may be identified with the Karmaṇāśā, a small river joining the Ganges above Buxar. According to N. L. Dey[248] the Karmānāśā is situated on the western limits of the district of Sahabad and forms the boundary between Bengal and U.P. The Kokouthis may be identified according to Lassen with the Bāgmatī, a sacred river of the Buddhists in Nepal. Another

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[246] Cf. Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 99. Sarabos is identified with the Sarayū or the Ghargharā or Ghogrā. It rises in the Himalayas, a little to the north-east of the sources of the Ganges. Lassen takes it to be the Rapti. The confluence of the Sarayū and the Ganges was visited by Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa [*Rāmāyaṇa*, Ādikāṇḍa, 23 sarga, v. 5; vide *Mahābhārata* (84.70); Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (VI. 4.174); *Viṣṇusmriti* (85.32); *Kālikāpurāṇa* (Ch. 24, 139), *Padmapurāṇa* (Uttarakhaṇḍa, vs. (35—38); *Raghuvaṃśa* (VIII, 95; IX, 20; XIII, 60—63]. The city of Ayodhyā about 6 mles from the Fyzabad Station stood on this river which was a tributary of the Ganges (*Bhāgavatapurana*, V, 19, 18; IX, 8, 17; X, 79, 9). This river joins the Ganges in the district of Chapra in Bihar. According to the *Mahābhārata* (Anuśāsanaparva, Ch. 155), this river issues from the Mānasasarovara.

[247] The Rigvedic Gomatī (*Rigveda*, X, 75, 6) is the western tributary of the Indus. It joins the Ganges below Banaras. It rises in the Shahjahanpur district and flows into the Ganges about half-way between Banaras and Ghazipur (*Indian Antiquary*, Vol, XXII, 1893, p. 178). The *Mahābhārata* (Ch. 84. 73), *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (V. 19, 18; X, 79, 11), *Padmapurāṇa* (Uttarakhaṇḍa, vs. 35—38), *Skandapurāṇa* (Avantikhaṇḍa, Ch. 60) and the *Viṣṇusmriti* (85.43) mention this river (for details, Law *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, p. 80).

[248] *Geo. Dic.* p. 240.

name of this river is Bāchmatī.[249] The Andomatis has been identified by some with the river Dāmodara (Dammuda) which flows by Burdwan. The river Bhāgīrathī in its lower course receives the well-known tributary called the Damodara which rises from the hills near Bagodar in the district of Hazaribagh and flows south-east through Hazaribagh and between the districts of Manbhum and Santal Perganas and then through the districts of Burdwan and Hughly. It flows into the Hughli in several streams in the district of Midnapur. The Amystis is identical with the Ajavati. The Oxymagis may be identified with the Ikṣumatī. The river Kālindī flowing through Kumaun, Rohilkhand and Kanauj is the Ikṣumatī.[250] The Errenysis may be identified with the rivers Varaṇā and Asī joining the Ganges in the neighbourhood.[251]

The Diamouna is identified with the Yamunā. Pliny calls it the Jomanes. Arrian calls it the Jobares.[252] The Ganges with its junction with the Jumnā and the Sarasvatī is called the Triveṇī.[253] The river Yamunā (modern Jumna) is mentioned in the *Ṛgveda*,[254] *Atharvaveda*,[255] *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*[256], *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[257], *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa*,[258] *Śāṅkhyāyana-Śrautasūtra*[259], *Aśvalāyana Śrautasūtra*[260] and Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*.[261] This river is called the Kālindī by Bāṇa in his *Kādambarī*[262] because its water appears

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249 Law, *Geography of Early Buddhism*, p. 36.

250 N. L. Dey, *Geo. Dict.* p. 77.

251 McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes & Arrian*, 191 f. n. The river Dāmodara is called by Ptolemy as the Damuda (Ptolemy's *Ancient India* p. 100).

252 Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 98.

253 *Ibid.*, p. 99.

254 X. 75, 5; V. 52.17; VII, 18, 19.

255 IV. 9, 10.

256 VIII, 14, 4.

257 XIII, 5, 4, 11.

258 IX. 4.11.

259 XIII, 29, 25, 33.

260 XII, 6, 28.

261 1.1.9, p. 436; 1, 4, 2; p. 670.

262 p. 62.

to be dark. The Yamunā proper is the first and great western tributary of the Ganges. The Vāluvāhinī is mentioned in the *Skandapurāṇa* as a tributary of the Yamunā.[263]

The Indus and the Ganges are greater than the Ister and the Nile. The Nile does not receive any tributary but in its passage through Egypt its water was drawn out to fill the canals. The Ister is an insignificant stream at its sources and though no doubt it receives many confluents, still these are neither equal in number to the confluents of the Indus and the Ganges nor are they navigable like them.[264]

Megasthenes mentions the river Silas named after the fountain from which it flowed through the dominions of the Silæans, on the water of which nothing would float but everything would go to the bottom. The Indians think that this river is located in the north. It purifies everything plunged in it.[265]

Among the south Indian rivers, the Godāvarī, which is identified with the Greek Goaris by Ptolemy, is the largest and the longest river, the source of which can be traced to the western ghats. According to the *Brahmapurāṇa*[266] this river has its source in the Trayamvakatirtha. Many holy places are situated on its bank.[267] The Kṛṣṇā is called as Maisolos by Ptolemy.[268] It is the same as the Kṛṣṇavenā of the *Pur..ṇas*. It survives in its modern name Kṛṣṇā. It issues from the Sahya mountain according to

[263] For further details, see Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, pp. 135-136.

[264] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, pp. 198-99.

[265] *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 64 f.n.

[266] Ch. 77. vs. 9-10; *Śaurapurāṇa*, Ch. 69, v. 26.

[267] For further details, vide Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, pp. 152-53.

[268] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, 1927, p. 67.

the *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa*.[269] The river Kāverī is known to the Greeks as the Khaberos.[270] This river starts from the Coorg and passes through the districts of Coimbatore and Trichinopoly and falls into the Bay of Bengal. It is called "the beloved of the Pallavas." The river Bindā is the Bhīmā[271] or the Bhīmarathī which joins the Kṛṣṇā.[272]

The Adamas, as Yule observes, is probably a branch of the Brāhmaṇī river.[273]

The Namados is identified with the Narmadā or Revā or Mekalasutā[274] or Samodbhavā. The Quindion identified with the Vindhyas is described by Ptolemy as its source. The Nanagouna is identified with the river Tāptī. The source of this river is the Quindion which stands for only that portion of the Vindhya wherefrom rise the Narmadā and the Tāptī, that is to say, the eastern part of the modern Vindhyas, south of the Narmadā. According to Ptolemy the Dosaran is identified with the Daśārṇā of the *Purāṇas*.[275] This river can still be traced in the modern Dashān river that flows through Bundelkhand, rising in Bhopal and emptying into the Betwa.[276] According to Wilson a Daśārṇā river is said in the *Puraṇas* to rise in a mountain called Citrakuṭa = Kāmptānathgiri in Bundelkhand.[277] Ptolemy failed to give indigenous name of this river but named it after the people inhabiting the region. Thus the Dosaron is the river of

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[269] 57. 26, 27.

[270] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 65.

[271] *Ibid.*, 1927, p. 103.

[272] *Garuḍapurāṇa*, I, p. 55.

[273] Ptolemy's *Ancient India*, p. 71.

[274] It has its source in the Maikal range, preserving the name of the ancient territory of Mekala. Mekalakanyā is another name of the Narmadā.

[275] *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, II, 160 f.n. 3.

[276] Law, *Tribes in Ancient India*, p. 375.

[277] Essays Analytical, etc., II, 336, f.n. 1.

the region inhabited by the Daśārṇas who belonged to the south-east of Madhyadeśa.[278]

The Mahī is known to Ptolemy as the Mophis.[279] This river rises in Malwa and drains itself into the Gulf of Cambay. It occurs as the Mahatī in the *Vāyupurāṇa*[280] and as the Mahita and Rohi.[281]

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[278] McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, 1927, p. 71.

[279] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[280] LXV. 97.

[281] *Mahābhārata*, Bhīṣmaparva, IX, 328; *Varāhapurāṇa* (LXXXV); vide also Law, *Geographical Essays*, p. 117.

SOME REFLECTIONS AND NOTES ON SOUTH INDIAN MYSTICISM

By Dr. K. C. Varadachari,

I.—Eros in Mystic Approach[1]—Āṇḍāl

It is well-known to students of Philosophy that Plato held true love to exist between souls and the ordinary ways of love are more clearly of the lower nature that is between the sexes and might properly be described as lust. But the fact remains that we are seized with the sexes and the element of sex has to be sublimated in the process of love.

The glory of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava theology of the Āḷvārs consists in the beautiful understanding of the ways of transformation of the Eros through dedicated devotion (*anbu* or prīti). The sublimatory process however, required the understanding of the double poise of the Infinite Being, as an inseparable Di-unity of Nārāyaṇa and Śrī, Knowledge and Mercy. Accordingly the soul comes to a peculiar relationship in its realisation of the Ultimate Self. The path is the path of Mercy or Dayā invoked as the Teacher and the Mediator to the Infinite, a sort of interpretor of the Infinite to the finite and the finite to the Infinite through mother-love. This has become a cardinal principle of the ascent to divine relationship of the intensest kind. The attainment is nothing less than the attainment of the eros (*Śṛngāra*) relationship that is unique to the highest consciousness of absorption in the beloved. Its pale counterpart is the bridal experience,

[1] Submitted to the *All-India Oriental Conference* : *Annamalainagar*, *December* 1955 and read at the *Religion and Philosophy* Section.

its imperfect image so to speak, in the terrestrial world but nonetheless the only adequate one.

The path of Love was chosen by the hardy souls St. Nammāḷvār (Śaṭhakopa) Tirumaṅgai, and Āṇḍāl. But in the case of the former two it was the transformation of the attitude of the ordinary male to the female ere the relationship could be established. It should prove much more easy for the female (sex) to realise the Highest through her own route of being (in physical incarnation). But not until the soul itself becomes feminine could this ecstacy be achieved. Whether this is so or not, it is clear that for the female of this incarnation, the path of Āṇḍāl shews how the transformation could be effected and the rich raptures of the Supramental are open to her.

It is not my purpose in this paper to expound the esoterics of the two works of Āṇḍal but to shew the psychological process through which a double ascent has been made by her though each one of them seems to promise the attainment of the Absolute. Why then the two compositions—one which utilizes the Mother (for Kātyāyanīvrata in Mārgaśīrṣa) to attain Śrī Kṛṣṇa for husband, and another a Kāmadeva-vrata to get the reciprocal love of Lord Kṛṣṇa in all ways. The Tiruppāvai and Tirumoḷi of Āṇḍāl (*Nācciyār*) form two episodes of the same process of growing into the divine nature preparing for the triple absorption of mind, breath and life and body. The final attainment of the Saint has been described as an absorption in the Idol of the Lord which was the fulfilment of the Eros.

It is clear from the Tiruppāvai, that sex of the female must find its culmination in the sex-love of the Divine, but indeed the effect of the entire *vrata* is to lead to the state when the Divine consorting with the Celestial Mother is now weaned away to look at the souls ardent in theirs of the Divine Lord. We are significantly reminded by

the Freudian interpretation of the Father-love (which smacks of incestuousness-phobia) but surely the paradoxicality of the psychic development is that it is holy when it is in respect of the metaphysical Ultimate Being who is all to all—the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* recognized this subtly when it said that all men were of the father-essence and all women of the mother-essence and always it is the father and mother that are spouses. Whatever may be the explanation based on the principle that the son is indeed the father born of the mother, it is clear that Āṇḍāl boldly ventured on this experiment of psychic potentiality and revealed what the tantras had in a gross way sought and failed—the potentiality of the God-love transforming the direction of the ascent, through the Mother's grace. The Divine once perceived by the soul does not give up its love but love urges it on to a final fulfilment.

The *Nācciyār* or Āṇḍāl now dreams and yearns sleeplessly for the culmination, the spiritual marriage with the Lord Himself who has become a lover. The dreams are wonderful portrayals of the sole absorption in the marvellous exploits of the Lord in all His incarnations. Love itself is the master of this drama, a selfless love which is rich and grand, fragrant with the perfumes of renunciation and resignation. Kāma is the inner spirit and breath of all beings, by desire does every thing love and move and has its being. The Vedic hymn to Kāma is almost identical with the status given to the supreme Puruṣa. Indeed the supreme is the Love of love (Manmathamanmatha—Kāmasya Kāmaḥ). Śrī Āṇḍāl seeks this father of all Kāma through Kāma himself. The Bhāgavata hierarchy reveals that Pradyumna is the son of Śrī Kṛṣṇa and Pradhyumna is Kāma himself. The saint seeks the Father through the son. The indwelling principle in every one is the Kāma or love which is identical with our very *antaryāmī*. The mystical understanding of this love within

us seeking the Eternal transcendent Love which is Universal and supra-cosmic makes it possible for the Divine Love to incarnate and possess us fully and in all our parts.

Thus St. Āṇḍāl practised the two fundamental vratas of Mother and Son typifying the essential nature of oneself as part of the Mother integral to the Mother, and the essential nature of oneself as love (son) of the Eternal Love and integral to him.

In mystic experience these two are co-ördinated and integrally experienced are very unique. St. Āṇḍāl therefore, stands as the most marvellous exponent of the bridal path of Mystic Attainment.

II.—AYONIJA

The concept of *ayonija* or not born or unborn or born of no womb has been one of the most common among mystical subjects. The true meaning is certainly beyond the usual conception of not being born of a womb. *Aja* and *ayonija* have to be distinguished. '*Ajo'pi san*', being unborn, I am yet born says Śrī Kṛṣṇa. It is usually interpreted as meaning that God is not born forced by the results, good or bad, of his previous karma. His birth is free birth out of His free will, of course, guided by His compassion and love to his devotees and adherence to dharma or supreme Law which He himself has promulgated. Birth from womb therefore, would refer to the conception of being born through karma. *Ayonija* would therefore, mean not materialising oneself as is said to be in certain theosophical literature but rather that their conception is through free will and grace of God for doing His work in this world. The dwelling in the womb (*gar-*

[a] Substance of the Inaugural Lecture on "Āṇḍāls" *Tiruppāvāi* festival. T. T. Devasthanam, TIRUPATI, on Dec. 17th, 1958.

bhavāsa) or even the concept of 'immaculate conception' need not be thought of except by those who will hold the literal truth in a physical sense of the conception.

The first three Āḷvārs are said to have been born of flowers growing in tanks. The fourth was also said to have been rather mysteriously born, though Bhṛgu is said to have been his parent. Āṇḍāl is claimed to have been born under the basil (tulasī) plant. So Sītā is said to have been earlier born of the plough. We also know that the Pāṇḍavas were said to have been born of the gods, Dharma, Vāyu, Indra and Aświns, and Karṇa of Sūrya. The truth behind this concept has to be gleaned through the birth of Śrī Kṛṣṇa himself who said that he of his own wish and the prayers of Vasudeva and Devaķī in their previous lives was born of them three times as Pṛṣṇigarbha, Vāmana and lastly, as Śrī Kṛṣṇa. The birth of Śrī Rāma is also a case in point showing how divine birth happens—*janma karma ca me divyam*—and it is the real meaning of *ayonija*—not born of the womb of karma but the womb of dharma, yoga, tapasyā, satya of women whose life was divine and divinised for the birth of God. Great Mahātmās are always born of parents whose life bore the stamp of dedication through lives. Āṇḍāl therefore, is not a myth nor her birth should be said to be miraculous. Viṣṇu-Citta could have no other glory than to be the father of a divine child. He was the soul of purity and dedication and love. The reference to the kind of flower as in the case of Gods is to show what divine quality they exhibited in their lives. A more natural explanation when it is available should be adopted.

Āṇḍāl was a divine child, a self-gift of Śrī or the Higher Mother who has the three forms of Śrī, Bhū and Nīlā, and a trinity of Mother form which helped to rouse maidenhood to levels of divinity.

III.—Ars Intuitiva or Intuitive Love[3]

Āṇḍāl, it is said, was a genius; and her first, and in one sense the work that made her immortal mystic of the path of śṛṅgāra, Tiruppāvāi reveals the subtle intuitions of her consciousness, both transcendental and poetic. As such one eminent critic almost suggested that such perfection cannot be referred to her but to her poetico-mystic father Viṣṇu-Citta. It is well-known that her work has been interpreted and expounded with a wealth of learning and scholarship and delicacy that makes it a work of true Vedic and Vedāntic wisdom, Gītaic versatility and Bhāgavata-beauty. Hearing such discourses one almost could agree with the eminent critic. But intellectual thought though it can admire and adumbrate cannot reach up to transcendence of itself. Intuitive Vision and approach is of a different order of experience which, whilst it can exalt and suggest and uplift man's consciousness including his sensations and perceptions, and reasonings and imaginations, cannot be truly understood. Her love was not of the sensate amatory order, nor is it an intellectual love of God as found among philosophers but only of the intuitive order of being, which found in Him being and consciousness and bliss, apart from whom she felt as non-existent, unconsciousness and inconscient and miserable. Her intuition was not contemplative resignation but dynamic seeking for mergence in the Body of God. Intuitive Love then is integral in a sense; it is love with a totality of self-surrender to the Univer:al Being who is the life of the universe, and with whom one is eternally united, inseparable and basic to all existence, of the sensate, waking, dreaming and deep sleep. Understood in this sense, and also in the sense that one does not become a jñānī in one life alone (*bahūnāṁ janmanāṁ ante jñānavān māṁ prapadyate*),

[3] Substance of the Inagural Lecture on "Āṇḍals" *Tiruppāvāi* festival, T. T. Devasthanam, Tirupati, on Dec. 17, 1958.

that one is born intuitively loving the Divine One Person, is not inconceivable. In this sense are mystics made and born, and poets too and others. In this case it is a divine afflatus descending into the creation, freely to demonstrate the glory of love and the truths of Real Being.

Bhaktyātvananyayā śaktum jñātum draṣṭum ca tattvena praveṣṭum ca. . . . said the Lord. The only way to know, to have Vision, and to Enter into God is through devotion. Bhakti only is capable of making God reveal Himself to the soul. Devotion is of course, to be shewn through observances, such as those prescribed by the śāstras; in the case of those who are not qualified in any sense from following the directions of the śāstras, the śāstras themselves have prescribed the methods, to be adopted by women, girls, outcastes and so on. Thus, it cannot be said that the śāstra has not prescribed to each his particular method of devotion fitting his station and condition. Even devotion to be pleasing must be *vidhi-pūrvakaṁ* and not *avidhi-pūrvakaṁ* (according to rule and not otherwise). The *Svadharma* or one's own dharma in this regard also must be remembered as better than the dharma of others. Āṇḍāl following her *svadharma* as woman or girl awaiting to be married to a proper person, elects to seek God as husband, and indeed asks her comrades to do the same. Thus, individual effort or tapasyā or *vrata* is necessary for shewing devotion. God's grace is always ready (*siddhopāya*) but one should revere it, receive it, with devotion, and earnest necessity for living should prompt one to get up in the morning at Brāhmī-muhūrta and having bathed go to the temple of God to receive the prasāda or Grace of acceptance, Vision and knowledge and entry into the temple. One of the very important differences between the necessity for individual effort and spontaneous grace is solved by Āṇḍal who shews that if one is physically fit one should express one's devotion in all one's parts (*tṛikaraṇa*). The Vrata

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concept itself is ancient and has the sanction of the Vedic Yajña and Bhāgavata-vrata and kalpa. The soul should seek God, aspire after the highest state of union with Him. Undoubtedly, this love for God may grow or arise from the Divine selection (vṛṇute in *Yameva eṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ* of the *Gītā* and the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*). This is *kāma-yajña* disinterested love of God for the sake of God who is not a viṣaya of the senses. Real nirviṣaya-bhakti or karma does not seek a material object that satisfies the senses (viṣayas). The love of God is self-giving utter and complete for the sake of realizing God. Bridal union usually develops as a consequence of integral aspiration, seeking a melting of oneself in the Divine Personality. This truth is brought out by Śrī Kṛṣṇa's especial statement : *tattvena praveṣṭum ca*; entering by one's essence into God. Some enter through their sense or perception, some through knowledge or jñāna, but rarely does one enter into God through or by his essence or spirit, substantially. The other two are by means of *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* or consciousness as attribute but the last is by means of one's substance.

That this is a reading that is to be really accepted is testified to by the very story of Āṇḍāl who was absorbed into the Iconic personality of God in the temple. She found herself entering into the Infinite Godhead even as earlier Pān Āḻvār entered into the Iconic personality of Śrī Raṅganātha. The Infinite Godhead took them into the body of Himself (*tanu*). It is said in the story of Mārkaṇḍeya (*Bhāgavata* XII) that the Child on the banyan leaf opened its mouth so that he could enter into Him and see the worlds within. This opening of the body of God to the devotee for the entry of the devoted soul and his coming out of it is there declared to be the Viṣṇu-Māyā. Here then the Door of the Infinite is open and one thence is born of the Immortal Being. A divine birth is the beginning of a Divine Life in God for God and by God. One

moves in Brahman freely, living and moving and being in Him really in one's own fullness.

IV.—Prapatti and Bhakti or the so-called *Mārjāla-Kiśora-Nyāya and Markaṭa-Kiśora-Nyāya*[4]

In Śrī Vaiṣṇavism alone the distinction between prapatti and bhakti is characteristically exploited. There has been some kind of loose thinking about the former being the mārjāla-kiśora-nyāya and the latter as markaṭa-kiśora-nyāya. Indeed the two are accepted by both the schools of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and emphasized almost equally as the means to the highest realisation. The whole question then bristles with reference to the problem of realisation and liberation. The former shews utter helplessness and fear of impediments, obstructions including the wily but powerful Māyā and all beings and elements and so on. The latter is not so much fear-conscious as love-conscious. This differentium is usually forgotten. If liberation means the freedom from fear of saṁsāra, then the prapatti is quite adequate when the individual surrenders out of his helplessness and fear to the One Supreme Being who can save him from saṁsāra and all fear—*abhayaṁ sarvabhūtebhyo*—. But realisation means not merely liberation from saṁsāra but also attainment of Brahman or Godhead, experience and service and one's own self-realisation as God-dependent Being, then prapatti leads up to the same through engendering bhakti for the saviour-God which leads to the highest experience of Him. It is true that in this case prapatti is both capable of being the means to God as also directly to liberation from saṁsāra. Thus, it is an independent method for attaining liberation through God's grace even like Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti which entail certain fundamental performance of works, mentation and worships

[4] Submitted to the *All-India Oriental Conference*: *Delhi*, 1957 December.

in prescribed manner in a selfless manner and for God-realisation together with liberation. Prapatti can indeed also lead to God-realisation directly even without passing over to the bhakti-state of prīti or love because in a sense prapatti or declaration of utter dependence on God alone through surrender is an assertion of the metaphysical or real truth of the nature of the soul—which is utter dependence on God alone, and on none other—*parama-śeṣataika svarūpa*, or *parama-ekānta-bhāva*.

There is hardly any possibility of considering that prapatti and bhakti are to be equated with the theory of self-effort and God's-grace as if they are separable in the Śrī Vaiṣṇava theology. The one puruṣa-kāra or doer or bringer about of the result is the Supreme Being himself or Mother who is the Supreme Being or so intimately in union with Him. The guru partakes of the nature of the Mother and leads the surrenderer to the highest realisation.

2. The conception of the identity of the *upāya* and *upeya*, the means and the end of self-realisation which in Śrī Vaiṣṇava theology and Vedānta includes the attainment of freedom from saṁsāra and all-fear (*sarva-bhaya*) entails the Śrī Vaiṣṇava conception of oneness of the Mother and Brahman or Nārāyaṇa and Śrī. There is of course, the peculiar difficulty of the puranic view not so much of the Pāñcarātra view which makes Śrī, a soul albeit eternally free, *nityamukta*, and in a special sense capable of being the Guru or *puruṣa-kāra*, even as the Īśvara of the Yoga school. The two schools of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism designated northern (*Vaḍagalai*) and southern (*tengalai*), seem to differ from one another on this issue. The Yogic situation demands that the Mother-Guru must be deemed to be identical with the Supreme Being or Parama-puruṣa or Brahman in order to satisfy this canon of identity of upāya and upeya. The conception of Ācārya—devobhāva becomes in a sense the guiding principle of ācārya-niṣṭha. The Yoga becomes the activity of

uniting the soul (jīva or the surrenderer) with the Supreme Status of the Paramapuruṣa or Brahman by the Supreme Puruṣa himself in the form of the Mother or in the Mother-aspect or Guru-aspect. Thus, the method of prapatti for the sake of self-realisation or self-protection clearly envisages this acceptance of the Guru as Mother also in the spiritual sense of granting divine birth or knowledge-birth or bliss-birth to the soul. The supreme meaning of the Gītācārya is essentially this identity of means and ends in Brahman as self-realisation and Brahman as Mother. All souls however eminent are less than the Highest and cannot be the final means to the Final End. This is obviously the reason for the concept of di-unity of the twin-personalities of the Final Being. Whilst this is the ultimate concept, the actual process of release and realisation proceeds with the co-operative activity of the twin-personalities of the Mother-Guru and the Ultimate Being known as the Goal of All Beings—Nārāyaṇa—*narāṇāṁ ayanaṁ*.

3. The third concept of importance for prapatti thus naturally follows that prapatti is the preparation for bhakti, the surrender leads to the enjoyment to the person who saves and redeems and frees and finally becomes the Object of all one's being and the substance of all life. Bhakti includes both the attainment of the Divine Lord through love or enjoyment as well as the realisation of one's self as dependent on the Ultimate Being and not merely as a self-conscious intelligence. It would certainly appear to be too much of a claim to state that prapatti for self-protection from saṁsāra or even for realisation of oneself could engender love for the Divine as such and for the sake of the Divine. The utter offering of oneself and all for the Divine that one loves and seeks to love exclusively and solely is different from a surrender that is made out of fear of the world and its cycle of saṁsāra and associations and death. Therefore it follows that only in a limited way does pra-

patti lead to God-realisation as saviour and not to God as the Ultimate Being of supremest worth.

4. There is another point of importance which has to be considered, namely that self-realisation does not lead to God-realisation and those who seek to save their souls through attainment of self-realisation really never attain the highest. This doctrine of isolationism or *paraccheri* is impossible because of the intimate relation between oneself and the Divine Lord which is one of prakāra and prakārī and the knowledge of oneself entails the knowledge that one is the prakāra of God. It is perhaps a severe way of stating that one should seek to know God rather than oneself : the knowledge of God entails the knowledge of oneself, but not *vice versa*. The knowledge of the whole leads to the knowledge of the parts but not the knowledge of part the knowledge of the whole. This is impossible in the organistic view. There can be no isolationism and just as the attainment of freedom from saṁsāra inevitably will engender love for the saviour or redeemer or the Guru so also the knowledge of oneself inevitably will lead to the knowledge of the Divine Lord and lead to Love of God solely. The great teachers held this organic relationship and it is only the atomistic and mechanical thinking that has led to the schism.

5. There is another interesting point as to the speed of the ways. Prapatti is speediest way of release whereas bhakti is a slow and arduous path. In the Yoga Upaniṣads there is a version about this. There are said to be two parts to the highest Reality, the Śuka-patha or the patha followed by Ṛṣi Śuka or otherwise stated as bird-path or flight to the Divine and the Vāmadeva path or the path followed by Vāmadeva, the path of ant or slow-ascent or gradual path.[5]

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[5] *Varāha Up.* IV.

Prapatti may be claimed to be the method of flight to the Unknown or the supreme Saviour. The ease with which the goal is achieved and the simplicity of the method show that it is open to all who are qualified by helplessness; 'whosoever seeks my refuge him (or her or it) shall I save without doubt. Him even if he be a sinner shall I make righteous'. There are of course variations of the urge for release due to intensity or purpose. Some seek immediate release : some could wait for it. But the flight to the Supreme Being happens because of the knowledge that the Supreme Being is the life and being of the soul. The path of gradual ascent by Vāmadeva is indeed also dependent on the grace of God which makes the seeker realise the eternal presence of God in all and his own oneness with that Supreme Puruṣa which makes him exclaim that he is Manu etc. . . . The prapatti of the ārta has the characteristics of the Śuka-patha which entails immediate release and immediate realisation of the Supreme Brahman, where as the prapatti of Vāmadeva has the characteristic of bhakti and kaiṅkarya rejoicing in the Nature of the Divine immanence in all and love of God in all and one's own inseparable relation with God in all things. So much so the contrast drawn between bhakti and prapatti is merely a distinction without difference. Ultimately, the aim of the seeker is integral realisation of God and love of God and freedom from the world of death and saṁsāra and rebirth. The concept of loving service (Kaiṅkarya) of God as the Ultimate aim of being resolves this duality for it is that which is implicit in the notion of absolute dependence of the soul on God and in all states and in all circumstances of the Divine Nature.

6. The Divine or God is clearly defined as fivefold unity, as the Ultimate Transcendent Being beyond all knowings and realisations too, as well as the Creator etc., and the Incarnate Historical personalities, the inner Ruler

immortal in all beings or creatures, and the Object of Worship in the temples who is the luminous power that can lead us to the apprehension of the other statuses of the Divine. Indeed to know one is to be guided to the knowledge of all in a truer sense than the usual version that to taste a drop of the ocean is to know the taste of the entire ocean. It is in this sense alone did the Tamil saints speak of the knowing of one is to know all: the integral unity of the five-fold nature entails this deduction. Prapatti is said to be direct and requires to be made by each soul in its moment of distress and dire need. To which Godhead has it to make this offering or surrender? The Śrī Vaiṣṇava thinkers following the Āḷvārs made this counsel: prapatti should be made to the Arcā or Icon in the temple or to the Godhead directly known as Vibhava or Incarnation as in the case of Vibhīṣaṇa, Kākāsura, Arjuna etc. The conception of prapatti however, has undergone certain changes in the history of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. Indeed the prapatti is performed as rite or ritual in the set terms of Śrī Rāmānuja's *Gadya-traya* specially the *Śaraṇāgati-gadya* either at the time of performing the samāśrayaṇa or *pañca-saṁskāra* or as a special rite when the soul is needing the surrender—*bhara-nyāsa*, getting conscious of its futility and inability to attain realisation by its own efforts. There can be hardly any doubt about the need to become individually conscious of the need to attain self-realisation or/and freedom from saṁsāra and death and rebirth. The technique of *bhara-nyāsa* if it is given over to the Guru or the ancient Teacher or performed in such a way that the individual whose *bhara* has been offered is unconscious of this act itself as in the case of a consecrated or dedicated cow or calf or gift of animal for the service of the Divine, would be precisely the extension of the mārjāra-kiśora-nyāya (the Kitten's way). But such a technique however, acceptable to be self-abasing creature does not entail the fullest attain-

ment of the self-realisation or God-realisation. What is true of the unconscious creature or helpless soul cannot be said to be open to the soul already aware of its spiritual nature and able to choose the right way and means and goal. Bhakti, on the other hand, demands the conscious acceptance of God and love and seeks only the freedom from saṁsāra and ignorance and enjoyment of God alone through love, for love, and as love. Thus Prapatti is self-surrender either conscious or unconscious but bhakti is always a self-conscious act, therefore the distinction between self-surrender and self-offering. They are however, capable of being integral steps in a single process of divine attainment resulting in a double realisation as stated in the Upaniṣads: *vināśena mṛtyum tīrtvā sambhūtyā amṛtam aśnute* /[6] *ātmanā vindate viryam, vidyayā-vindate amṛtam.*/[7]

7. There is however a very important difference between prapatti and bhakti in addition to what we have stated. Prapatti or self-surrender has no niyama or condition in respect of place or time or fitness or fruit or methods of *yama* or *niyama*; provided the five conditions of *akiñcanatā*, *anukūlyatā*, *pratikūlyavarjanam*, *goptṛtvavaraṇam* (*bhagavaccaraṇa-varaṇam*), *mahāviśvāsa*, *kārpaṇya*, *ātmanikṣepa* happen. Even here it may be pointed out that five conditions are so interrelated that if one of them is present the others naturally follow by the grace of God. The central aspect is akiñcanatā which must relate itself with *varaṇam* of God's feet for refuge or in some divine manner get related to the Grace of God who chooses to save the helpless, willy nilly. The aim of sādhana on the prapatti path is to arrive at this helpless or nothingness state of being so as to ensure the flow of grace of God to it. The aim of the bhakti sādhana is to love God and feeling the help-

[6] Iśa.

[7] *Kena.*

F. 8

lessness of attaining him love more and more for the sake of God alone till oneself is forgotten utterly in such a love.

8. It is the most important part of the Northern school to hold that the two must be integrated to arrive at the Highest state of Realisation of God and freedom, and each individual though he might have been chosen by the Divine out of sheer pity (karuṇā or dayā) for being saved should again perform the deep dedication of surrender and offering to Him alone. Though surrender is said to to be such that it must be done once only and that this 'once'ness can refer to that performed by one's teacher or Ācārya sometime also, yet it is claimed rightly in sādhanā that to remind oneself and perform it for other aims than that which prevailed at the first time, since the conception of release or realisation undergoes changes as one advances in the spiritual life of God and in God. The charge of lack of faith is never so serious as the charge of not doing what ought to be done by each individual soul in its conscious moments of self-realisātion as the utter dependent of God who had developed the illusory sense of independence of oneself. This is serious enough from the point of view of sādhanā, for faith of the real kind is that which grows as an organic force of dependence of God rather than an external imposition or habit.

9. The conclusion follows from all the above that :

(1) The integral yoga has two parts : Prapatti and Bhakti.

(2) Prapatti is the act of seeking refuge of God, but it also includes when refuge cannot be consciously made or one is incapable of doing it, the act of God's grace which protects him, this latter being a spontaneous act (*iāyamāna kaṭākṣam*).

(3) Prapatti accordingly is unconditional surrender to God or acceptance by God of the incapable soul, and depends on no other condition of knowledge or birth or station or place or occasion or fruit.

(4) Bhakti is the self-offering of the soul to God for the sake of freedom or for the sake of God-Love or both, and is a development of the real knowledge culminating in supreme devotion and love.

(5) The source for both these can be found in the Pāñcarātra Āgama, the *Gītā* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. It depends on the type of individual whether he seeks the God-love or just freedom from fear of all kinds. But once being freed from one kind of fear by God's grace it is but natural for him to turn to God for securing freedom from all kinds of fear for which he could make his surrender more and more complete. But the main feature of prapatti is more or less selfish searching for security from fears of all kinds whereas bhakti is the unselfish love of God for the sake of God and fused with true intelligence of jñāna; it is self-offering integrally.

(6) The conflict between the mārjāra-kiśora and markaṭa-kiśora-nyāyas is not found in the earliest works of the sampradāya writers, even till the time of Manavāla Mahāmuṇi. The reference to it by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in the introduction to the *Gītā* is therefore not sanctioned in the earliest schismatic writers of the Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. There is no sanction for it in the works of Śrī Rāmānuja or the Āḷvārs or the ācāryas up-till the 15th century.

Popular contrasts somehow have come and have led many writers to contrast the two schools of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism on this basis. Śrī A. Govindāchārya of Mysore in his *Arthapañcaka* edition of Pillai Lokāchārya[8] mentions this but it is not found in the works.[9]

[8] *J. R. A. S.*, July 1910.

[9] References are given to *J. R. A. S.*, 1908 p. 338 and vade-mecum, A. Govindāchārya, p. 45.

DHARMAŚĀSTRAS AND THE MODERN AGE

By Dr. P. T. Raju

I

INTRODUCTION

The very name of the subject, "*Dharmaśāstras* and the Modern Age," presupposes the doubt whether all that is said in them is applicable to life in the modern age. *Dharmaśāstras* are not treatises on ethics like the modern treatises on the subject; they are not philosophies of morality, analyses of moral experience, but ethical codes in which the duties of individuals and groups called castes etc., are codified. They are a mixture of ethical, social and positive laws used by judges in courts as well as by religious, political and ethical teachers. They include even laws about economic relationships like the laws of inheritance, obtaining of course at a time when economics was not yet a full-fledged discipline.

The question raised about the *dharmaśāstras* of India may be raised about other ethical ḍoes also, of the Muslims, Jews, Christians, Parsis etc. For there is a general question whether the codes of conduct given to a society some centuries ago can be and ought to be followed literally in the modern age. The opinion has become general that all ethical codes were composed to suit societies living in a certain set of circumstances, which are not now the same; and changes in conditions of life necessitate modifications in the codes. But at present we are mainly concerned with the ethical codes of India.

There are indeed orthodox people in India who do not wish to view the *dharma-śāstras* in the perspective of history or social development, but as sacrosanct for ever,

But such people are to be found in other communities also. Their attitude can easily be appreciated: all ethical codes are associated with certain institutionalised religions; they support the religions and are supported by them; and any charge in the moral codes or even a critical attitude to them is considered to be a danger to religion, which promises redemption. But societies have been going through several kinds of transformation, economic, political and social, and even religious ideas are getting more and more purified; and humanity is not going to admit that all this charge is heading towards damnation. Unless the objections to reform are known to be not prompted by vested interests, they cannot have much weight.

II

Growth of Morality in Society

Anthropologists, sociologists, writers on ethics and law, and other scholars have shown that moral consciousness has a growth, that it differs from culture to culture, society to society, tribe to tribe, and then again from the less advanced to the more advanced cultures and civilizations. It is almost universally accepted that the development of moral consciousness determines the development of religious consciousness also, though it is not as commonly mentioned that the purification of religious consciousness influences the nature of moral consciousness by introducing a stronger sense of ethical relativism with regard to fixed moral laws and by strengthening tolerance in human relationships. The latter particularly holds of Indian religious consciousness as found in the Vedānta, which made the Hindu proverbially tolerant not only of other religions but also of other moral codes. It is of importance to note that originally the rules of moral conduct prescribed for the different castes and subcastes were motivated by the

laudable and commendable desire to allow every group to follow its own moral traditions and forms of worship, which later on became a desire to insist upon its following them and to prevent it from changing them. The problem of caste was not merely one of fixing separate professions, but also of tribes and races and forms of cult and worship. India, which is determined to abolish caste system, has consistently to support all fight against race discriminations. And if the abolition on a world-wide scale materializes, the emergence of a new culture based upon new principles is bound to occur.

Ethics, as we find in modern works, is reflective morality. It appears in the history of man at a quite late stage. One may summarize the stages of the growth of morality in the following way :

1. First; there was only custom or tradition, which governed the conduct of primitive society. Tribal people may have their gods associated with different forms of conduct. But for an objective study, the gods are unimportant, the traditions handed down from generation to generation are important. Generally the leaders of the tribe do not question them even if no gods are associated with them.

2. Next, when a tribe comes into contact with another tribe having different customs and traditions, the idea dawns on the members of the tribe that customs and traditions can be different. Even apart from noticing the forms of conduct of another tribe, some members of the tribe may violate some traditions. Usually leaders of the tribe attribute calamities to such violations; but when they find that other tribes are prospering in spite of violating what they themselves consider to be right forms of conduct, some connivance at violations and a vague sense of ethical relativity begin to appear.

3. But these violations introduce some internal disorder. And when some tribes unite and constitute a nation

or a larger society, the disorder is observed on a wider scale. Observation of different customs outside one's society introduces reflection; but the innovations and changes, which are in a sense violations of the tradition, introduce unstability. Besides, when everything depends on tradition, and tradition is handed down from generation to generation, it depends, for exactness of detail, on the memory of individuals, which is not often reliable. Different persons may remember the same tradition in different ways, and their memories clash. It is in such situations that ethical codes are composed. They are meant (1) to preserve the tradition in its exactness, (2) to prevent innovations and changes, (3) to offer ready guidance in detail for the administration of justice and (4) to relate the practices to the existing religion.

4. But just by the time of composition of codes reflective morality must have already entered the minds of men. Questions must have been raised not only about how an act should or should not be done, but also why it should or should not be done. Justification for every injunction is sought, and when justification is not obtained, reform is advocated. Opinions may differ about the forms of justification. It may be given in terms of some sacred scripture, social welfare, political stability or individual welfare. If it is given by appeal to some sacred scripture, it is acceptance of some authority and therefore tradition, though considered sacred. But the justification of the very tradition is now sought, and therefore justification of a tradition in terms of a sacred scripture is arguing in a circle. But when it is given in terms of the nature of society or the individual, no further justification is sought, because society and the individual are hard facts for ethics. But then some ideals of society and the individual are introduced, for no ethical conduct aims at merely preserving the brute in the gregarious man,

but man with individual, social and spiritual ideals. It is at this juncture that fullfledged ethics, rationally articulated and discussed, appears on the human scene. Thus ethics as a distinct discipline appears after ethical codes, which are biassed towards conserving particular forms of traditional conduct and opposed to complete rational investigation.[1]

III

Growth of Morality in the Individual

Ethics demands that one should control one's activity according to certain rules and laws. But no individual is born with a knowledge of these rules and laws. He learns them first from nature and society, then reflects over them and assimilates them to his experience, and afterwards is even prepared to go beyond them when convinced by his experience that he should and ought.

1. First, the child learns to control its activity from nature. When it places its finger near fire, it is burnt. Thus nature teaches the child through pains and pleasures. Even a grown-up learns what to eat and how much to eat through pains and pleasures.

2. Next, as the child grows, its parents and elder sisters and brothers teach it what to do and what not to do through rewards and punishments, and also praise and blame. So far the individual is not very reflective about conduct. He may now and then ask his elders why a certain act is performed in a certain way. But the majority of children are satisfied with the answers

[1] My teacher in Navya-Nyāya, M.M. Sri Sankar Tarkaratna, was fond of telling us that his own teacher would challenge every scholar to argue with him on any philosophical point, giving him any position to defend, but would refuse to argue on any point of the *dharmaśāstras*, the rules of which he regarded as sacrosanct and inviolable. This is real orthodoxy.

F. 9

obtained, and care more about rewards and punishments than about the justification of prescribed forms.

3. But as the child grows, many of the rewards and punishments are discontinued; and many forms of conduct have no rewards except social praise. A stage is reached in the individual's life, when no concrete rewards are obtained for right conduct except social approval, praise and fame, and the opposite for wrong conduct. Many forms of wrong conduct are not legally or even socially punishable. At this stage, the individual follows the traditions and is eager for social praise and approval.

4. But a stage comes in the life of some individuals, who are of course very few, when they rise above social approval and praise. They think for themselves, question their own head and heart about the justification of the prescribed laws of behaviour; and if they find that they are unjust, they are prepared to violate them and go against society. Such are ethical geniuses, leaders of mankind, some of whom become martyrs, and others successful reformers. It is they who give real impetus to reflective ethics.

IV

Dawn of Reflection and evoluation of Codes

Now, we may give the causes leading to reflective ethics and re-evaluation of codes as a summary and in an analytic manner.

1. The first is the observation of different social practices. In the contemporary age our knowledge of these differences is far greater than before. This knowledge is making us question the validity of many of our traditions, and is at the same time enabling us to see the living importance of equally many or even more.

2. Our attitude to physical nature has considerably changed. We view it as an inanimate force with specific laws by knowing which we can control it. We do not

think of the natural forces as being controlled by spirits, and we are attributing natural calamities less and less to the spirits angered by violated traditions.

3. There has been a gradual change in our outlook on man also. Many modern Christians, for instance, are less prone to believing in original sin. The Hindus are believing less and less in the unreality of the world. We are less convinced now that it is a sin to enjoy the values of the world and lead a comfortable life.

4. There is progress in our understanding of human nature also. There are certain acts which a man can do and certain others which he cannot do, and still others for not doing which he commits a sin or crime. That all moral laws are divine commandments is not accepted by many, who say that they are to be based on the uature of man and not on the will of God. Even if God gave them, they should not conflict with human nature ; and if they do, they cannot be dictates of God, who created man also.

5. Hence has arisen a change in the methods of establishing the validity of moral and legal laws, and many view-points have been taken for establishing and justifying them.

(a) First there is the standpoint of tradition. In the case of many customs like etiquette and formalities, which are not found to be particularly harmful, we follow them and justify them as belonging to "our culture", though we are not prepared to follow every practice handed down by our tradition. The amount of appeal to "our culture" varies from individual to individual, group to group, and locality to locality. In any case, justification by tradition is current throughout the world.

(b) Then, there is justification by appeal to religion. Practically every religious founder was a

reformer of his time. But when once his reforms were established, religion acted as a conservative force and gave sanction to all the practices. When it got institutionalized, all the institutions of society became religious, and any violation was regarded as a sacrilege.

But now our conception of religion is changing. If God is one and if the relation of God to man is the same throughout the universe, then all social institutions must be good and God could not have been interested in any particular set of social institutions and could not have damned the others. Besides, we are more often distinguishing than ever before the essentials from the non-essentials of religion, and are insisting that the essentials of all religions must be and are the same. Christian social forms, Islamic social forms, Hindu social forms etc., are externals to the essential spirit of religion. Indeed, as Radhakrishnan has often been saying, we demand that spirituality should be embodied in our social institutions; but we are at the same time not ready to accept that any particular traditionally handed down set of institutions alone embodies the spiritual. On the contrary, we are asserting that many institutions have lost the spiritual in them. Justification by religion is current throughout the world; but our conception of religion is more and more purified. On the one hand, there is a demand to separate religion from social and political life; on the other, there is a demand to make our social and political life more and more spiritual. But

ethics in its concrete form cannot be separated from social and political life, and it cannot be separated from .religion too. Hence a constant change of emphasis in our evaluation of traditional codes. Sometimes we argue against traditional ethics from the secular point of view; other times we want to make it religious.

(c) With the immense progress made by the physical and natural sciences, and the sciences of man, scientific outlook dominates our thought, and we want that everything should be viewed from the standpoint of science. I do not wish to raise the question whether scientific attitude to ethics is right or wrong. I only want that we should take note of its presence. Among the educated, the number of those who have more faith in science than in religion is on the increase. They demrnd that religion should not conflict with science; and where there is conflict, science is accepted and religion is doubted. They demand that traditional ethical codes must meet the requirements of scientific outlook. If they cannot, they should be modified. Some of those who advocate scientific outlook are extremists; they want to abolish all religion and condemn all reference to religion.

(d) Another basis taken for establishing and justifying ethical laws is the sociological. Those who adopt this attitude are indifferent to religion, even if they do not condemn it. The criterion for all ethical laws is social welfare, and not the salvation of the individual. Whichever of the traditional laws is found to be harmful

to society and retarding its progress is to be discontinued and new laws are to be introduced which contribute to social progress.

(e) But this sociological justification may be so interpreted as to submerge the individual in society and ignore his welfare. Humanism therefore wants that all laws should, be justified from its own point of view. Practically humanism is as old as man himself; every man with deep sympathies, compassion, kindness, love and respect for other human beings is essentially a humanist. But humanism with a distinct name and programme could appear only when a movement, both theoretical and practical, was started in the interests of the welfare of man and in defense of human values and boldly challenged the excesses of religion and laws of orthodox tradition. Immense good has been done to man by the humanistic movement, whatever be its ultimate defects. In the contemporary world, particularly in some communist countries, it seems to be fighting for the recognition of the dignity of man and freedom of the individual; and many seem to be becoming martyrs in the name of humanism. And humanism can act as a check on the extravagances of science also.

(f) We are not to forget that what are called ethical codes are not merely concerned with what are now-a-days called ethical laws but with all laws of all kinds of social institutions including the economic and the political. They give their justification of economic and political relationships from the religious point of view. But now throughout the world

there are demands for readjustment of these relationships; and the demand is made and justified from the point of view of various ideologies, socialistic, communistic, democratic, humanistic and even religious. If the readjustment is justified, then the traditional codes cannot be right. All that we can say is that the traditional laws suited certain conditions, which do not now exist. In any case, this new demand gives occasion to questioning the eternal validity claimed for the ethical codes. For if the institutions and their relationships are to be changed, then ethical codes also have to be changed.

6. We may incidentally note that in the world now there is a demand for revolutionary change, for burning everything past; and there is a demand for conserving everything past. In order to avoid conflict between the two and the agonies of revolutions, slow and steady change is advocated by wise men who do not want a complete break with the past and yet realize the inenvitability of change. This change has to be neither too quick nor too slow, as either large sections of people will be condemned to misery by quick changes or outworn laws will keep many sections in unjustifiable conditions too long. If change is to be introduced steadily and carefully, re-evaluation and modification of ethical codes becomes necessary.

V

Nature and Growth of Dharmaśāstras in India

So far have been presented only general considerations,which are fairly universally applicable. But as the paper is concerned mainly with the *dharmaśāstras* of India, we may briefly review their nature and growth. Whatever

be the orthodox opinion—it is strong in its own circles—scholars on the whole believe that the *dharmaśāstras* have had a historical growth. There are several of them. Though not on fundamentals, they show differences of opinion, and the differences were due to changed conditions which historical life introduced. The largest amount of work done on *dharmaśāstras* is by M. M. Dr. P. V. Kane.[2] There are other important writers like M. M. Dr. Ganganatha Jha, and Dr. K. P. Jayaswal. Writers like Dr. Bhagavan Das have attempted to interpret Manu's ideas with the help of Plato's classification or rather stratification of classes. As the *dharmaśāstras* are also works on jurisprudence, they interested writers like Maine. This paper is not primarily concerned with the history of the *dharmaśāstras*, except to show that they had a growth. It is not interested also in the psychological justification of any of their ideas or in jurisprudence; its interest is mainly limited to their relevance to the modern age.

1. According to the orthodx tradition, the *dharmaśāstras* are based on the Vedas. The former are called *śrutis*, those which are heard, and the latter *smṛtis*, those which are remembered. Manu says that whatever he teaches about *dharma* (right action) was first told by the Vedas.[3] But a little later he says that, if there is conflict between *śruti* and *smṛti*, the former is to be followed but not the latter,[4]—which shows that Manu himself was not sure that the s*mrtis* were always right.

2. The *smṛtis* are therefore meant to present the laws of conduct, which are not given in a codified form in the *śruti*. The *śruti* therefore could not be a ready

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[2] *History of Dharmasāśtra*, 5 Vols. (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona).

[3] *Manusmṛti*, II, 7. (Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1946).

[4] II, 13.

guide to conduct. This was the original reason for the composition of the *smṛtis*. For this reason the *smṛtis* are called subsidiaries to the Vedas (*śrutis*).

3. Before the *dharmaśāstras* came into existence, it is believed, there were *dharmaśūtras*, some of which are now available. Here we are entering a controversial field. Max Müller and Bühler seem to think that the Hindu law originated in the *dharmasūtras* of the Vedic *caraṇas* or schools. Kane says that the *dharmasūtras* of Apastambha, Baudhayana and Gautama belong to the period between 600 and 300 B. C., and that Gautama speaks of *dharmaśāstras*.[5] But none of those *dharmaśāstras* is now available. It is also possible that the writers of the time were using the words *dharmasūtra* and *dharmaśāstra* indifferentlly for the same work, for both were meant to serve the same purpose. Jayaswal thinks that the source of Hindu law is Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*,[6] that *Manu's Code* was written in order to assert the supremacy of the Brahmins when the Brahmin empire was destroyed by the Mauryas, and that *Yājñavalkya's Code* was written during the time of the Satavahana empire which combined orthodoxy with Buddhism and made woman equal to man under Buddhist influence.[7] But Kane points out that *Arthaśāstra* is really a part of *Dharmaśāstra*, that, according to Yājñavalkya, wherever there is conflict between *Dharmaśāstra* and *Arthaśāstra*, the former should prevail,[8] and that Kautilya was earlier than the extant *Manusmṛti*, though not earlier than its kernel.[9]

It is the historians and orientalists who can pronounce judgment on these differences of opinion. In the present

[5] *History of the Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, p. 8.

[6] *Manu and Yājñavalkya*, p. 2. (Butterworth and Co., Calcutta, 1930).

[7] *Manu and Yājñavalkya*, p. xxi.

[8] *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, p. 87.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

paper the attempt to fix the stages of growth and their dates cannot be made. But it seems to the present writer that it is the general feature of the development of Indian philosophical literature that at first there were scattered and uncoordinated expressions of experiences, then a coordination of them in the form of *sūtras*, and then elaborations and expositions of the *sūtras* in the form of commentaries, summaries and other presentations. Neither are *sūtras* always aphorisms or pithy utterances as usually defined, but also complete sentences and discussions as in some Buddhist *sūtras*. So to think that originally there was *sūtra* literature on *dharma* (right conduct), the ideas of which were later expounded in the extant *dharmasāstras* is in accordance with the general nature of the development of India's philosophical literature. That some of the authors of *sūtras* refer to *sāstras* before them may or may not mean that, prior to the *sūtra* literature and as distinct from it, there existed another literature called *śāstra* literature. *Arthaśāstra* can be treated as part of *dharmasāśtra*, because the latter deals with what the kings have and ought to do for obtaining wealth and increasing their power.

However, according to Dr. P. V. Kane, there was some *dharmaśāstra* literature prior to the period of 600-300 B.C., to which the authors of *Dharmasūtras* like Gautama, Baudhayana and Apasthambha belonged.[1] The *Śrauta-sūtras* and *Gṛhyasūtras* belonged to a period even earlier than 600 B.C. The *sūtras* make frequent references to the Vedas. Kautilya, the author of *Arthaśāstra* is identified with Canukya, the minister of Chandragupta Maurya, and destroyer of the Nanda Dynasty, and is generally assigned to the period between 300 B.C. and 100 A.D. The present *Manusmṛiti* is assigned to sometime between 200 B. C. and

[10] *Ibid*, p. 9.

200 A. D., *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* to 100 A. D. to 300 A.D., and *Parāśarasmṛti's* date is left undecided, as the extant one seems to be re-written and the original one lost. Yājña-valkya and even Kautilya mention Parasara. In any case, the *dharmaśāstra* literature seems to have obtained particular importance after *Manu*. It may be also true that different sects like Manavas etc., were holding particular views about conduct and that the extant *dharmaśāstras* brought them together and coordinated them. Such work was found necessary because of the prevalence of a large number of views which were sometimes conflicting. We may, therefore, say that one main purpose of the development of this literature was to present the different forms of right conduct as given in the Vedas in as consistent and exact a form as possible in the circumstances.

4. But the circumstances did not always remain the same. Buddhism and Jainism, which weakened the distinction between caste and caste and sex and sex, was born in 600 B.C., and began to reinterpret and attack orthodoxy. There were conversions and reconversions. And some disorder entered society. Then rules and laws had to be fixed, and unrestricted freedom had to be restricted. That the authors of the *dharmaśāstras* were aware of, and alive to the new conditions is shown not only by the changing views on the function of castes and status of women, but also for their concern for reconverting those who were forcibly converted by the *melecchas* and for purifying the women who were raped by them.[11] The author who devoted much thought to this question was Devala, who is supposed to be an inhabitant of Sindh. He is said to have taught on the banks of the Indus and perhaps knew the first Muslim invasion by Mohammad Kasim in the eighth century. Thus *dharmaśāstras* were written again and again

[11] P. V. Kane : *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, p. 399; Vol. IV, p. 117.

not only to make the Vedic ideas of right conduct consistent and exact but also to make new rules and laws which changing conditions required in the interests of social stability and strength.

5. We may now give the social conditions and outlook in which the *dharmasūtras* and *dharmaśāstras* originated.

(a) The social conditions of the time were as complex for those people as the conditions of our time are for us. By the early *sūtra* period we find that the castes were more or less formed. The distinction and separation were not yet as rigid as later. Besides the castes, there were the untouchables and the *mlecchas*. There were tribes pouring into India from outside, both Aryan and non-Aryan by blood. And they were mixing up with the settled society at various levels. Some of them were accepting the orthodox religion and cult, but the others were not. So orthodoxy could not be decided by blood or race alone. Again, every tribe was bringing with it its own social and religious forms; and when the tribe was incorporated into the settled society, its social and religious forms also were to be incorporated, while at the same time the supremacy of the orthoxy was to be asserted.[12] Those who were called Sudras and *mlecchas* were not necessarily non-Aryan by blood. Orthodoxy had its own definition of the word Aryan; the Aryan was one who accepted the Arya Dharma or the Aryan Way of Life, and it was the Way pres-

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[12] See the author's *India's Culture and Her Problems*. For a detailed account see P. V. Kane: *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part I, Chs. II, III and IV.

cribed by the first two parts of the Veda, namely, the *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*, or by the Vedas in general. But this conception was later contested by the Buddhists and the Jainas, who maintained that theirs was the true Aryan Way.

The formation of the Indian society may briefly be delienated. It seems to the present writer that by the time the Aryans entered India, the Dravidians were the rulers of the land. They were experts in trade and commerce and fortification of cities. They subjugated the pre-Dravidian inhabitants. Some are of the opinion that the caste system originally belonged to the Dravidians, for nowhere else in the Aryan countries is the caste system to be found. It is difficult to be exact on this point. However, when the Aryans, who had more effective mehods of offensive in warfare, conquered the Dravidians, they found the caste system very useful for establishing their own superiority and at the same time peace in the country. They retained priestcraft and warcraft completely for themselves, thus retaining religious and political superiority in their own hands; they retained part of trade and commerce also for themselves and allowed part of it to be carried by the Dravidians, who were already experts in it. This seems to have enabled some of the Dravidians to enter the third caste. The fourth caste was comprised of the agriculturists, whether they owned the land completely or not, and of the slaves, labourers etc. Those who were too uncivilized and did not have a settled life were out-

side the four-fold caste system of society; and when some of them wished to settle down, they were allotted some of the lowest professions and were treated as the fifth caste.

But the actual formation of the Indian caste system could not have been as simple as presented. First, some of the new tribes, though Aryan by blood, would not accept the social and religious forms so far established. Those who accepted them were absorbed, but those who did not were called non-Aryan. Secondly, all the tribes whieh entered later were not Aryans, some of them were Hunas etc., who had Mongolian blood. Ways had to be found for absorbing them also, if they agreed. Thirdly, both Aryans and non-Aryans who chose to remain outside the orthodox society had inter-marriages and other relationships with it. Ways had to be found for recognizing them and legalising them. Fourthly, every tribe which had been inhabiting India or came from outside later had its own social traditions and religious cults. And it entered generally one of the four recognized castes. Hence, sub-castes had to be formed and different professions had to be assigned to each. In addition, professions had to be found for people born of mixed castes. In the fifth place, all the tribes had to be allowed to follow their own social traditions and forms of worship, so that they would peacefully settle down without bloodshed. For instance, each sub-caste was allowed to follow its own forms of marriage and worship its own gods and goddesses. The Brāhmaṇa usually officiated at such functions

which meant an indirect recognition of the superiority of the orthodoxy. But sometimes this was not even required. In the sixth place however much the authors of the *dharmaśāstras* tried to prevent the castes from following each other's professions, the profession of ruling and fighting was taken up by every caste, and they would inter-marry. Wealth and power seem to have broken the caste barriers often, which was justified in the name of profession.

(b) The outlook of the *dharmaśāstras* is generally that of the Mīmāṁsā or in other words of the *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*, the first two parts of the Veda recognized as authoritative by the Mīmāṁsā. Jaimini in his *Mīmāṁsāsūtras* expounded their philosophy. The Mīmāṁsā is an exposition of Dharma (duty, right action, conduct). But the right action which the Mīm¯ṁsā wishes to explain is confined only to sacrifies to gods, and is not so much concerned with worldly professions and laws. Hence the need for later *dharmaśāstras* and *dharmasūtras*. Kane says that Apastambha's *Dharmaśātras* contains many of the technical terms and doctrines of the Mīmāṁsā.[13] And there are many cross references between the commentaries of the *Mimāṁsāsūtras* and *dharmaśāstras*. This is natural, as both aim at expounding *dharma*. The Mīmāṁs¯ is the main *karmayogaśāstra*, and all the *dharmaśāstras* are meant to expound Karmayoga in all its detail for all the castes. Manu, though

[13] *History of Dharmaśūtra*, Vol. I. p. 41.

extolling knowledge or *ātmajnāna*,[14] calls his exposition Karmayoga.[15] We have therefore to say that not only do the *dharmaśāstras* make use of the Mīmāṁs· methods of interpretation, but also are they meant to be continuations and expansions of the study of right conduct. This is the view of Kumārila also, which it is important to note. The importance of this view is missed if the *dharmaśāstras* are taken to be only texts of jurisprudence and codification of legal laws.

This expansion was necessitated by the fact that the Mīmāms· was not concerned with many of forms of conduct like the political and economic and that new rules and laws were required by the changing conditions. That is why the authors of the *dharmaśāstras* accept not only the Vedas but also *smṛtis*, the conduct of moral leaders, and one's own satisfaction as the valid sources of *dharma*[16]. A little earlier Manu includes another, namely the character also of those learned in the Vedas as a source of *dharma*.[17] He says that he gave the *dharmas* of the differrent countries (*deśadharmas*), of the castes, of the sub-castes, and of even the *pāśaṇḍas*[18] (those who were outside the Vedic fold).

Thus the authors of the *dharmaśāstras* had to collect the various rules and laws of right action not only from the Vedas, but also from the extant *dharmaśūtras* and *dharmaśāstras*,

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[14] XII, 85. [15] II, 2.
[16] *Manu*, II, 12. [17] *Ibid*., II, 6. [18] *Ibid*., I, 118.

the forms of conduct prescribed for the castes, the customs and traditions of the many tribes which constituted the sub-castes, and also of those tribes which did not accept the Vedic way of life and were called *mlecchas* and *pāṣaṇḍas*, and which lived in the outskirts of the Aryan kingdoms and sometimes within them. The study of *dharma* made by the Mīmāṁsā could not have included so much as the *smṛtis*.

The Mīmāṁsā was mainly interested in the *dharma* that produced other-worldly effects. For it, human society was only a part of a wider society, the cosmos. The cosmic forces were at first conceived as animated and living, and later the distinction was drawn between the presiding deities (*adhidevatās*) and their material bodies. Thus the physical wind was controlled by the wind-spirit within. Besides these spirits, there were those of the ancestors. Thus, man was a member of a huge system of cosmic society and its worlds, and human society was only a small section. The Mīmāṁsā was interested in man's duties in this wider society in order to make his life comfortable and happy, and man could have such life only in and through action. Kumārila says that the Mīmāṁsā is not interested in secular matters like agriculture,[19] though it is interested in right action, *karma*. But the *dharmaśāstras* had to take interest in secular activities and expand the scope of *dharma*, without losing sight of its other-worldly reference and reference to the wider society. They

[19] *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III, p. 838.

do not indeed contain treatment of agriculture, but the relation of agriculturists to other professions. The emphasis of the *dharmaśāstras* is on *karma* (action), not on non-action, and here they follow the first two parts of the Veda and the Mīmāṁsā. The outlook of all the three, the *dharmaśāstras*, the Mīmāṁsā, and the first two parts of the Veda is one and the same. But as the first had to enter more and more into the ways of life of all the sections of human society, they had to deal more and more with secular laws and became works on jurisprudence.

6. The orthodox society with the four castes was called the Aryan fold by the writers, though the fold did not include the Aryans only by race. Those outside the fold were called non-Aryans. Even the members of the fold had different customs in different localities. The authors of the codes had to observe and legalise them for purposes of law. Similarly, they had to legalise the practices of those outside the fold. For instance, it was the practice of the *mlecchas* to sell their children; but the members of the Aryan fold were not allowed to do it. So Kauṭilya did not prescribe any punishment to the *mlecchas*, if they sold their children.[20] Instances like this show that the authors of the codes observed the customs of the tribes and castes at different places, related them to the Mīmāṁsā ideal of Dharma, and then codified them.

Then the difficulty arose about conflicts between the Vedas and the customs. It is said that the four sources of Dharma are the Vedas, *smṛtis*, customs, and one's own desires. It is also said that each preceding source is more authoritative than the succeeding one. The latter is to be

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[20] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 183 and 508.

followed only when guidance is not obtained from the former. This means an admission that the Vedas did not cover all the cases covered by the *smṛtis*, that the *smṛtis* did not include all customs and traditions, and that even customs and traditions left out cases in which the individual could have his choice according to his pleasure. But whenever there was conflict between the higher and the lower, the higher alone was to prevail.

But this dictum was not accepted universally. The reason is simple. Dharma is both this-worldly and other-worldly. Some acts which are right other-worldly are not right this-worldly and *vice-versa*. The *smṛtis* are concerned with both kinds of *dharma*, but the Veda is concerned only with the other-worldly *dharma*, which comprises the laws according to which the deities and spirits of all the worlds influence the happenings of this world and the lives of men both here and here-after. Śabara says that, when there is conflict between the *smṛti* and the Veda, as the former is concerned with worldly purposes, it cannot prevail over the latter.[21] But Kumārila sees the conflict in a different light. He seems to be in favour of the view that both are always right, and reconciliation must be made between the two by referring them to two different purposes or subject matters[22]. All *smrtis* are authoritative when we consider the purpose they serve.[23] The portions dealing with *mokṣa* and *dharma* (here Kumārila seems to be referring only to the other-worldly *dharma*) have their origin in the Veda and so do not conflict with it; but the portions dealing with wealth and pleasures (*artha* and *kāma*) have their source in worldly practices. Then also there can be no conflict, as the Vedas are not concerned with worldly practices. But this solution ignores the relation between the four values of

[21] *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III, p. 836.

[22] *Ibid*, p. 834.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 839.

life, while Śabara's solution ignores the latter two values by completely subordinating them to the first two which are accepted solely on the basis of the scripture.

Again, in the case of a conflict betwren *smṛtis* and customs, many hold that the former should prevail. But some, like Viśvarūpa and Medhātithi, think differently, the latter even maintaining that custom also is *smṛti* as it is one of the sources of right conduct. In fact, the *smṛti* is itself a codification of several practices including the extant customs and traditions. Then customs and traditions are really part of *smṛti*. So far there can be no conflict between a part and the whole. But there may be customs not observed by the authors of *smṛtis*, or introduced by new tribes entering the country, or changed in different parts of the country in order to suit the new conditions of time and place. Then there will be conflict between the codified laws and the new customs. These differences of view apply to such situations, and some of the authors showed liberality. However, on the whole the gradation of the authoritativeness is accepted.

7. Another important point we have to note about the *dharmaṛāstras* is the recognition by the writers that, in interpreting, applying and following the four guides of *dharma*, namely, the Vedas, *smṛtis*, custom and satisfaction, both head and heart are to be used. Manu gives the general characteristic of *dharma* as that which is followed by good and learned men, who are devoid of attachment and hatred, and who understand it through their heart.[24] The word "heart" is explained by the commentators as "direct" (*sākṣāt*). But Manu might have meant more. The word should have meant sympathetic. The interpreter has to observe the customs of groups and tribes, not merely to reject them if they are not similar to his own, but to under-

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[24] II, 1.

stand sympathetically why and how they are being followed, what human and social purpose they have been serving.

Again, the interpreter has to use his head also. Bṛhaspati says that "the decision (in a cause) should not be given merely relying on *śāstras*, for in the case of a decision devoid of reasoning loss of dharma results."[25] The roots of a human and rational approach are found in the *dharmaśāstras*, and their general principle is accepted, though within the limits prescribed by the conceptions of the time. But the general tendency was to follow the texts in all important cases, as it is done in many of the courts now.

VI

Points for Revaluation

1. We have seen that the *dharmaśāstras* were the codifications of the extant customs and practices. This codification was done first, to bring together in a connected form all the ideas about conduct scattered throughout the Vedas, secondly to coordinate the views of all the interpreters of the Vedas, in the third place to legalise all the customs and practices of all the tribes and localities of both the Aryan and non-Aryan folds, in the fourth place to prevent tranagressions and settle down people in their traditions, and in the fifth place to enact new laws suitable to changing and unforeseen conditions like rape and forcible conversion.

Now, apart from the injunctions of the Vedas, which cannot change, there is change faster than ever before in the customs and practices of castes and sub-castes and people outside the castes. We are finding many traditional customs and laws to be outdated, and we are introducing and importing new ones. The general tendency now is not to fix any group to any of its customs, though they are respected if the group likes to follow them. Again, the standpoint

[25] Quoted in *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III, p. 867.

of our approach to the appreciation of customs has been at least modified. For instance, attempts are made to dissuade some hill tribes from continuing their custom of marriage by capture, polyandry, polygyny and so forth. And our reason is not that they will be prevented from entering heaven but that of equality of sexes and so 'forth, which is humanistic; and we have other human, humanistic and sociological considerations.[26] We want that both head and heart should be used on a far wider scale than the traditionalists allow. The tendency is to give greater importance to this-worldly *dharma* then before.

2. This brings us to the second point, which is more philosophical than the first. The *dharmasāstras* call themselves *karmayogas* and say that every man will attain *mokṣa* if he performs his duties according to castes and *āsramas*. By the time of the Codes the ideas of God and *mokṣa* were already accepted by the Mīmāṁsā, which therefore said that *mokṣa* was attainable through *karma* (action). It first distinguished between two kinds of *karma*, sacrifices and other forms. Sacrifices do not produce bondage (*bandha*), but others do. Another distinction also was developed, namely, that of actions for visible fruit and actions for invisible fruit; and the Vedas were regarded as enjoining action with invisible fruit. Again, a third distinction, namely, between *karma* satisfying desires (*sakāma*) and *karmas* performed as duties without the idea of satisfying desires (*niṣkāma*), was also made, which was elaborated in the *Bhagavadgitā*. The former produce bondage and the latter liberation. Here come our philosophical difficulties.

(a) Can and does man perform any acion without any desire and purpose? Can any action be well-

[26] McDougall writes: "——it has been observed that the abolition of polygamy, in communities in which females are more numerous than males, has led to gross irregularities in the sexual relations as to diminish greatly the rate of reproduction", and criticises the "well-meant efforts of missionaries." *Social Psychology*, p. 233.

done without concern for the result? If it is said that actions are to be performed without any attachment and with perfect detachment, will they be done with all the care and deliberation necessary for them or will they be perfunctorily done? How can we prescribe the *karmayoga* as *niṣkāmakarma* to the general run of mankind and make it its philosophy of life and guide? Psychologists tell us that behaviour is purposive. If so, does *karmayoga* teach us unporposive action?

(b) Again, as regards the distinction between the visible fruit and the invisible, we are not as certain of the latter as we are of the former. Many of us like to reverse this Mīmāṁsā criterion and say that, when there is conflict between the two, texts advocating visible fruit must prevail. For our contention is: If both are true, then there should be no conflict between two truths; and when we are convinced of the truth of the visible, it is the invisible that should conform to it and not contradict it; if there is contradiction, we doubt the truth of the invisible. This is in line with our demand that religion should not conflict with science; and even if it does not confirm science, it should be compatible and not incompatible with it, if it is to be accepted.

This attitude of ours is due to the growing feeling that every statement of the scriptures cannot be equally true, and that every statement is not God-given and eternally true. This problem was easier for the ancient writers who accepted the scriptures as an absolute authority, and whenever they found it diffi-

cult to accept a statement at its face-value they wrestled with it grammatically and by introducing interpretative rules in order to extract new meaning. But there is a limit beyond which the passages cannot be stretched and historical scholarship is averse to artificial methods of interpretation. The modern view of the scriptures is that they are the expressions of experiences of historical individuals and seers, but not that the words of scriptures existed eternally in order to convey eternal truths.

(c) Our third difficulty on this point is about understanding how *karma* leads to a state beyond *karma*. Action presupposes the agent of action, man, ego, and also the result of action. *Mokṣa* is complete egolessness, according to all the Vedāntins. If the nature of liberation is pure egohood as the Mīmāṁsā thought, then it cannot be *mokṣa* for the Vedantins. But even according to the Mīmāṁsā, it is difficult to understand how purpose, desire etc,. can cease, if the ego even as pure continues for ever.

(d) Our fourth difficulty also is philosophical. We are no longer prepared to accept the spirits (*adhidevatās*) of the natural forces. And so we find it difficult to treat as true the conception of cosmic society, in which the spirits of the natural forces, the spirits of ancestors and the spirits of men live as members with mutual obligations and cutting across the different worlds. We have been taught to understand the activities of the natural forces as unpurposive; only activities of living beings are purposive; and of the living beings,

only man has duties and obligations. He has duties and obligations primarily to other living beings who have duties and obligations like him and secondarily to other living beings who have instinctive qualities having ethical significance like love, gratitude and faithfulness. He has no obligations to the material world of natural forces, which he can learn to control and utilize as it suits him. Thus human society acquires primary significance, and next the society of all living beings. But as the wolf and the jackal, for instance, can never be taught duties and obligations to man, man has no duties and obligations to them. They are outlaws from his ethical society. Destroying them or preserving them depends on other considerations. He has duties only towards those animals which have corresponding duties to him, whether they perform them by instinct or by a spark of reason. Thus when natural forces are known to be unpurposive in their activities, the duties of sacrifice to them lose all their significance.

(e) In the fifth place, we have to note that, according to the Mīmāṁsā, "that one should attain the knowledge of the Brahman" is not a *vidhi* or *codanā* like the other *codanās*, or in other words, *ātmajñāna* is not a *dharma*.[27] The Vedāntins hold different views about the nature of this injunction.[28] And on the whole they treat in as a special sort of injunction. But from the Mīmāṁsā

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[27] *ātmajñānasya——na tatra dharmatvam* is the opinion of the *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgādhara Gāgā? Bhaṭṭa referred to by *Mīmāṁsākoṣa*, Vol. I, p. 896.

[28] *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgoraha*, p. 6. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banares, 1916).

point of view, the injunction, "the Ātman has to be realised", is not a *vidhi* to act, to perform some action (karma), but to suspend action. Without reference to *karma*, there can be no *vidhi*. Hence the conflict with the Mīmāṁsā idea that anything can be attained only through action. Here the conflict between the Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta is fundamental. This conflict also has to be resolved by the moderns. For if the injunctions of the Mīmāṁsā and the *dharmāśāstras* are ethically binding, one who violates them is to be called unethical,—even one who does not perform sacrifices is to be called unethical with reference to the comic society; but one who obeys these injunctions but refuses to have *mokṣa* cannot be called unethical. We may admit that he may be called unspiritual, and that the injunction, "the Ātman has to be realised", is meant to make man spiritual. But the difficulty lies elsewhere; the whole ethics is geared to *mokṣa* and is justified in the name of *mokṣa* by the Vedantins and the *dharmaśāstras* under the influence of the Vedānta. Then why should one who does not believe in *mokṣa* or does not care for it regard the injunctions as ethical, if they are all geared to *mokṣa*? Will he be not justified in founding his ethics on something else? Even taking the word *mokṣa* in the wide sense of religion, so far as the general run of mankind goes, psychological tests have shown that religious faith is no guarantee of moral behaviour. H. E. Barnes says that studies carried out in New York show that orthodox religious training

did not promote honesty and reliability. "To the contrary, children who have been exposed to progressive educational methods, based upon secular premises and psychology, appeared to have a far better record as to honesty and dependability."[29] The complaint against religious ethics is that it "was designed to please the gods rather than serve man directly and efficiently".[30]

(f) In the sixth place, the ethical codes recognize three debts, debt to gods to be paid back by performing sacrifices, debt to ancestors to be paid back by having a son, and debt sages to be paid back by propagating their learning. Our generation has grown sceptical about the first debt. Regarding the second debt, people now want to have children, but for more practical and secular considerations. The propagation of learning has become now as much society's responsibility as it is the individual's. The father does not train his son in the same profession as his. Every educated man is not a teacher, and the way he teaches his children is rather indirect. All this is due to the gradual changes in our social institutions.

3. Another philosophical point of interest is the traditional conception and classification of values into *artha* (wealth), *kāma* (desires, pleasures); *dharma* (duty), and *mokṣa* (salvation, redemption). As these are values, they are also "oughts", in some sense, not necessarily in the sense of moral duty. Wealth has to be acquired; but it

[29] *Social Institutions*, p. 713. (Prentice-Hall Inc. New York, 1947).
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 669.

is meant for use in the enjoyment of pleasures and satisfaction of desires. "Wealth for wealth's sake" can be the motto of only the miser. But desires should not be indulged in disorderly, but according to prescribed rules of *dharma* or duty. There is an urge to enjoy pleasures as well as a duty to enjoy them. When urge and duty coincide, *dharma* is satisfied. But "duty for duty's sake" is not the ultimate criterion; duty is for *mokṣa*, by attaining which man transcends the sphere of duty. Thus each preceding value is a means for the succeeding one, and *mokṣa* is not a means to any.

Artha covers economic and political values. *Kāma* covers the psycho-physical values of the individual. *Dharma* covers partly religious and partly social, political and economic values. For instance, *artha* has to be acquired, but it has to be acquired only according to the rules of *dharma*. Similarly, *kāma* has to be satisfied, but it has to be satisfied only according to the rules of *dharma* again. Thus *dharma* has reference to both *artha* and *kāma* on the one side and *mokṣa* on the other. For all the three *karma* or action is necessary. There are no definite laws of *mokṣa*, because it is beyond description. The only kind of activity prescribed for attaining *mokṣa* is *niṣkāmakarma* or action without the appropriation of any of the three sets of values. But as mentioned earlier, this requires examination and explanation.

4. The next point for re-examination and evaluation is the sociological one, namely, the caste system. The modern age is not prepared to justify the continuation of this system. It is not prepared to accept that the son should take to the profession of the father, that the castes were created by God, that each caste has a particular nature (*guṇa*) and will have it eternally, that every caste should be confined to the profession assigned to it and should not take to any other profession, and that there

should be no inter-mixing of castes. It is also not prepared to accept that the difference between the sexes is as great as *dharmaśāstras* made it. It does not also beleive that the outcastes were created as outcastes by God. It is discarding many of the legal conceptions. We have therefore to determine which of the conceptions are still important for us and which harmful.

VII

Re-evaluation

1. Does a codification once made remain authoritative for ever? The answer certainly is in the negative. The authors themselves of the *dharmaśāstras* were not unanimous on every point, and some of the later writers were obliged to introduce new laws to suit new conditions.

We attach more importance therefore to the spirit behind a traditional law than to its word. That is, we want to know the reason and understand in what form and with what modifications it can be applied to our present conditions. "Present conditions", so far as the laws go, mean the changing forms of social institutions, which determine the forms of social relationships including the political and the economic. Our conceptions of man, family and society have now changed or at least modified. So any set of codified laws which suited the social institutions of a particular time may not suit the social institutions of another.

In the past, the basis of laws was religious, though as a matter of fact the authors observed the social customs and traditional laws of people and gave them a religious sanction. But this made the customs not only inviolable but also unchangeable. But the modern authors approach the studies from the side of man as a member of society, and the viewpoints are sociological and humanistic. They do not all discredit religion, but demand that

religion should not be harmful to social and individual welfare. They say therefore that only as much of the traditionl codes as is useful for the welfare of man and society should be retained, and the rest modified or rejected. The codes certainly should be allowed to act as a conservative force, but should not be allowed to hinder progress. The *dharmasāstras*, as we have noted, are peculiar combinations of ethical, social, political and legal laws; and as our conceptions of ethics, society, politics and economics change there is necessity for constant re-codification of laws.

2. (a) It is difficult, in formulating and enacting laws, not to take into consideration the purpose and motive of actions. *Niṣkāmakarma* is meant, even according to the ancient writers, for *mokṣa*, not even for *dharma*. For *dharma* all is *kāmyakarma*, though in higher interpretations of *dharma*, *karma* becomes *niṣkāma*. But for the Codes, which constitute jurisprudence, there is no *niṣkāmakarma* except in the case of children and the insane. *Niṣkāmakarma* may be interpreted as "duty for duty's sake", without reference to the results of action. But when there is no desire for results, the carefulness and interest necessary for doing an act well will not be given to it, and the act becomes perfunctory. Society and social relationships are natural to man; they grow out of his nature and serve his needs. So to ask him to act without reference to his needs is to ask him to do what is not natural to him. Visible fruits therefore are to be taken seriously into consideration so

far as the laws of the *dharmaśāstras* are concerned, even if we believe in invisible fruit. All visible fruits are connected, directly or indirectly, with man's desires and needs.

(b) So far as the codes go, the present age is not prepared to give primary importance to invisible fruit like *apūrva* in enacting our laws. Social and individual welfare is a visible fruit. There may be invisible fruits; but if they are true, they should not conflict, but be compatible with visible fruit.

(c) The relation therefore between *kāmyakarma*, *niṣkāmakarma* and *mokṣa* becomes more difficult to understand for us than for the ancients. *Karma* not backed by desire will be performed perfunctorily, whereas that backed by desire prevents salvation and strengthens bondage. This difficulty can be overcome only if ethically done *karma*, though backed by desire, has a way of leading to *mokṣa*. This is possible, so far as the present writer's understanding of the problem goes, only if *niṣkāmakarma* is interpreted as *karma* done from the universal point of view, that is, the point of view of reason or, as the ancient Greeks called it, the *Logos*. Such action can liquify the knot of egoity and identify the ego with the Universal Spirit or the Brhaman. In order to achieve this, the ,ego has not only to identify its consciousness with the consciousness of the Universal Spirit,

but also its own purposes with the purposes of the Cosmos, society and humanity. What is then attempted will be the raising of the ego from particularity to universality, which is tantamount to the negation of one's egoity[31] through action and realising the universality involved in it with all its objectivity. The transformation then will be a psychological and spiritual transformation of the inwardness of man. Action is the test of the objectivity and authenticity of the realized universality and of the sincerity of ego in its attempts to raise itself to universality. This interpretation not only accords with the essential teachings of the *karma-yoga* but also makes it understandable to the modern man. It is not possible to discuss this philosophical point further in the present paper, as the discussion will lead deep into many other intimately connected problems.

(d) The problem of cosmic society need not detain us long. We no longer believe in it, as we are not prepared to believe that the natural forces of inorganic matter are presided over by spirits (*adhidevatās*).

(e) So far as ethical duties are understood, the exhortation that the Ātman has to be realized cannot be treated as an ethical injuction. To the man who wants *mokṣa*,

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[31] The present author has so far made two attempts to explain the situation. See his "Indian Philosophy: Its Attitude to the World." (*The Vedānta Kesari*, Madras, Nov. and Dec. 1944) and "Activistic Tendency in Indian Thought" (*Ibid.*, Oct. 1955).

it may be said to be necessary; but to the man who does not want it or does not believe in it, but is satisfied with performing his duties to human and other living beings, it cannot be an ethical injunction. And he cannot be called unethical and his actions cannot be called unlawful, if he disobeys it. He can avoid *moṣka,* but he cannot avoid being a social animal with interests in his own and society's welfare, and so cannot avoid being an ethical animal.

There is a sociological side to religion. In the history of religion throughout the world, it has often affected and influenced social and political events, though in its essence it has often been regarded by philosophers as man's individual relation with the Universal Spirit. When man follows this definition strictly, his ties with society become weak. That is why religion in its psychological and spiritual aspects is often called individualistic. But when it has entered social forms and become institutionalised, it has become unprogressive and conservative, and has even degenerated itself and degenerated society. In such situations the revolt of man against religion becomes sociological and humanistic: the emphasis is laid on ethical and humanistic values. This is a peculiar feature of ethical laws which are obligatory on every man, while spiritual laws are not binding. Religion is man's own concern; but it is society's and

even humanity's concern that he is ethical.

(f) About the three debts, we accept in practice that it is the duty of every man to be a useful member of society and to contribute to its future continuity by having children; and instead of regarding the duty as enabling the spirits of our ancestors in heaven to continue in the blessed life, we regard it as a contribution to society. Similarly, in order to be a useful member of society and contribute to its progress, it is the duty of every person to educate himself, and to educate his children so long as they are not able to educate themselves. In this way, we accept two of the debts, though interpreting and justifying them in our own way. The conception thus interpreted agrees with the sociological and humanistic approaches also. Regarding the third debt, the debt to gods, it is difficult to justify it in this scientific age. This change in our attitude is due to our conception of society as limited to man and other living beings and our disbelief in the spirits of natural forces.

We are not confident about the validity of our laws if they are based on conceptions rooted in a religion that peoples the material world with spirits. We approach our study of human relationships from the side of sociology, psychology, biology etc. The present writer does not want to be understood as rejecting

the usefulness of religion for ethics. Something will be said on the topic at the end. But we have to demand that our laws should not come into conflict with our studies in these sciences. If there is conflict either must be false. But as religion is based entirely on scripture, if we are asked to accept every statement it makes, our own alternative is to ignore it, as we have now no way of knowing its validity.

3. The classification of values into *artha*, *kāma*, *dharms* and *mokṣa* is also a gradation. It has importance and value even for the modern man. The first three concern every man, whether he believes in *mokṣa* or not. If he does not believe in *mokṣa*, then *dharma* has to be reinterpreted for him. He will not accept it as the action enjoined by the Veda, but as the action required by human and social needs and welfare. He will not accept also that the ethical codes should be based on scripture. However, we have to accept the inter-relationship between the first three values.

The problem of the relation between *dharma* and *mokṣa* is very complicated, and will be presented last.

4. Caste distinctions will no longer be accepted. And no one will be treated as an outcaste. Opinion against such distinctions is now too strong for them to continue for ever, though similar distinctions are still existent outside India in the name of colour. Throughout the world including India, a new system called class system is becoming strong. Even communist countries, the aim of which is to build a classless society, are not without a class system now. In the communist and capitalist countries, the classes are of different kinds, because power and wealth are obtained in different ways in the two systems. One

rather feels that the Indian caste system, which places the Brahmin with the ideals of poverty, learning and knowledge, and advice at the top of the social ladder is morally superior to the class system, which places the man with wealth and power at the top. The degeneration of the Brāhmiṇa caste, which is poor and powerless, cannot be so harmful to society as the degeneration of the wealthy and powerful class.,

But there is another point that is worth considering. The caste system was not the result of a theory hatched by some leading Aryan, but the result of spontaneous growth, for which justification was improvised by the *dharmaśāstras*. The great advantage of the system at the time of its formation was that it allowed all castes and sub-castes, which were generally different tribes, to co-exist in a comprehensive pattern of society, each following its own social forms like marriage and its own religious forms and gods and goddesses, and contributing professionally its best to the society as a whole. Thus caste-system was an embodiment of the principle of co-existence of tribes, cultures, sets of social forms, religions, all of which the Aryan thinkers re-interpreted as forms and sub-forms of one spiritual life, and made them suit the conditions of the time. Instead of thinking that there was only one way of right living, which was theirs, and destroying all others, which was done in the history of other religions, the Aryan-leaders of India allowed all cultures, except the too barbarous and cruel, to co-exist, giving each a place within the general pattern which they called the Aryan culture. The modern age can draw some inspiration from the ancients so far as the co-existence of religions and cultures go. Of course, one should not blindly accept everything of the past.

The criticism of caste system is that it prevented the groups from changing their professions and social and

religious forms. The principle which has to be evolved by modern thinkers for co-existence of differences should avoid this mistake of preventing all change and therefore progress of any culture or religion. This is as important as to allow each to continue in its own way.

VIII

Ethics and Mokṣa

Following the *dharmasāstras*, the English word "ethics" is used in this paper in its wide sense covering all forms of prescribed conduct, including the religious and secular. The word *dharma* in the *dharmasāstras* covers all.

The question of the relation between *karmayoga* and *mokṣa* may be thought by some to lie outside the scope of this paper; then they may treat this section as an appendix. But this is a problem which the *dharmasāstras* left unsolved, except saying that this *yoga* also leads to *mokṣa*. For instance, the Yoga of Patanjali has a definite description and theory of the state of *mokṣa*, the nature of the world, and the relation between the two. On the basis of this description and theory, it tells us how *mokṣa* can be attained by following the methods prescribed. But the *dharmasāstras* have given nothing of the kind. The Mīmāṁsā, from which they drew their inspiration, was not at first concerned at all about *mokṣa*; but later it said that performance of actions according to Vedic injunctions and in a spirit of non-attachment will bring *mok:a*. But we are not given enough information about the processes that intervene between the performance of such actions and the state of *mokṣa*.

In this section only a few of the points that need consideration can be mentioned, as they are too many to permit the inclusion of all. And these points also will be mentioned in their relevance to the problem of the relation between ethics and *mokṣa*.

1. *Mokṣa* is a spiritual ideal. It is to be inwardly realized, not outwardly. It is said to be the original perfect state of the Ātman, and that is the most inward being of man.

2. Ethics is concerned with *dharma*. It is not necessary to refer to all the meanings of the word *dharma* for our purpose. They are many. Here we are concerned with the meaning in which the word is used in the *dharmaśāstras*, which are based on the Mīmāṁsā. For Jaimini, the author of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtras*, it is action according to the injunctions of the Veda. The *dharmasāstras* added actions according to the injunctions of the *smṛtis*, well-established customs and one's own satisfactions. If we generalise, we may say that it is action according to some injunction, and in cases in which specific injunctions are not present, according to one's desires. In any case, it is action, which is concerned with reality outward to man.

3. Now, while *mokṣa* is concerned with the inwardness of man, *dharma* is concerned with his outwardness. Man's conscious being has two directions, inwardness and outwardness. *Mokṣa* is concerned with the former, and *dharma* with the latter. *Mok:a* is the realisation of complete inwardness, which is differently understood by the schools, and which the *dharmasāstras* do not explain at length. *Dharma* is the realisation of perfect outwardness as embodied in social relationships.

The problem for us is to understand how perfection in the realisation of outwardness can lead to perfection in the realisation of inwardness. The former is attained through action, and the latter through cessation of all action. Now, we are not concerned with the answers given by the Vedāntic schools, which do not give *karmayoga* a place equal to that of *jñānayoga* or *bhaktiyoga*. We want the answer from the *karmayogins* themselves, but we do not find one which is satisfactory and adequate. If it is

said that *karma* ceases to have effects after knowledge of the Ātman is attained, then it is tantamount to saying that *jñānayoga* is primary and *karmayoga* secondary. But this is not consistent with the Mīmāṁsa position. Moreover, the modern man wants to justify the necessity of ethical action for every one, and so has to take up the thread of the argument of the Mīmāmsā and develop it further.

The development requires that (1) the perfection of outwardness is identical with the perfection of inwardness, (2) both of them have objective validity and inwardness is not merely subjective, and (3) both of them have universal validity. The perfection of inwardness is not private to the individual, but is a state of existence common to all, and perfection of outwardness, which is the attainment of complete *dharma*, is identical with it and is also a state common to all. An additional requirement then follows, namely, (4) that the perfection of inwardness is best attained through action (*karma*), through which perfection of outwardness is attained.

4. From the standpoint of *mokṣa* then, ethics is to be an inwardising discipline. From the standpoint of sociology and humanism, ethics is a discipline meant for social and human welfare. Both society and the individual are objective facts, and the criteria of social and individual welfare are objectively available. But the criterion of true inwardness, which is not merely subjective and imaginary, is not so easily available. Man's own subjective and imaginary states may be mistaken for true inwardness.

For attaining inwardness, there should be no other way than to be ethical, and go through ethical activity. Here can be the necessity for ethics in true spiritual realisation. And here are two presuppositions : (1) ethics is an inwardising agency; (2) it alone confers objectivity on inwardness, and makes it true. In the words of modern existentialists, which are very apt here, the inwardness

attained through activity alone can be truly "authentic" or genuine, because it coincides with the objectivity involved in practical activity. There is only one way of testing the authenticity of man's true inwardness, and that is his activity. Otherwise, as he alone can know it, he may be mistaken. Others cannot enter his mind.

5. Thus only can the necessity of ethics for spirituality be established. But there is the necessity of religion for ethics also. Man is a reflective animal; and he reflects through and on his experience. He wants justification of ethical laws, proofs for their validity. We have seen that a stage is reached in the moral development of the individual when he is prepared to go, in the very name ethics and justice, againt established laws, and flout social approval and praise. Then what can be the criterion of his activity?

Established laws are violated either secretly or boldly and openly. Those who violate laws in a cowardly fashion are the small men, who accept the law but disobey it stealthily. The other kind are the outlaws and reformers. Openly and boldly they go against the law. That is why people treat them as heroes. But in the outlaw, transgression is motivated by his ego, activated by egoistic motives. He becomes an outlaw through personal considerations. But the reformer, religious, social or political, is activated by impersonal or universal considerations. Egoism is absent in the reformer, but present in the outlaw.

It is here that religion, understood as spirituality, is necessary for ethics. Religion demands the surrender of the ego, its negation through universalisation. This is what is wanted also in those men who are social, political and legal reformers. All of them should put the question to themselves, "Am I motivated in fighting for this reform by any selfish egoistic interest?" They should be able to get from their head and heart the answer "No"

It is not the success of their fight that is the criterion of their morality, but the negation of their ego behind their activity. Political reforms may be introduced for perpetuating a man or party in power; and social reforms may be introduced to legalise one's activity, which otherwise will be illegal and even immoral. All these acts are unethical. At the highest level of ethical perfection, self-surrender, negation or cancellation of the ego, is the only criterion. And again, this can be applied only by every man to himself alone. Application of this criterion is necessary whether the leader is an atheist or believes in the Universal Spirit. Here, at this juncture, one can appreciate the modern existentialist criterion that "sincerity to oneself" is the primary criterion of morality.

This way of approaching the problem should reconcile the Mīmāsṁā with the Vedānta. For the Mīmāsṁā, realisation of the Ātman is not even a *dharma*; it is not a *codanā* (injunction) to do *karma* (action), without which there can be no *dharma*. Its value is subsidiary, because one who performs *dharma* should know what he is, that he is the agent etc., of the *karma*. So this is taken for granted, just as the Vedānta takes for granted that one who attempts realisation of the Ātman is already ethically disciplined and has realised *dharma*, if not in this life, at least in the past. The basic difference between the two schools lies here : the Mīṁāmsā understands the Ātman not only as a plurality, but also as an active agent, and therefore as the ego; but the Vedānta understands the ego as different from the Ātman.[31] But if ethics at its highest stages requires man to transcend his ego's particularlity, annul it, and rise to the level of universality, we have to

[32] There are differences between the Vedāntins again, into which one cannot enter here. They can be discussed only in a book of considerable size.

accept the distinction, and say that his cancellation of the ego is necessary for ethics in its highest stages.

Then religion is necessary for ethics, and ethics is an agency for true and objective inwardisation of man's conscious being. Then from the spiritual standpoint, all ethical actions, not only at the highest level, but also at lower levels, are graded attempts at universalising the ego and so at inwardising man's being.

6. At the highest level therefore a great deal of self-analysis and care are needed to test the authenticity of the universality of one's ethical consciousness and sincerity of one's motives. This may be called ethical psychoanalysis, performed not on others but on oneself. It is here that anxiety has ethical value. It is anxiety not only about one's motives, but also about the authenticity of the universality of one's consciousness. About authenticity, there may be another mistake, which also is a source of anxiety. So far as one's knowledge goes, its universality may be authentic; but because of man's finitude and ignorance, it may not be truly universal and not truly authentic. The leader may sincerily think that the law he is introducing will certainly promote social welfare, like the Christian missionaries to whom McDougall refers; but he might have miscalculated. But we cannot treat him as unethical for that reason. Gandhi admitted his "Himaliyan blunders", which are sincere miscalculations. At the highest level therefore authenticity, sincerity, and inner motives become more important than external consequences, because ethics is approaching spiritual inwardness more consciously.

7. Because of this inwardness and the negative criterion involved, religion cannot supply positive content to ethical laws. The source of ethical laws are social institutions, human relationships and nature. The positive content of laws is to be derived from their study.

But for one who frames the laws and inter-relates them, and for one who applies them, the negative criterion also is necessary. There can be no syllogistic deduction of ethical laws from the nature of the Universal Spirit, which is acknowledged to be beyond all description by almost all religions. What is beyond description, beyond the reach of mind and speech, cannot constitute the major premise of any syllogism.

DR. RADHAKRISHNAN AND IDEALISM.

By Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao

Among the contemporary interpreters and exemplars of India's eternal ancient cultural ideas and philosophic wisdom, harmonised with the best in modern thought, professor Radhakrishnan stands second only to Gandhiji and Tagore. He is the most renowned representative philosopher of India. He has in all some thirty volumes to his credit. They are partly interpretative and partly constructive. His two volumes on Indian Philosophy are the most authentic and liberal interpretation of the history of Indian Philosophical ideas and systems. We get a very concise account of his constructive thought in his Hibbert Lectures *An Idealist view of life*.

He is our best speaker today. Dr. Joad gives us a graphic account of the impression he made on the western audience as a speaker some twenty years ago in his book *Counter attack from the East, The Philosophy of Radhakrishnan.*[1] He is the most gifted of our Philosophical writers. In every speech and page we see the undiminished vigour of his thought, the arresting originality, and the amazing sweep and range of ideas. As an expositor he has the genius to explain clearly the most abstract and difficult problems in Philosophy and metaphysics in the most lucid manner. He has made "righteousness readable." The distinguishing characteristics of his dynamic Idealism are a deep spiritual note, a catholic outlook, a quick appreciation of the eternal values of all cultures and religion in the history of human thought and an abiding confident optimism as to the future

1 *Counter attack from the East*, by Dr. C. E. M. Joad Published in 1933. George Allen and Unwin Indian edition 1952. Hind Kitabs Ltd. Bombay, Rs. 4-12-0. pp. 228.

of human civilisation. Radhakrishnan's idealism shows influences of Śaṅkara, Hegel, Plato and the doctrine of emergent evolution. In the construction and exposition of his system he has been alive to the criticisms of the philosophical concepts by modern physics and biology. His idealism in some aspects differs from Śaṅkara and other western parallel. It is upaniṣadic idealism in its comprehensiveness. He accepts the monistic and theistic stands of the upaniṣads and does not subordinate one to the other.[2]

The central philosophical category in his idealism is the primacy of the spirit, and its manifestation in Matter, life, mind and self. The Spirit is not a homogeneous, non-composite entity like the Brahman of Śaṅkara. It is not the substance of Hegal. It is dynamic energy not immobility. It is something real in itself and by itself "we know it, we cannot explain it. It is felt everywhere though seen nowhere. It is not the Physical body or the vital organism, the mind or the will, but something which underlies them and sustains them. It is the basis and background of our being, the universality that cannot be reduced to this or to that formula.[3]"

The spirit with its characteristics, 'creativity, order, change and progress, is present in all the levels of existence in an ascending series, each representing a higher level than its former. It is the presence of the Spirit that is responsible for the energence of Matter into life, life into consciousness and consciousness to self-consciousness. The development of evolution is not merely continuous but also marks the emergence of new levels. Man is not naturally selected but spiritually elected. Reality is a general unity or continuity running through the different levels. The Spirit is not only immanent but also transcendent.[4]

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[2] *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, Chap. 13.

[3] *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 205.

[4] See *Taittirīya upaniṣad* Chap. III.

The Spirit is the Absolute. It has infinite possibilities present in it. The one actual manifestation of it is the world. The *Absolute* is not exhausted by it. Other aspects of the Absolute are *God* and *Souls*. Creation is a free act The Absolute is in no way dependent on the world. It cannot add or take away anything from the Absolute. It is a one-sided type of causation. "We cannot say the world follows from the nature of the absolute even as the conclusion of the syllogism follows from the premises, as Spinoza would have us believe. The Absolute is the ground of the world only in the sense that the possibility of the Absolute is the logical prius of the world. The world would not be but for this possibility in the Absolute[5]." Here we see the strong influence of Śaṅkara's *vivartavāda* in Radhakrishnan's Idealism.

God is the Absolute viewed from the cosmic context. It is the absolute in the emperic dress. God does not assure himself by watching from the universe the drama of life. He is organic with the world and endures as long as the world lasts. Time, God and the world are coeval. The world is relatively real. There is no dualism of God and the world in his system. God is not the mere appearance of the Absolute, but is the very Absolute in world context. When all the souls attain the conscious realisation of the unity with the *Spirit*, *God* and the world lapse into the Absolute.

The human self is conceived by Radhakrishnan as an organised whole and not as a fallen creature born in sin. Man and Spirit are akin to each other. Man and spirit are consubstantial. By ceremonial purity and ethical perfection man acquires the necessary merit for spiritual realisation. But spiritual experience is realised fully in religious intuition.

5 *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 282. Here we see that Whitehead influences also on his thought.

The concept of intuition is central to Radhakrishnan's Idealism. Intuition is wisdom transcent, it is different from intellectual knowledge, yet not discontinuous with it. It is not contra-intellectual but trans-intellectual. It is not an instinct. "It is not a shadowy sentiment or pathological fancy fit for cranks and dancing darvishes.[6]" It is not fancy or make be lieve, but a *bonafide* discovery of Reality. It is the response of the whole man to reality. Intellect, emotion and will are fragmentary aspects and their total is intuition. The great scientific inventions, literary productions, artistic achievements and moral reforms are touched by the Spirit and rooted in intuition.[7] We discover by intuition and explain by Logic Spiritual intuition is another name for mystical experience.

Radhakrishnan affirms that the future religion of the world is the religion of the mystics. He calls it the *Spiritual religion* and its two characteristics are it is *scientific* and *humanistic*. In his "*Eastern Religons and Western Thoughts*" he gives the most glorious account of the perennial philosophy of the mystics and their history in the east and the west in some 150 pages. His massive erudition, theological scholarship, and thorough documentation of the facts and theories of mysticism leaves one supremely satisfied. He sums up there the role and characteristics of mysticism. They do not admit of being summarised.

He regards that religion to day has to face science on one front and Humanism on the other. The Religion of the mystics of the Upaniṣads and *Gītā* does permit us to fly from social agonies. In his Kamala Lectures on *Religion and Society*, he has set forth how religion should spread the gospel of humanism and eliminate the gap between irresponsible wealth and human misery. It should not seek to explain social injustice in terms of

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[6] *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, p. 269.

[7] *An Idealist View of Life* Chapters IV and V.

God's will. After some 18 months stay in Russia as our ambassador at Moscow, he declared in one of his recent speeches that if religion fails to stress the humanist element; "militant atheism will be the alternative to dishonest religion." "Religion has no secrets which absolves us from living." It is not *quiescent* but *combative*. It starts with the individual but it must end in a fellowship. When the mystics refer to the kingdom of God, they do not mean this country or that continent, they mean the *world-community*. Radhakrishnan feels that the original pure Hinduism had so many good elements in it which we could follow. He suggests that all political ills, economic confusions and psychical anxieties of our age can be set right by the power of the Spirit. He writes "what we require is not professions and programmes but the power of the spirit in the hearts of men, a power which will help us to discipline our passions of greed and selfishness and orga nise the world which is at one with us in desire"[8]

Dr. Radhakrishnan's interpretation of Buddhism reconciles it with Advaita Vedānta. He has consistently maintained in his British Academy Lecture on Gautama the Buddha and other writings that Buddhism is not nihilism and Buddha is no agnostic. He could by no possible means have preached an arid rationalism to his six century B.C. pupils and enjoyed such spiritual popularity. To regard Buddha a rationalist and an agnostic is to mistake his stature. Radhakrishnan's faithful and free English translations of The *Bhagavad Gītā* and *The Dhammapada*, the representative religious classics of the two systems, give us a clear idea of the unity of their moral and spiritual outlook.

Radhakrishnan's idealism gives us a balanced and true picture of the relation between the individual and society.

[8] *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, pp. 33-34.

Two very different conceptions of human life are struggling for the mastery of the world. Extreme individualism on the one hand regards society as a means for the individual. Collectivisms of East and West do not come for the individual but aim at producing an efficient society and not the splendid individuals with power and freedom to pursue their aims. Radhakrishnan states that the individual and society, each considered apart from the other, is an empty abstraction. The real individual needs society to grow to his best stature. Society and the individuals are not antithetical principles. They are inseparable.

Radhakrishnan blue-print i.e. his Report on university education sets forth the integral view of education, of the whole man. The chapter on religious education in the report sums up his conception of religion and its influence on education. In his role as India's ambassador at Moscow, he interpreted India's mind to Russia and also Russia's five points to us. He has been invited to deliver the celebrated Gifford lectures in which I am sure he will give us a complete picture of his philosophy of life and the metaphysics underlying it. In the famous Library of *Living Philosophers series*, edited by Paul Arthur Schilipp, a volume is devoted to the philosophy of Radhakrishnan. He takes his right place in that series of the great philosophers of our age which includes Whitehead, Moore, Santayana, Einstein and Dewey Prof Hinmann in his presidential address at International Philosophical Congress, America, 1921 mentioned Radhakrishnan as the representative idealist along with Bosanqueut. His influence on Indian thought and education is of the foremost importance. He represents the best in the West and East. The need of an age is such men, but they are all too few.

"A SUGGESTION FOR A BALLET—*ABHIJÑĀNA-ŚĀKUNTALAM.*"

By Dr. J. K. Balbir

"Le geste est un acte, quand la paroḷe n'est que l'annonce de l'acte. ... La création dramatique véritable c'est la réprésentation. ....Le geste a ce rôle captiale de traduire le mouvement même de l'être, en décá de la conscience qu'en a l'individu de son propre personnage."[1]

—Paul André Lesort.

The majority of extant dramas may give an impression that the Sanskrit Drama is more the work of a poet-dramatist rather than that of the metteur-en-scène, that it is more to appreciate the beauty of composition and imagery than to witness the presentation in a theatre hall. But the impression may not be generally correct, for the *Kuṭṭanīmata* gives an account of the performance of the gay comedy *Ratnāvalī* of Harṣa, and though incomplete, the description makes it clear that it was played according to the stage directions still extant in the printed text[2]. It is, however, possible that the use of elaborate poetic verses in Sanskrit with a mixture of Prākrits and complex dramaturgical composition was rather to restrict its public to the èlite only, who with their cultural background could understand and experience the *Rasa* of the play[3]. Only the trained eye will reap the maximum of pleasure

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[1] "Gesture is an act, whereas speech is only an announcement of the act. ...Performance alone is the real dramatic creation. ...To translate the movement of the soul itself of the human being, even beyond the consciousness that the individual has of his own personality, is the significant rôle of the Gesture." Translation by the author of the paper.

[2] A. B. Keith : *The Sanskrit Drama*, p. 368; based on a statement by S. Lévi : see below.

[3] S. Lévi : *Le théâtre indien*, p. 367 ff.

from a performance. It is with this view indeed that Bharata laid down qualifications for the audience.[4] Ignorant and barbaric persons should not be admitted to the representation.[5] And no dramatic presentation at the stage is possible without *Abhinaya*: Bharata states that there are four kinds of *Abhinaya* viz. *Āṅgika* (Gestures), *Vācika* (Words), *Āhārya* (Dress & Make-up) and *Sāttvika* (Temperament).[6]

But the ballet transcends the language expressions and draws on the tradition of a particular region. As such it can be instrumental in forging cultural relations and good will in other areas of the rest of the world, being itself "the greatest shop-window for a nation's art" (Haskell). With our long tradition of dance, music and drama, and the details of *Abhinaya* given in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and *Abhinaya Darpaṇa*,[7] and lying hidden in manuscripts like the *Bharatārṇava*, the *Nāṭyasarvasvadīpikā* and the *Bharatasāstragrantha*, it is possible for us to help in the renaissance of a ballet. This is necessary because "more and more people are finding calm in this gentle art of ballet", and we may add that it is so not only in the West, but in our country as well.

The story of Śakuntalā is very well known in India as well as abroad, and with that background, we have, therefore, to consider if the immortal play based on this story could not satisfy the cultured audience if presented as a ballet.

Bharata says that only after the *abhinaya*, a poet-dramatist receives celebrity in the world.[8] After a study of the

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[4] *Nāṭyaśāstra*(N.Ś.) 27. 50-62, Kashi Sanskrit Series (KSS). See "Sanskrit Drama and the Spectator" by the author, in the Journal of Research, Agra University (Letters).

[5] S. M. Tagore : *The eight Rasas*, p. 61.

[6] NŚ. 8. 9 (The English terminology is according to Dr. M. M. Ghosh, *translation of the Nāṭyaśastra*, Calcutta, 1951) see *Abhinaya Darpaṇa* (A.D. 38—41).

[7] Edited by M. M. Ghosh.

[8] *NŚ*. 26.121 (*KSS*).

Abhijñānaśākuntalam, it appears that Kālidāsa wrote this play having in mind the stage: the stage-manager says, "*apūrvam nāṭakam prayoge'dhikriyatām*". Furthermore, Kālidāsa is sensitive to the success of his play, for he has made the stage-manager say : "Until the satisfaction of the experts, I do not consider the knowledge of acting to be perfect."[9] Indeed Bharata stated that "the production of a drama is wholly meant for attaining the success (*siddhi*) in it."[10] And unless there is a living contact between the story and the stage, the former cannot evoke the admiration that we have known to be accorded to the great artist that Kālidāsa was.

If the *Śāk*. is, in truth, stage-worthy, we can be justified in suggesting that with all the stage directions and references—direct and indirect—to *abhinaya*—Histrionic representation, given by the poet, it can be also performed as a ballet. In the *Śāk*., no less than thirteen times does he give stage directions to let the initiated spectator know the position and the description of the characters in the play. Sometimes, he would describe the positions and then add "*yathokta-vyāpāraḥ tiṣṭhati*"[11], or he would describe an action and say "*tathā karoti*"[12]. At times, he seems to help the metteur-en-scène regarding the movements of certain acts, viz., *kalaśam āvarjayati*[13], *puruṣam parimuktabandhanam karoti*[14], and *cūtāṁkuram pātayitum icchati*[15]. The position of Mārica with Aditi is given in the stage direction "*adityā sārdhamāsanastho mārīcaḥ*[16]. The king Duṣyanta tries to kiss Śakuntalā but she "acts" so as to avoid it.[17]

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[9] āk. 1. 2. [10] *NŚ* 27.1.

[11] References to the *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* (*Śāk*.) are to Nirnaya Sagar Edition, 1947. See pages 26, 57, 89, 100, 128, 241, 254.

[12] *Śāk*. pp. 27, 88, 210, 239.

[13] P. 32. [14] P. 186. [15] P. 199. [16] P. 256.

[17] P. 111.

Actually about thirty direct references point to *abhinaya* : *arthavegam nirūpya*[18], *sarasandhānam naṭayati*[19], *rathuvegam rūpayati*[20], *nimittam sūcayan*[21], *nipuṇam nirūpya*[22], *vṛkṣasecanam rūpayati*[23], *bhramarabādhām rūpayati*[24], *sṛṅgāralajjām rūpayati*[25], *madana-bādhām nirūpya*[26], *samsparśam rūpayitvā*[27], *sābhilāṣam nirvarṇya*[28], (*nalinipatre nakhair nikṣiptavarṇam rūpayitvā*)[29], *ṣakuntalā mukham pariharati naṭyena*[30], *kusumāvacayam naṭyantyau sakhyau*[31], *padântare skhalitam nirūpya*[32], *puspoccayam rūpayati*[33], *priyamvadā nāṭyena sumanaso gṛhṇāti*[34], *nāṭyena-prasādhayataḥ*[35], *śakuntalā vridām rūpayati*[36], *nāṭyena alaṁkurutaḥ*[37], *kokilaravam sūcayitvā*[38], *gatibhaṅgam rūpayitvā*[39], *adhikārakhedam nirūpya*[40], *nimittam sūcayitvā*[41], *bhītināṭatikena*[42] *nāṭyenāvatīrya sthitā*[43], *sāvadhānam nirūpya dṛṣtvā*[44], *rathādhirohaṇam nāṭayati*[45], *nāṭyenāvatīrṇau*[46], *nimittam sūcayitvā*[47].

In order to devise a ballet, we can take the above as the basis, and look for other references within the text to be translated by way of histrionic representation following the advice of the dramaturgical texts, and setting them to *appropriate* music. Bharata devotes about seven chapters[48] to the histrionic representation alone, one full chapter (23) to the costumes and make-up, and another chapter (26) to the representation of particular objects and ideas. Likewise, the *Abhinayadarpaṇa*, the *Saṅgītaratnākara* etc. among the printed texts, and manuscripts like the *Nāṭyālocana*[49] and others mentioned before, may pro-

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[18] P. 18. [19] P. 19, [20] P. 23. [21] P. 24.
[22] P. 25, [23] P. 27. [24] P. 33, [25] P. 40,
[26] P. 85, [27] P. 87, [28] P. 89, [29] P. 100,
[30] P. 111. [31] P. 115. [32] P. 119. [33] P. 119.
[34] P. 127. [35] P. 129. [36] P. 131, [37] P. 132.
[38] P. 135. [39] P. 139. [40] P. 157. [41] P. 161.
[42] P. 178, 182 [43] P. 189. [44] P. 214. [45] P. 229.
[46] P. 237. [47] P. 240. [48] Chapters 8—14.

[49] See my article entitled "*Nāṭyālocana of Trilocanāditya*" (a manuscript in the Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Varanasi). Actes du XXI^{e} Congrés International des Orientalistes, Paris, 1948, p. 192ff.

vide us with the necessary guidance for our suggested ballet.

According to Bharata, "dramatic performance in its entirety relates to the six limbs including the major and the minor ones such as head, hands, lips, breast, sides and feet;. . . and the (six) minor limbs (upānga) are eyes, eye-brows, nose, lower lip and chin."[50] And the details of "gaits" are also important.[51] It is said that "under the head of Sāttvika are described the physical states, which are deemed appropriate to feelings and emotions while the Āṅgika prescribes the physical movements which express most effectively both psychic states and physical movements."[52] And thus, different situations can be rendered by means of various expressions.

We remember that the *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* opens with the king riding in a chariot and following an antelope; we are told of the stopping of the chariot and later[53] of Sānumati entering by an aerial carriage. And Bharata states that "the Gait of a person riding a chariot should consist of simple (*cūrṇa*) steps. From the *Samapāda*[54] posture, he is to make a mimicry of the (sic) being carried in a chariot and with the one (hand he is to take up) the bow and with the other the pole (of the chariot). And his charioteer is to remain busy with the whip and the reins and the draught animals according to the class (of the vehicle) should be represented differently. And with quick and simple steps he is to enter the stage."[55] As for the celes-

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50 *NŚ*. 8. 12-13 (Translation by M. M. Ghosh).

51 *NŚ*. 13. "Abhinavagupta says : 'The Gait is to be prescribed with a view to the person, sentiment, situation, place and occasion." (M. M.Ghosh, *NŚ*. trans. p. 213, fn.1).

52 A. B. Keith : *op. cit.* p. 368.

53 *Śāk*. p. 188.

54 "Samapāda—the two feet close together. . . ." (*NŚ*. 11.14 KSS).

55 *NŚ*. 13.88—92 (Translation by M. M. Ghosh).

tial car, it is said, that "the Gait of one in a celestial car should be made like that of one riding a chariot,"[56] or "the Gait of a character moving through the sky is to include the aerial *Cāris*."[57] It is also said that "one who is about to mount (these vehicles) is to hold his body up and with opposite of this (motion) one is to make one's discent (from them)."[58] The "gait" of the child Bharata of our play "will be according to his will and no *sausṭhava* (sic) and (fixed) measurement will be required."[59] It is noteworthy that the Gait of the Jester has merited a long description in the NŚ.,[60] where his gait is to be like lame men, cripples, and dwarfs, consisting of simple laughable steps with feet raised high (and put forward). And his Gait will relate to (three) kinds of laughter : laughter due to limbs, due to words, and due to the costume and make-up. Of these, the ugly and big teeth, baldness, hunch on the back, lameness and distorted face will be objects of laughter due to limbs. When one walks like a crane looking up and looking down and with wide strides, this too becomes an object of laughter due to limbs." In the ballet, naturally we shall have to leave out the laughter caused by his words.

The Chapter on Gaits is of vital importance as will be evident from the foregoing extract. And we need not cite the Gaits mentioned in NŚ. fit for the king, the *kañcukī*, the ladies, ascetics, and other characters, and in accordance with the different Sentiments evoked in our play. Suffice it to point out that the stage-direction in

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[56] *Ibid.*

[57] *Ibid.*, 13.92. For aerial cāris, see *NŚ.* 11.11—13 & 11.30—48. *KSS.* (corresponding to NŚ. II. 10—12 & 11. 29—49-M. M. Ghosh).

[58] *NŚ.* 13. 92 (Ghosh) cf. Sāk. p. 159, 229 for mounting and p. 189, 237 for descending from a chariot.

[59] *NŚ.* 13. 186-187 (Ghosh).

[60] *NŚ.* 13. 136—144 (KSS), corresponding to Ghosh's Translation, NŚ. 13.137—146.

regard to the *śara-sandhānam nāṭayati*, could be effectively represented in accordance with NŚ, where it is stated that "there are four acts relating to the bow, viz, preparing (*parimārjana*), taking an arrow (*ādāna*), *taking an aim* (*sandhāna*), and shooting (*mokṣa*),"[61] and the appropriate gestures and postures can be used.

While women are walking and speaking, their posture (*sthāna*) is said to be of three kinds : "*Āyata*, when the right foot will be *sama*, the left foot obliquely placed, and the left waist raised; *Avahittha*, when the left foot will be *sama*, and the right foot obliquely placed and the left waist raised up; and *Asvakrānta*, when one foot is raised and the other is resting on its forepart and ready for the *sūci*[62] or the *āviddha cari*."[63] It is this last posture that is "to be assumed in taking hold of the branch of a tree, plucking a cluster (of flowers) or in the taking of rest by .... women for any purposes."[64] Obviously in the setting of the ashram and elsewhere, as planned by our poet-lover of nature, the heroine with her two female friends will have quite some occasions to be shown in this posture along with the specified movements of the hands, when they collect flowers[65] or when one of the two maid-servants holds the mango-sprout.[66] In the sixth act, Sānumati takes leave of the king and goes away with a movement of the foot called *udbhrāntaka*, which will be the same as *bāhyabhramarikā* according to the *Saṅgītasudhānidhi*, cited by Rāghavabhaṭṭa.[67]

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[61] *NŚ*. 11. 92-93 (Tr. by M. M. Ghosh).

[62] *NŚ*. 11.33—A *kuñcita* foot thrown up and brought above the knee of the other foot, and then its fall on its fore part is called *sūci cāri*; see M. M. Ghosh, tr. of *NŚ*. p. 200.

[63] *NŚ*. 13. 159-168. (Tr. Ghosh).

[64] *Ibid.*, 169.

[65] Śāk. p. 115, 117, 119, 127.

[66] *Ibid.* p. 191.

[67] P. 223.

There is a direct reference to a movement of the hand in our play, i.e. *kapotahasta*.[68] This is the technical name for the usual salute when the palms are joined, and Rāghavabhaṭṭa cites the *Saṅgītaratnākara's* definition; it is used either to 'salute, or while talking to elders.' *NŚ*.[69] also defines the movement and states the usage. Like this, in the progress of the story, many incidents will have to be represented with the movements of the hands. For instance, they will have to be inferred from the action of the ascetic boys prohibiting the king from attacking the hermitage deer,[70] which is actually indicated later[71] by a stage-direction : (*hastamudyamya*); or from the blessings offered when the king withdrew his arrow, and accepts the blessings, with a movement of the head. The ascetics greet the king in his court when they accompany Śakuntalā.[72] We can as well say that Gautamī uses the movement of the hands to sprinkle water over the head of Śakuntalā when the latter is burning with love, though Gautamī thinks, it is due to heat of the season.[73] And above all, for the curse on Śakuntalā, Durvāsas can be shown as using his hands. References to the *Janāntika*[74] are to be found as many as nine[75] times, and this stage convention necessitates the usage of the *Tripatākāhasta*—the movement of the hand in the form of a flag with three fingers.[76] Similarly, the stage direction of intently listening to (*karṇam dattvā*), or just listening (*ākarṇya*) which figures no less than twelve times[77] suggests the movement of hands.

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[68] *Śāk.* p. 191. [69] 9·124—126 KSS. [70] p. 20

[71] p. 21 [72] p. 164. [73] P. 112.

[74] See my article on "*The Conception of Conventions of Speech in Sanskrit Dramaturgists*"—Proceedings & transactions of the All India Oriental Conference, Thirteenth Session, Nagpur University, 1946, p. 192-193.

[75] *Śāk.* p. 38, 40, 64, 90, 95, 136, 141, 221, 228.

[76] *NŚ.* 9. 26-31 *KSS.*

[77] *Śak.* p. 25, 52, 77, 84, 128, 136, 172, 180, 195, 223, 240, 241.

Appropriate movements of the eyes will be indicated by stage directions in the play: viz., *sadṛṣṭikṣepam*[78] or *snigdhādṛṣṭi* or other references like *avalōkya*[79] or the throbbing of the eye.[80] For this also it will be worthwhile to seek guidance from the *NŚ*[81] which gives the thirty six varieties of glances expressing the sentiments, the dominant states, the transitory states, as also the different kinds of gestures of the eyeballs, of the eyelids, and eyebrows and mentions some additional Glances.

It is, however, to be acknowledged that while presenting a ballet of the famous play, we cannot isolate the movements of the different parts of the body of an actor portraying a certain character. And the whole body must move to depict a certain feeling or a reaction to it. We may therefore, now cite two instances of *composite movements* from Rāghavabhaṭṭa which may suggest such and similar action for other incidents of the story of Śakuntalā. The commentator is explaining the stage direction, *bhramarabādhām rūpayati*, and states that the representation of this is to be done with the movement of the head called '*vidhūta*', with the lip quivering, and the hand movement called '*patākā*' with the palm showing extrovert and stuck to the mouth.[82] Then the technical terms are defined with quotations which are not from the NS, though in essence they are not different from Bharata. Thus the *vidhūta* movement is described as quick and oblique, and its usage is given as on the occasions of an attack of cold, fever, or terror; it is said that the lip quivers in cases of suffering terror, cold and anger; and in the *patākā* hand, the fingers are extended and close one against another and the thumb

78 *Śāk*. p. 106, 134, 224, 247.
79 *Ibid*., p. 25, 89.
80 *ibid*., p. 161.
81 8· 38—125.
82 See *Rāghavabhaṭṭa* on *Śāk*. p. 34-35 (NSP. Edition).

is bent. Then again, another stage-direction, *vṛkṣasecanam rūpayati*, is explained.[83] Its representation is to be done with the movement of the hands in *padmakosa* and *nalinipakṣakosa*, taking them to the region of shoulder with the head in the *avadhūta* movement, by bending the body slightly. Again the technical terms are defined, though this time they pertain only to the movement of the hands, for the bent movement of the head is known to be called "*avadhūta*";[84] the above-mentioned movements of the hands are defined as the turned down and separated and *svastika* the *Śukatuṇḍa* hands ['the two *arāla* hands upturned and held together at the wrists will form the *svastika* hands[85] (*saṁyuta-hasta*); and in the *arāla* hand,[86] the forefinger is curved like a bow, the thumb also curved and the remaining fingers separated and turned upwards'; whereas in the *Śukatuṇḍa* hand' the ring finger (third finger) of the *arāla* hand is bent.[87]]

It is obvious that the suggested ballet cannot be staged without a proper analysis and delineation of sentiments (*rasas*) or emotional states. For Bharata said : "no sense issues (from drama) without a Sentiment"[88], or again "No play in its production can have one Sentiment only."[89] The primary *rasa* in our drama is *Śṛṅgāra*—in all its facets, *pūrvānurāga*, *sambhoga* and *vipralambha*. Therefore, as far as the representation of pure feelings is considered, we shall have to have recourse to the definitions and usages for expression mentioned by Bharata in chapters six and seven of the NŚ; though he reverts to the subject in chapters twenty four and twenty six, in the former is treated the Basic Representation (*sāmānyābhinaya*), and in the

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83 *Ibid.*, p. 27.

84 *NŚ*. 8. 28. *KSS*.

85 *NŚ*. 9. 134 (Ghosh).

86 *NŚ*. 9. 46—52 (ibid).

87 *NŚ*. 9. 53-54 (ibid).

88 *NŚ*. 6.32 (KSS).

89 *NŚ*. 7.118 (Ghosh).

latter the Special Representation (*Citrābhinaya*). Evidently these two kinds do not figure under the four kinds of *abhinaya* generally mentioned. And Abhinavagupta[90] has been in difficulty in explaining the sense or the derivation of the term *Sāmānyābhinaya* without giving any "convincing explanation." From the explanation given by Bharata himself,[91] "the Basic Representation is that which is made *simultaneously* by the head, the face, the feet, the thighs, the shanks, the belly, and the waist." It will be seen, therefore, that it corresponds to what we have called "*composite movements*" above. That clarifies the reason for Bharata to revert to such movements in later chapters after having given the specific movements of the different parts of the body. Consequently, we need now to refer to situations in our play which evoke feelings, or even to feelings themselves which direct the movement of limbs.

We have stated that *Śṛṅgāra* is the main Sentiment of our play. But there is a blending of other Sentiments also: for instance, but for the *adbhuta*[92] in the *nirvahaṇa sandhi*, the drama would have ended otherwise. We also find a happy combination of *karuṇa* in the play. And if other Sentiments are accessory, it is only necessary to represent them according to the School of Bharata.

Śṛṅgāra (Erotic Sentiment) is suggested by *smitam* (smile) and *bhrūvikṣepa*, movement of the eyebrow.[93] As for *smita*, the female companions of Śakuntalā cleverly tease her sometimes with a cunning smile,[94] sometimes with a naughty laugh.[95] As for Hāsya (Comic Sentiment) the *Vidūṣaka* is there to provide it and his presence with the

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[90] *Abhinavabhāratī* in a transcription from the Lucknow University Library, pp. 1518—24, corresponding to BORI ms. pp. 334-36.

[91] *NŚ*. 24. 72 Ghosh.

[92] P. 180, 237, 248.

[93] *NŚ*. 6.

[94] *Śāk*. P. 36, 44.

[95] *Ibid*., P. 28, 49, 119.

king gives occasions for its representation.[96] The Superintendent of Police laughs at the fisherman,[97] the king at the cleverness of the fair-sex,[98] and the child Bharata at the ascetic woman.[99] It is to be noted that most of the speeches by the king start with a smile, sometimes with a sarcastic one on himself[100] and Mātali starts to speak with a smile on three occasions.[101] Such smiles could be rendered in accordiance with the instructions in *NŚ*.[102] *Krodha* (Furious Sentiment) figures when Śakuntalā is angry with the king at his repudiation of her in the court;[103] or the king is furious when the *Vidūṣaka* cries for help at his neck bent backwards, and himself being bent "in three places like a sugar-cane".[104] *Bhaya* (Fear) in general and from having done something against royal laws (*nṛpāparādha*),[105] can be represented according to *NŚ*;[106] *bhayānaka* (terrible Sentiment) will be seen in instances of the frightened deer being followed by Duṣyanta and others and may be depicted according to *NŚ*.[107] Pathetic (*Karuṇa*) indeed is the condition of Śakuntalā when she reaches the court of Duṣyanta with a longing to meet him. After repudiation, and on seeing his ring, the king is also repentent and is reminded of his love. These poignant situations evoke expressions proper to the Pathetic Sentiment, like falling of tears.[108] This *sāttvikabhāva* is due to charm and shall therefore fall under the category of *ārtijam ruditam* accoring to *NŚ*.[109] Other *anubhāvas*—consequents, like change of colour, drooping limbs, and being out of breath, have also found place in the more famous descriptions in our play.

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96 *Śāk*. p. 62, 70, 80, 82, 199, 216. 97 P. 183.
98 P. 172. 99 P. 242.
100 P. 58, 59, 151. 101 P. 22‘ 230, 255.
102 6.54—56 KSS. 103 P. 175‘ 178, 104 P. 225.
105 *Śāk*. P. 178, 182, 192· 106 26, 57, KfiS. 107 6.72 KSS.
108 *Aśrupāta*, P. 129, 139, 140, 176, 180, 216.
109 7, 12, KSS.

Of the thirtythree transitory states (*vyabhicāribhāvas*), indications can be found to no less than twenty and it is possible to represent them according to *NŚ*. 7 and *NŚ*. 11·53. *Nirveda*, or discourgement;[110] *glāni* or weakness in Vidūṣaka being hungry, thirsty and tired; *Śaṅkā* or apprehension due to the guilt of the fisherman finding the royal ring, and in Śakuntalā when her right eye throbs;[111] *asūyā* or envy;[112] *śrama* or weariness;[11] and *ālasya* or indolence in the case of Vidūṣaka; *dainya* or depression, and *cintā* or anxiety[111] in the condition of the king; *smriti* or recollection in Śakuntala when she is reminded of the days gone-by; *vrīdā* or shame, at times, *śṛṅgāralajjā*,[115] and *vrīḍā* in the king;[116] *harṣa* or joy[117] *āvega* or agitation (in mounting the chariot) in the king going to help Indra and we have examples of agitation with confusion and haste,[118] *viṣāda* or despair;[111] *utsukatā* or impatience in Śakuntalā; *garva* or arrogance in the king; *vibodha* or awakening in the disciple entrusted with the work of keeping watch;[120] *āmarṣa* or indignation; *avahittham* or dissimulation and *ugratā* or cruelty on the part of the policemen questioning the fisherman; and *vitarka* or deliberation in Śakuntalā in the first scene; and such other feelings, are all to be found in our play. Bharata has given an elaborate treatment to this topic in the seventh chapter of his NŚ and we may seek help there for the representation of these. The stage direction *saharṣam*,[121] and *saroṣam*[121] and

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110 *Śāk*. P. 152, 197.

111 Cf. *NŚ*. 24.253, where it is said : "Personal omens indicating occurrence favourable to women will occur to their left (side) while omens in case ot all undesirable happenings will take place on their right. (Tr. Ghosh).

112 P. 176. 187. 113 P. 157

114 P. 82, 97, 99, 169, 180.

115 P. 40, 42, 131, 133, 103, 109. 116 P. 89.

117 P. 80, 94, 98, 102, 190, 249.

118 P. 20, 33, 37, 53, 222. 119 P. 89, 167, 172. 120 P. 121

121 P. 80, 94, 98, 102, 190, 244. 122 P. 44, 47 etc

of agony prevailing in Act. V and Act VII might be depicted according to Nāṭya Śāstra[123] respectively.

Evidently, the physical states, and the representation of the psychic states in a ballet has to be accompanied by the appropriate dress and make-up, a subject that has been developed under the heading of the *Āhāryābhinaya*, for which Bharata devotes one whole chapter.[124] The treatment can be found in other texts, particularly in the manuscripts mentioned above. Mātṛgupta is said to classify *Rasas* from an angle different from the traditional; he mentions three rasas: *Vācika Rasa*, *Nepathya Rasa* and *Svābhāvika Rasa*. Of these, "dialogues, verses, sentences and words, which are in accordance with the Sentiment and full of embellishments produce the *Vācika Rasa*; garlands, ornaments and dress which are in accordance with action, figure, age, caste and are proper for the time and place, produce the *Nepathya Rasa*; and that produced by beauty, exuberant youth, steadiness and patience and other qualities is the *Svābhāvika Rasa*."[125] Thus we know that even if there was difference of opinion about the number of rasas, both Bharata and Mātṛgupta were conscious of the importance of what the latter termed the *Nepathya Rasa*. Bharata mentions four elements of Āhāryābhinaya, and two of the acknowledged[126] authorities agree to their being *pusta* or model-work, *alaṅkāra* or decoration, *aṅgaracanā* or painting of the limbs, and *sañjīva* or living creatures. For a few items in our suggested ballet, we might have to procure some model-work; as for decorations, we know

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[123] *NŚ*. 26. 49, 51, and 54 (KSS). [124] *NŚ*. 23.

[125] Rāghavabhaṭṭa on *Śāk*. p. 7 quotes Mātṛgupta (*NSP*. Edition).

[126] *Nāṭyālocana* op. cit. Foll. 4b-6a; and *Nartakanirṇaya* (extract) quoted by S. Lévi : *Le théâtre indien*, p. 386.

[127] P. 97.

of the ornaments for the king, such as the fateful ring; other ornaments which he hands over to the charioteer before proceeding to the ashram, and the golden bracelet which "slips down from the wrist."[127] Under 'decoration', we have to deal not only with the ornaments but also with dress and flower garlands etc. There are regulations for dress. Thus while repenting and longing the king should wear sober dress.[128] The ascetics, as has been often said, wear bark garments, Vidūṣaka should be in tattered clothes or in at least such clothes as provoke laughter, the Chamberlain in a long white robe going down to the ankle,[129] and the *yavanīs*, either in the dress proper to their race or those of the maid-servants attending on the king. We know also that Śakuntalā herself is wearing a bark-garment, because even with that, she "was all the more attractive; what indeed is not a decoration for a charming figure?"[130] As for painting the limbs, an elaborate introduction precedes the actual usage of different colours, not only in the Bharata's NŚ., but also in the manuscript *Nāṭyālocana*, and the citation made from this work by Raghavabhaṭṭa,[131] is to be found in this manuscript. Basing ourselves on these instructions,[132] we could make use of the modern techniques of make-up for different characters staging the ballet. All that appears as living on the stage is Sañjīva, and this is a reference to the entrance of animals. Though such presentation on the stage may not have been possible in the theatre halls of yore, but could be profitably produced in this era of big and revolving stages, and the epoch of the famous ballets like the Swan-lake. And as a practical advice to the producer, Bharata says that

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128 P. 196, 251.

129 *NŚ*. 23. 116-117 (Tr. By M.M Ghosh). 130 P. 28.

131 Rāghavabhaṭṭa on *Śāk*. P. 7. Cr. *Nāṭyālocana* Foll. 4b.

132 *NŚ*. 68-145 (Tr. by M. M. Ghosh).

F. 17

upakaraṇas or other accessories may be used,[133] and only proper light substitutes for things which we see in life[134] may be used, otherwise by weight of ornaments, and arms, histrionic representation is liable to suffer.[135]

Bharata devotes one chapter to the Pictorial Representation of particular objects and ideas.[136] Such examples as the presentation of the morning[137] of the ponds of water,[138] the sun and the desire to avoid its heat[139] and the summer season in which the play has been set, omens, other than those concerned with the bodily movement of the eye or the arm, and others can be improvised on the basis of the instructions given in this chapter by Bharata.

An attempt has been made in the foregoing to show that the theme of the famous play and its celebrity, the copious stage directions, the universal appeal of the situations through which the story passes, and above all, the presiding Sentiment are of such irresistable nature, that a ballet of this tender comedy set in the midst of nature, of courtly life and divine intervention can be a greater cementing force in the cultural relations that exist between our motherland and the countries of the outside world. Its authenticity can be guaranteed if the guidance is sought in the existing texts notably the Nāṭyaśāstra and other texts on dramaturgy, dance and music. If it has been pointed out above that at many a place such texts can be our guide, as far as, at least, the histrionic representation is concerned, it is not intended that a modern enthusiast of ballet should not apply modern technique where it can be of use. It is to be admitted that suitable music has to be found or composed to accompany, but our tradition

133 *NŚ*. 23. 187.
124 *ibid*. 191. 135 *NŚ*. 23, 207 ff. 136 *NŚ*. 26 on *Citrābhinaya*
137 P. 121. 138 P. 135. 139 P. 87, 121.

of music and dance is so rich that it should not be difficult to be able to do so. It is, therefore, for the present only a suggestion for the consideration of experts of dance who have practised this art of ballet. If language be a barrier for understanding and appreciating our culture by those who do not belong to it, let ballet—this sublime language of Gestures—step in to take to fare off lands the message of our country! [140]

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140 This is a recast of a paper of the same title, read before the Classical Sanskrit Literature section of the 17th Session of the All India Oriental Conference, held in Ahmedabad, 1953. This paper was later discussed with the noted Bharata Nāṭyam danseuse Madame Mṛṇālinī Sārābhāi at her residence. She was appreciative of the suggestion, and her opinion is all the more valuable as she has held very successfully many shows abroad, and at home.

SOME ASPECTS OF ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY IN ORISSA UNDER MARATHAS.

By Dr. Bhabani Charan Ray

Orissa under the Marathas was divided into two political divisions, one of which was distinguished by the name of Garjat and the other by that of Mughalbandi. These united possessions were bounded by sea on the east, the Maratha province of Chhatisgarh on the west, the Chilka lake and Ganjam district on the south and the districts of Jaleswar and Midnapur and the province of Birbhum on the north[1]; more than one third of the country was covered with jungles.[2]

The Garjat was held by 24 tributary chieftains[3]. The Raja of Khurda was the descendant of the royal family of Orissa. He was most powerful of all the chiefs. He continued to exercise the regal privilege of conferring titles on the inhabitants of Mughalbandi and Garjat countries which was never objected to by the Marathas. It is said that no title granted by the Maratha Government was considered to confer any distinction in Orissa until confirmed by the Raja of Khurda.[4] Nearly the whole of Khurda which from the days of its rule under the native princes was parcelled out into jagirs, continued so during the Maratha Government.

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1 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultationts* 1st. March, 1804, No. 41.

2 *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 12 April, 1804, No. 13.

3 They were the possessors of "Khurda, Kanika with Kirwa and Koel Dip, Nikhuria, Dashapalla with Mohanpur, Khandapara, Narasingpur, Dhenkanal, Ranapur, Bunagur, Talcher, Baramba, Mayurbhanj, Nilgiri, Angul, Hindol, Athgarh, Marichpur, Harishpur, Bishenpur, Kujang and Pattia ; *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*, 1st March, 1804 No. 42 A.

4 *Board's collections* Vol. 586, No. 14189, p. 1.

The holders of the jagir known as jagirdars were bound by the terms of their tenure to perform certain services about the person and the court of the Raja. They were required to pay a light quit-rent in kauris denominated Tanki or provide certain amount of grains, cloth etc., for the table, wardrobe or household expenditure. A very numerous and important class of the jagirdars who were of course, the hereditary chiefs of the military of the country were Dalabeheras. Next subordinate to them were Dalais. Every estate they possessed had a principal garh or fortress of brick, stone or mud to which was attached a band of paiks, a native hereditary militia. These paiks were trained to the use of arms, such as bows, arrows, swords and also matchlock: they were always ready to follow the command of their hereditary chiefs.[5]

The Paiks held lands from the jagirdars on lowest terms; in ordinary times they appear to have been employed in agricultural labour as common raiyats.[6]

More or less similar type of feudal government, however liable to variation in details from local peculiarities existed in all other feudatory states of Orissa.

These tributary chiefs were intermediate superiors between the Maratha Government and the tenants of the soil; they were paying a stipulated light quit-rent either in money or in kind. While a smaller state like Nilgiri paid an annual tribute of Rs. 30,000,[7] a comparatively bigger state like Mayurbhanj was paying a tribute of Rs. 6,000.[8] No tribute was paid by the Raja of

[5] *Board's collections* Vol. 586, No. 14189, pp. 88-95; Ibid Vol. 587, No. 14190, pp. 291-300.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Early European travellers in Nagpur territories*, p. 6.

[8] *Selections from official letters and records relating to the history of Mayurbhanj*. Vol. I, Letter No. 241.

Dashapalla in consideration of the Raja supplying free of cost all the timber annually required for the Jagannath cars at Puri.[9] It appears that there was perhaps no definite principle for collecting tribute from the feudatory chiefs.

The Maratha Government acted as an umpire in case of boundary disputes between two chieftains. In 1775 A. D. Padmanabha Deva Birabal Mangaraj Mahapatra was the ruler of Baramba. His state was invaded by the Raja of Narasinghpur; two important forts of Kharod and Ratapat fell into his hands. The Raja of Baramba in his distress appealed to the Maratha Government which settled the boundary disputes between the contesting parties by restoring Kharod and Ratapat to the Raja of Baramba. Another example may be given here. Once there arose a dispute for the possession of Jormuha between the Raja of Angul and the Raja of Dashapalla. Raghuji Bhonsla was intimated of this matter; he settled the dispute by granting a sanad for the contested place in favour of the Raja of Dashapalla.[10]

The Maratha government seldom interfered in the internal administration of the feudatory chiefs. But in case of lunacy or inabiliy to rule, a chief was occasionally replaced by another suitable person chosen from the same family. Birakishore Deva, the Raja of Khurda, went mad[11] and beheaded his two sons, Jagannath Rao and Balabhadra Rao. In view of such violence committed by the Raja, the Maratha government deposed him from the gaddi (throne), confined him in the fort of Barabati and raised Divyasinha Deva, son of Jagannath Rao to the throne.[12]

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[9] *OrissaTributary States Bengal gazetteer*, p. 159.

[10] *Ibid*, pp. 129-30, 159.

[11] A. Mahanty (ed) *Madalapanji* (Prachi Edition), p. 79.

[12] *Board's collections*, Vol. 585, No. 14185, p. 250; A. Mahanty (ed), *Madalapanji*, p. 18.

Being secure in their forts, most of which were surrounded by dense jungles and confident of their strength to resist any attack, many of the feudatory chiefs were often irregular in payment of tribute or occasionally showed spirit of insubordination to the supreme government in Orissa. During the Mughal rule, particularly in the beginning of the reign of Aurangazeb most of the tributory chiefs of Orissa refused to pay tribute and even declared war against Khan-i-Dauran, the Governor of Orissa. The Mughal Governor took the trouble of leading a series of campaigns to suppress the chiefs most important of whom were the Raja of Khurda, Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar, Narasinghpur and Nilgiri.[13] Such instances were not rare during the Maratha rule. During the time of the dismissal of Shiv Bhatt Sathe (in 1764) from the subahdari of Orissa, the Raja of Dhenkanal murdered Buli Khan, an adopted son of Shiv Bhatt and seized his horses and effects. At the same time the Raja of Nilgiri with another chief plundered the inhabitants of some part of Balasore. Bhaskar. Pandit as faujdar of Balasore fell into arrears; he was asked by the Governor of Orissa to make payment. The Raja of Nilgiri offered Bhaskar Pandit protection, and also took the latter away with his effects.[14]

In the middle of 1769 Jai Narain, the Raja of Dhenkanal wrote to Mahammad Riza Khan, naib nazim of Bengal appointed by the British, "His country has been plundered by the Marathas. Sambhaji Ganesh, who is staying at Jajpur has rebelled against Raja Januji. Consequently the Raja's people have come from the Deccan to summon him to Nagpur. The whole country from Balasore to Cuttack is undefended and Sambhuji has

[13] J. Sarkar, *Studies in Mughal India* (Cal. 1919), pp. 205-14.

[14] *C. P. C.* Vol. II, No. 2484.

design to loot it. Should a letter of encouragement be sent to the writer, he will stay in his country with a satisfied heart. Sends to Murshidabad his brother who will relate all particulars to the Khan.[15]" In 1781 the Raja stopped the payment of tribute and rebelled against the Maratha Government. Chimna Bapu with a large force marched to suppress the rebellion.[16]

During the rule of Sheo Bhatt Sathe, the Maratha Governor of Orissa, Narayan Deo, the Zamindar of Kimedi, a descendant of the royal family of Orissa, put his claim to the throne of Khurda and invaded it. Birakishore Deva, the Raja of Khurda, in his distress, sought the help of the Marathas which was granted to him on condition of a payment of one lakh of rupees.[17] The Raja of Kimedi was driven out of Khurda. But Birakishore Deva was unable to pay off the money bargained for; he first evaded the payment and afterwards was forced to surrender to the Marathas, the parganas of Lembai, Rahang, Purusottam Chattar, i.e., the country lying between the Daya river, the Chilka lake and the sea together with the tribute of fourteen khandaits of the hills subject to his control.[18] Thus took place the dismemberment of the territory of Khurda. Even the management of the temple of Jagannath, a privilege which was so long enjoyed by the Raja from a very ancient time was taken away from his hands to be placed under the Maratha government; the Raja was allowed only a pension from the subahdars of Orissa. These matters so much annoyed the Raja that he was once attempting to obtain five hundred Telingas and provisions from the Chief of Ganjam and together with his own force to invade Puri. It was only on the representation

15 *C. P. C.* Vol. II No. 1483.

16 *Bengal Political Consultations* 29 January, 1781.

17 *Bengal Political Consultations* 4 December, 1759.

18 A. B. Mahanty (ed). *Madalapanji*, p. 79.

F. 18

of Raja Ram Pandit, the Maratha Governor of Orissa to the Governor-General at Bengal that the chief of Ganjam was dissuaded to help the Raja's design, which ultimately met with a failure.[19]

The Raja of Mayurbhanj whose country extended over the northern border of Orissa was found occasionally creating disturbances either by instigating rebels against the Marathas or withholding tributes.[20] His disloyalty to the Maratha Government is evident from a letter written by G. Vansittart, an English Officer at Midnapur to the Governor in Bengal, which said that Damodar Bhanj, the Raja of Mayurbhanj "is desirous of shaking off the yoke of the Morattas and becoming a dependent of the English and that his country is so advantageously situated that with a very little assistance from us he would at any time be able to prevent the Morattas from entering into Bengal from the southward.[21]" On 28 February, 1769 Vansittart in another letter to the Governor says "If authentic intelligence (about Marathae invasion) should hereafter arrive...............would you choose that I should enter into a negotiation with th Mohrbunge Raja and engage our protection for his support ? I have reason to believe that he would be glad of such an opportunity to shake off the Moratta yoke and the position of this country would in case of Moratta troubles render it extremely convenient to us."[22]

The Raja of Kujang was habituated to plundering vessels wrecked on the coast; he thus acquired vast wealth and was little paying any attention to the orders of

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[19] *C. P. C.* Vol. V, No. 1224.

[20] *Selections from official letters....* Mayurbhanj, Vol. I letter No. 7

[21] *Ibid letter* No. 20.

[22] *Ibid* letter No. 26.

the Maratha Subahdar of Orissa to refrain from such practice.[23]

Briefly speaking the Rajas of Khurda, Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar, Kujang, Kanika, Dhenkanal, Talcher, Hindol and Angul were troublesome while the rest of the feudatory states were either under full control or more submissive than the others.[24]

Mughalbandi comprised the plain and open part of the country which extended from the Subarnarekha to the border of Khurda and was actually in possession of Government as the royal domain and paid a regular assessment.[25] It was the policy of the Maratha government to destroy as far as practicable the smaller garhs owned by the zamindars in this part if they created any trouble at all.[26]

Mughalbandi was divided into 150 parganas under the management of 32 Amils. Each pargana was generally subdivided into two, three, four or more of mahals or allotments.[27]

The Amil or the Revenue Commissioner was responsible for the revenue assessed in his division entrusted to his charge. Under him were a number of hereditary

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[23] *C. P. C.* Vol. V. No. 314; *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations* 12 April 1804, No. 13.

[24] *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations* 12 April 1804, No. 13.

[25] *Do*..................1st March, 1804, No. 41.

[26] *Board's Collections*, Vol. 586, No. 14189, p. 96.

[27] *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, 1 August, 1822, No. 5, 15 Oct., 1821 Stirling to Government. A. Stirling was an assisant to the Commissioners for affairs at Cuttack, soon after its conquest by the British. He later on served as Secretary to the Commissioners at Cuttack till the year 1822j when he left the province to take charge of the Persian Department at the Presidency. He had access to all state papers delivered to the British by Gopal Pandit and Narayan Rao Mahashay, two Maratha officers; he ably helped the Commissioner who submitted the first report on the Marathha administration to the authority at Bengal. He submitted the minutes to the government which were published as Stirling's Minutes in 1882.

revenue collectors who were generally termed as Chaudhuries, Kanungoes, or Talukdars, each in charge of a taluka or subdivision.[28]

The Talukdars collected revenue from the raiyats of Pahikasht villages and through the Muqaddams from the Muqaddamic ones. They were required to keep the raiyats happy, prosperous and contended. In case of oppression over them, they were punished. For example Magun Chaudhuri, who, owing to his oppressive conduct caused the raiyats to abscond, was removed from office; another man named Narayan Chhotaray was given the office of zamindari of pargana Culguri with Kuthmul.[29]

In return of the service they rendered to the State, the Amils as well as the Talukdars were given rent-free lands known as Nankar as remuneration and were allowed on adjustment of accounts certain perquisites and deduction of account on expense of collection.[30] For example the Chaudhuris and Kanungoes i.e. Talukdars of Pargana Jhankar with Sadar jama, sicca rupees 9,293 enjoyed the deduction of 5,000 kahans (kauris) as zamindari kharch or Rusum from a sanad granted by Mania Bapu uncle of Raghuji Bhonsla.[31]

The Muqaddams also enjoyed some hereditary right of office and received a portion of land as Nankar known as Pitrali or patrimonial property.[32]

The Marathas respected neither zamindari nor Muqaddami tenures when it was considered suitable for them to collect direct from the cultivators of the soil. During the Governorship of Rajaram Pandit many hereditary Chaudhuris and Kanungoes i.e. Talukdars of Mughalbandi were set aside and rents were collected direct from

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[28] *Ibid*; [29] *Ibid*.

[30] *Board's Collections*, vol. 585, No. 14189, p. 300.

[31] A. *Stirling. An account* of *Orissa proper*, Appendix p. XXXVIII,

[32] *Board's Collections*, vol. 586, No. 14189, p. 300.

the raiats or through the heads of the villages.[33] For example the Raja of Patia-Sarangagarh had pargana Saibir (Sadar Jama Rs. 13,900) as a zamindari by the minister of Akbar; he was dispossessed of it and was allowed a pension and certain rent-free villages for the purpose of collecting revenue by the Marathas from the heads of the villages.[34]

It is said that the Maratha landholders scarcely had a proprietory rights in their estates. The right which was generally recognized by the Maratha Government was that the legal course of descent was seldom altered and interrupted; every transfer of land was attended with difficulties and expense. The legal heir could not obtain the estate of his ancestors without paying a fine. But this was neither certain in account nor regulated by any fixed principles. A fine was exacted from every transfer of property whether it came up from the operation of law or from the act of the landholders; this formed the part of the revenue of the government.[36]

A settlement known as Hustabood settlement was yearly made; the amount accruing therefrom was duly reported to the Government. The demand of the government was based on the amount of land actually under cultivation.[37]

The gross collection of the land revenue of Orissa of the last twelve years of the Maratha rule including that from the tributary states shows that the revenue of the last four years was higher than some preceding years rising as nearly as 15,00,000 rupees of sorts.[38] It is

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] A. *Stirling, An Account of Orissa Proper Appendix*. p. XI.

[35] *Ibid*, p. 93.

[36] *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations* 29 December, 1803, No. 45.

[37] *Board's collectins*, vol. 586, No. 14189, p. 300.

[38] *Board's collections* Vol. 586, No. 14189, pp. 182-3.

difficult to give any satisfactory reason for such an increase. One point which may go for a little augmentattion of the whole revenue was an increase in the revenue of the Parganas, Pataspur, Kamardachaur, and Bhograi, during this time under a peculiar circumstance. The zamindars of these parganas were exacting money from the landholders on various pretences, who paid their revenue through them. That amount was more than that the zamindars paid to the officers of the government. The landholders in a body went to Cuttack. They represented to the Subahdar of Orissa that the zamindars, estates were capable of paying a larger revenue than ever received from them; they were willing to pay to the government more than the government had so far received from them through the zamindars. The Subahdar was satisfied that the lands would very well bear the increase; so he passed an order for an increase of sicca Rs. 20,000 in the revenue to be paid to the government in the presence of both the parties.[39]

Stirling has estimated the land revenue of the province at 15,00,000 of sorts. But if we take the average of the last twelve years gross collection it comes to about 13,90,000 rupees of sorts only.[40]

The country being watered by a large number of rivers was occasionally subject to violent innundations which resulted in crop failure leading to scarcity and famine.[41] The Government constructed embankments at those places where banks were specially low in order to guard against spill of the rivers during flood. One of them constructed at the mouth of river Subarnarekha

[39] *Bengal Secret and Political consultations* 29 Dec., 1804, No. 45.

[40] *Board's collections, vol.* 586, No. 1489, pp. 182-3; *Asiatic Researches* vol. XV pp. 215-17; *Bengal Revenue consultations* 17 July 1818 No. 15, 13 May 1818, Ewer to government (Appendix).

[41] *C. P. C.* Vol. VIII, No. 1018.

did immense good to the people.[42] But the measures taken were not adequate to ward off such calamities from the country. During the outbreak of a famine in 1769-70 rice was so dear that it was to be had at two seers per rupee. In 1182 Amali (1775 A. D.) another dreadful scarcity of grain was experienced at Cuttack. Rice was hardly to be purchased in the bazar of Cuttack at 10 pans (Kauris) for Cuttack seer. In the mufassal paddy rose as high as 12 pans per gaun, Kulthi to 12-2, and Mandia 1—4. Considering its destructive effect a remission of seven lakhs of rupees was granted in the revenue of that year.[43] It was a general practice with the Government, to grant deduction of revenue from the raiyats and so also from the zamindars, in the event of sudden innundation, excessive rain, drought or other calamities.[44] The Government also made provisions for giving Takavi advances to the cultivators.[45]

Besides land revenue, the pilgrim tax was adding to the source of income of the country. There were only two inlets to the town and the temple of Jagannath and those were on the high road that passed through the province from the north to the south, of India. The southern inlet was close to the town while the northern one was within a distance of less than a mile. The Maratha Government appointed some officers and guards where the tax was collected. The amount of collection annually made from the pilgrims at these outlets estimated from 2½ to 3 lakhs of rupees.[46]

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[42] *Bengal District Gazetteer*, Balasore (Cal. 1907), p. iii.

[43] A. *Stirling—An account of Orissa Proper* p. 93.

[44] *Board's collections*, vol. 26, No. 14187, p. 24.

[45] *Fifth Report from the Select Committee on the affairs of E.I. Company* (1812), p. 435.

[46] *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations*—1st. March, 1804, No. 16; In Orme's Manuscripts, the fees collected by the Marathas from the pilgrims have been stated to be three lakhs; Orme's MSS. India Vol. 18, p. 5120.

In the pre-Maratha period weaving industries flourished in various parts of the country, most important of which were at Hariharpur, Balasore and Sore. At Hariharpur alone about three thousand weavers were engaged in manufacturing cloth of all sorts which was exported to the foreign countries.[47] Calicoes of Balasore and Sore were much appreciated particularly by the merchants of England and France. This profitable trade which brought a good deal of money to the country had met its gradual decline during Maratha rule chiefly because of the decline of the English, Dutch and Danish factories which were patronising the weaving industries for their business purpose. Yet the weavers as a class continued their business and made good profits.[48]

Paddy was profusely cultivated and cheaply available to be exported to Bengal[49] and in larger quantities towards Madras through the small ports of Golrah, Harishpur, Bishenpur and Manikpatna at Chilka.[50]

Salt was manufactured in plenty along the sea coast of Orissa; it was available very cheaply at four and a half maunds per Arcot rupee at the place of manufacture.[51] The amount of salt exported to Berar was three lakh maunds per annum.[52] The whole amount of salt exported to Bengal is not known. The British Company was in the habit of importing salt from Orissa at the average rate

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[47] Wilson, *Early Annals of the English in Bengal* London 1895), Vol. I, p. 15.

[48] *Early European Travellers in Nagpur territories*, pp 22-53.

[49] J. Long—*Selections fron unpublished Records*, p. 538.

[50] *Board's collections*, vol. 587, No. 14190, p. 193; Orme MSS India, Vol. XV, p. 1123.

[51] *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, 17 July, 1818, No. 15, 13 May, 1818 Ewer to Governmedt.

[52] *Bengal Civil Judicial consultations*, 5 Sept., 1805, No. 26, Encl. 4 May, 1804, Govt. to Mulville and Harcourt. Add MSS 13811, p. 57, no date. August 1885, Melville and Harcourt to Government.

of 68,269 maunds per annum during a period of ten years prior to the British conquest.[53] From a statement made by Raja Ram Pandit, the Maratha Governor of Orissa, it appears that the income of the Maratha Government from the salt sold in Bengal amounted to two lakhs of rupees per annum.[54]

A considerable trade existed between Cuttack and regions west of Orissa. Contillo (Collo) was an important centre of trade. Merchants of Berar and inland parts of India (Hindustan) brought cotton and other goods to this place where they met the traders of the coast. After the sale of their commodities while returning they carried with them salt manufactured in the Auranga in the Chilka.[55] The duty upon salt alone exported from the Auranga in the Chilka lake into the Western regions amounted to Rs. 4,500/- in Kauris.[56] The extensiveness of the above trade may be understood from the following example.[57]

Sambhu Bharti was a Mahajan of Cuttack who had Kothis (salt golas) in different parts of Khurda Raja's territory and stood security to pay Khurda-Raja's peshcash to Maratha Government to 10,000 rupees on condition of being permitted to carry on his commerce duty-free.

The following information is available to form an idea of the total revenue of the state. According to Foster's account, Cuttack province produced 17 lakhs of rupees out of which 7 lakhs were deducted for military

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[53] *Bengal Salt and Opium consultations* 26 Dec., 1817, No. 3, 9 Decm. 1817, Board of Trade to Government.

[54] *C. P. C.* Vol. VI, No. 1242.

[55] *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, p. 21.

[56] *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, 17 July, 1818, No. 15' 13 May, 1818, Ewer to Government.

[57] *Ibid*

expenses at Cuttack and the rest was sent to the Nagpur treasury.[58] Rennel (in 1793 A. D.) says "the sum of his (Mudoji's) revenue is variously stated. Some have reckoned his part of Berar (Nagpur territories) at 84 lakhs of rupees per annum and Cuttack at 24 etc.[59] Leckie says "he (Rajaram, the Maratha governor of Orissa) pays the Raja of Nagpur ten lakhs of rupees out of the collections which is estimated at 22 lakhs including what is sent from Balasore.[60]" In a letter on 29 December 1780 Rajaram Pandit writes to Beniram Pandit "the army requires for its maintenance four lakhs rupees a month, at this rate the expense of six months amount to 25 (sicca lakhs) where as the collections of Cuttack for the whole year do not exceed 20 lakhs.[61] According to Orme's MSS. the whole revenue of the country amounted from 20 lakhs to 25 lakhs rupees.[62]

Foster's account shows the lowest figure while the statements of Rennell, Leckie and Orme's MSS. put the collections at a higher rate. The statement made by Rajaram Pandit perhaps tends to show the normal income of the country. In view of the conflicting opinions given by various authorities the only thing which can be generalised is that while the normal income of the country did not exceed 20 lakhs of rupees, at times, the amount rose to the maximum amount of 25 lakhs of rupees at the time of prosperity.

In the absence of suitable bridges over the rivers for effectually opening a communication and intercourse between one part of the country with the other, the general improvements of roads and ferries received the special

[58] *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations* 2 *May*, 1788 Appendix.

[59] J. Rennel, *Memoir of a map of Hindustan*, pp. i-xxxi.

[60] *Early European Travellers in Eighteenth Century*, p 55.

[61] *C. P. C.* Vol. V, No. 2069.

[62] Orme's *India MSS* Vol. 18, p. 5119.

attention of the Maratha Government. The Marathas granted jagir for the support of ferries most important of which were at the rivers Mahanadi and Kathjuri. The land granted for maintenance of the Mahanadi ferry amounted to 12 battis or 240 bighas while the grant for the support of the Kathjuri ferry was 10 battis or 200 bighas. The persons who accepted the grants were bound to keep boats for the public purpose; such boats were provided by the owners themselves. The troops, the public officers and stores were crossed without toll but the grantees enjoyed the liberty of accepting reasonable toll for the carriage of other men and cattle. E. Watson, Judge of Circuit Court says, "Under the grants thus assigned by the Maratha Government, the ferries flourished by far the best "I ever saw in any part of India, they were decked and capable of carrying several elephants, carriages and palanquins together they must have been built at a considerable cost and kept up at a very great expense. All the purpose of a ferry as a common high way amply and fully assured under this arrangement." If the grantees did not discharge their duties to the satisfaction of the public, the only punishment which was inflicted on them was to confiscate some of the lands secured by them.[63]

The Subahdar of the province was at the head of both civil and military administration with his headquarter at Cuttack. Under him was a Kiladar in the charge of the fort of Barabati with a reserve which composed of musketeers, horse and foot. The number of the force stationed at the fort of Barabati was not same at all times. By the time Lackie travelled through the country the force consisted of 1000 Maratha and 150 Sikh horsemen and 500 irregular foot.[64] From the informa-

[63] *Board's collections* No. 14178, pp. 239-241.
[64] *Early European Travellers in the Nagpur territories*, p. 2.

tion given by an Englishman who visited Cuttack in the latter part of the eighteenth century the garrison composed of 300 musketeers and 20 or 30 horse.[65]

Under the control of the Subahdar there were a number of military stations each under the charge of a faujdar with some horse and foot. There were some chaukis under him; each of them consisted of a thanadar with some men. Garrisons were placed in some parts of the country one of them was in charge of a faujdar commanding the fort of Aurangabad.[66] A party of thirty six horse and five hundred foot was usually stationed at Balasore. A strong Maratha station at Fulwar ghat guarded the entrance of the town of Balasore. Some other important military stations that may be mentioned here were at Sore, Padmapur and Jajpur on the southern side of the river Brahmani.[67] According to Forster the number of cavalry stationed in Orissa amounted to 2,000.[68] It appears that when the British attacked Orissa the military strength was increased. 1000 matchlock men at the command of a Maratha chief were stationed at Guzar Ghat, Narasinghpur, Ramachandrapur and Kathipur in Mayurbhanj. One detachment consisting of 3,000 cavalry and infantry, under the command of Balaji took post on the north bank of the Mahanadi to fight against the British. A force of about 5,000 infantry marched towards Manikpatna for the same purpose[69].

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[65] *Orme India MSS* Vol. 18, p. 5119. This is an information given by an Englishman who visited Cuttack in the latter part of the 16th century; the name is not mentioded in MSS.

[66] *Early European Travellers in the Nagpur territories*, pp. 3, 14.

[67] *Early European Travellers in Nagpur Territories*, pp. 4, 8-12.

[68] *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations* 2 May, 1788-Appendix.

[69] *Add MSS* 13609, pp. 43-5 (a report from Budgaban Naik Kotwal of the Company's factory at Balasore, no date; *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations* 1 March, 1804, No. 26, Encl. 24 September, 1803, Ferguson to Government.

The faujdar enjoyed both military and civil authority. He looked to the general order and discipline of his division, watched the movements of the strangers, supervised trade and collection of duties on grains and other commodities on the way.[70] Particularly the faujdar of Balasore exercised his power over a large area, collected revenue from the tributary states of Nilgiri together with the annual tribute of Mayurbhanj, remitted it to Cuttack.[71] He controlled the disturbances in the frontier;[72] he suppressed the rebellion in the neighbouring feudatory states.[73]

The faujdars were given lands as their remuneration.[74] The sanads granted to the zamindars required them to attend the faujdars with the contingent of paiks on all occasions for subduing refractory subjects.[75]

The Amil was empowered to investigate and try both civil and criminal cases. Minor cases were settled by the zamindar in his revenue jurisdiction or when referred to by the Amil. The popular mode of disposing of cases was to refer them to arbitration. Harcourt the British Commissioner of Cuttack observed "even in felonies as in civil disputes all was arranged by compromise." The arbitration court or Panchayat generally consisted of five members chosen by the parties themselves or by the officer to whom the matter was referred. More heinous crimes were brought before the Subahdar of Cuttack.[76]

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[70] *C.P.C* Vol. I, No. 827; Translations of Pesian letters received 1792, No. 303; Translations of Persian letters issued 1792, No. 312.

[71] *Early European Travellers in Nagpur territories*, p. 22.

[72] *C.P.C.* Vol. VI, No. 556.

[73] *C. P. C.* Vol. I, No. 1763.

[74] *Early European travellers in Nagpur territories.*

[75] A Stirling, *An account of Orissa proper appendix* p. XI.

[76] *Bengal Criminal Judicial Consultations* L. P. 28 April, 1818, No. 37, February, 1818 Ewer to Government; Add. MSS. 13610, p. 228, 22 March, 1805, Harcourt to Shawe.

There was no distinction between civil and criminal cases. Proceedings were simple. Ewer wrote "all proceedings were summary, no written deposition taken and no form of trial observed." He was of opinion that the Oriya could "make his complaint heard without a prospect of incurring a loss neither of time and money." Justice was available quickly. Ewer also thought that under the Maratha government "Heinous offences were exceedingly rare."[77]

Generally the time-honoured customs were followed in determining the nature of punishment. A person committing a petty offence like stealing firewood was often punished with a small fine.[78] For serious offences the offender was generally imprisoned or mutilated.[79] In default of human evidence the Panchayat sometimes resorted to trial by ordeal like holding a red-hot iron or putting the hand in boiling ghee.[80]

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[77] *Beng. Cr. Jud. Consultations* L. P. 28, Apr. 1818, No. 37, 27 Feb. 1818 Ewer to Govt.

[78] *Bengal Revenue Consultations January-April*, 1791 pp. 626-7 (Resolution of Government).

[79] Ç. P. C. Vol. V. No. 1977.

[80] *Bengal Revenue Consultations*—January-April, 1791, pp. 626-7 (Resolutions of Governmedt).

A person was once accused of theft and brought under confinement by the zamindars of Dhi Bhograi. As he insisted on his innocence an ordeal was arranged in presence of a panchayat in the following manner.

The accused was brought to a place where the Thakur (God) was situated; an axe having weight of five seers was made red hot in fire and seven leaves of Pipal tree together with seven threads of silk were tied to it. The iron smith took it up with his tongs and placed it on the hand of the accused; in front were drawn seven lines on the ground at the termination of which was placed a sheaf of grass. The accused then took the axe in his hand, walked over the seven lines and threw it on the grass according to the instruction of some Brahmins.

The Ordeal of ghee was performed in the following way. Ghee was put to flame; when it was too hot a ring was placed in it which the accused was to take out in his hand. If his hand did not burn he was declared not guilty. All the above ordeals were to be performed according to *Śāstras* (Scripture).

The Amil was responsible to the government for maintaining law and order in his revenue jurisdiction. The zamindars or other revenue officers exercised police powers under the Amil. The Khandaits were responsible for maintaining law and order under the zamindars. One of their chief duties was to seize offenders and produce them before the zamindar. Under the Khandait were a number of chaukidars.[81]

During the Muslim period the worship of Lord Jagannath could not be performed with security, because of the occasional raid of the Muslims over Hindu gods. The priests of the temple of Jagannath often removed the idol of Jagannath to a place of safety very often towards south in fear of its being dishonoured in the hands of the Muslims.[82] But the Marathas, being Hindus, were much interested in encouraging the worship of Hindu gods. The government established a charity amounting to 20,000 kahans of kauris (about Rs. 6,000) to be paid annually which was known as anna-chhatra. The money was paid chiefly to the following types of persons by monthly instalments.

Some amount was given to the Brahmins who were in charge of 32 Thakurs or idols and to look to the Puja ceremonies and their other functions. Certain amount was spent for persons most of whom were old widows while the rest was expended for giving cooked provisions and cloth to the poor travellers.[83] Money[84] was also

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[81] *Bengal Revenue Consultations*, Aug. 1822, 15 Oct., 1821. Stirling to Government.

[82] J. Sarkar, *Studies of Aurangzeb's reign* p. 247; Reyaz (Eng. Trans.) p. 303; A. B. Mahanty (ed) *Madalapanji*, pp. 65-7, 76.

[83] *Letter Dt.* 28.2.1847 from Gouldesburg. Commissioner at Cuttack to the Secretary, Govt. of Bengal, regarding history of Anna-chhatra fund file No. 606, D 28.47 in the Record Room of Board of Revenue, Cuttack, Orisssa.

[84] *Ibid.*

granted to Muslim mosques for their maintenance. Kadam Rasul alone was given a monthly grant of about Rs. 75/-.

Brahmins were sometimes given lands as rewards and Gosains were occasionally given money for pilgrimage. When Motiger Summer and other Gosains came to Cuttack in the rains in 1784 for the performance of religious ceremony at the temple of Jagannath they were given one lakh of rupees in charity by Rajaram Pandit, the Governor of Orissa, by the instruction of Mundoji Bhonsla to that purpose.[85]

Particularly the worship of Jagannath and the management of the temple received the special attention of the Maratha Government. In order to add to the prosperity of this religious institution every encouragement was shown to the pilgrims intending to visit the temple by readily issuing passports for their purpose and often requesting the Government of other States to issue the same for the interest of the pilgrims.[86] As a result, pilgrims from all parts of India particularly from Bengal, Banaras, Rajputna and Central Province came in large number to visit Jagannath.[87] Assignment of lands by religious people to Jagannath was common. For example in 1773 A. D. Raja Raj Narain, Zamindar of Kashijora in Midnapur alone assigned 960 bighas of land in the village of Purusottampur for Bhog (offering) to Jagannath in the name of Govinda Das a representative of Mahant (head of a religious order) Sukdeo Das of the temple of Jagannath.[88] Another example may be given

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[85] *C. P. C.* Vol. VII, No. 38.

[86] *C. P. C.* Vol. VII, Nos. 371, 861.

[87] *C. P. C.* Vol. IV, Nos. 1094, 1104, 1224, 1367, 1395, 1475, 1591.
Vol. V Nos. 10, 604, 1247, 1386;
Vol. VI No. 927, Vol. VII, Nos. 188, 189.

[88] *C. P. C* Vol. VII, No. 1428; Vol. VIII, No. 142.

here. Bhonsla Raja and his family and Raja of Khurda and his family assigned the annual assessment of certain villages, which amounted to the large sum of 148373 K. 9 P. 8g (in Kauris) to provide Jagannath with Bhog.[89]

Brahmachari Goswain, a Maratha guru got prepared one statue of goddess Lakshmi in gold and another statue of Narayan Deva in silver. He placed the former on the left side of Jagannath on the throne; the latter was kept in the southern chamber. The temple was white-washed; many presents were made to Jagannath.[90] Offerings of an elephant, cloths and jewels to Jagannath were also made by Chimnaji Sau during his visit to Puri.[91]

Formerly the Raja of Khurda was the Superintendent of the temple of Jagannath. He was removed from this office during the rule of Sheo Bhatt Sathe. Then the temple was brought under the direct administration of the Marathas. A person was appointed on behalf of the Government for the management of land rents attached to the temple and for the general superintendence of receipts and disbursements. He also acted as the controlling authority regarding the regular discharge of the respective duties of the officers attached to the temple.[92]

Whatever offerings were given within the walls of the temple by the pilgrims to the priests and officers of the temple were utilised for the expenses of it along with the rents derived from the lands attached to the temple itself. At the annual celebration of two particular festi-

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[89] *Letter*, Dt. 10 June, 1805 from C. Grome, Collector, Jagannath Revenue Department to Thomas Fortesque, Secretary to the Commissioner of affairs of Cuttack, Vol. II, Issue II 1805—Orissa National Department to Thomas Fortesque, Secretary to the Commissioner of affairs of Cuttack, Vol. II, Issue II 1805—Orissa National Archives, Bhubaneswar, Orissa.

[90] A. B. Mahanty (ed), *Madalapanji*, p. 81.

[91] *C. P. C.* Vol. V, No. 1950.

[92] *Bengal Secret and Political Consultations* 1 March, 1804, No. 16;

F. 20

vals the extra expense met by the Government amounted to 30 to 40 thousand rupees annually.[93]

All persons working in the temple of Jagannath were the servants of the Maratha Government; all disputes in respect of duties of the Sewaks were to be referred to that Government for final decision. The offices of the Sewaks were ordinarily hereditary. But sometimes some of the offices of the Sewaks could be purchased by payment to the Government. For example, Gopabandhu Mahapatra once went to the Raja of Nagpur from the Court of Raja Birakishore Deva of Khurda. He purchased in the temple of Jagannath the office of Chhatisa Niyoga Naik; so he was awarded a state palanquin with golden pots, one pair of shawls, turbans, an ornamented umbrella, chauri, fan of peacock's feather and two torches to be used in the procession.[94]

The Maratha government was not in favour of effecting any change in the time-honoured custom of the worship of Lord Jagannath. Once an attempt was made under the leadership of Lakshman Nath Krishna Goswami who was addicted with the dogmatic views of Śankaracharya to place one idol on the jewelled throne of Lord Jagannath. In consequence of the dispute arising between the Vaiṣṇava-panthis and Śaṅkaracārya-panthis, the saint and the chief of the order of Śrīkṣetra stopped worshipping Jagannath. He sent a Vaishnava to Raja of Nagpur to launch a protest. As a result, Lakshmana Nath Krishna Goswami was warned not to introduce anything new and that he should pay due regard to the old practice and create confidence in the head of the order, so that he would continue the worship of Jagannath.[95]

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[93] *Ibid.*

[94] *P. R. letter* No. 1 from Chhatisa Niyog Nayak family at Puri.

[95] *Letter* No. 245 (*A document preserved in Orissa National Archives*),

Puri, as a seat of the temple of Jagannath long saw the rise of a number of religious institutions or monastic houses which were known as Mathas. The object of establishing these Mathas was to feed the beggars and ascetics and to give religious instructions to their disciples. So they received generally encouragement from the Maratha Government, either by occasional grant of lands or some privileges. The abot of Sri Ram Das or Dakhin Parusa Math was the guru (preceptor) of the Maratha governors of Orissa; they made rich endowments to this Math. Another Math known as Uttar Parusa Math was granted an estate, Kodhar rent-free by Raghuji Bhonsla; the revenue of the estate was to be devoted to the expenses of Mohan Bhog of Jagannath.[96] Braja Deva Goswami a preacher of Chaitanya cult had a Math at Puri; he was exempted from paying any tax for all the goods he brought from the Garjats for the religious purpose.[97] The government also took interest in assisting some heads of the Maths for recovering money and property belonging to Jagannath, which were left outside the country.[98]

With the advent of the Marathas in the country a new type of nobility developed. That class of people rose into prominence owing to the grace and favour of the Maratha Subahdar. They strengthened the hold of the Maratha Government over this country.

Rich men or the people of higher status used horses and mares for dignity and fashion to cover distance at an age when there were no modern vehicles. People on horseback were looked with respect by the people of lower

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[96] *Bengal District Gazetteer, Puri*, Vol. XIII (Cal. 1908), pp. 122, 270.

[97] *Journal of Kalinga Historical Research Society*, Vol. I, Sept. 19. No. 2, pp. 139-42.

[98] *Translations of Persian letters received* 1794, No. 153.

status. The higher class people who had some property or power were generally allowed to enjoy some exclusive rights over the others in the state. One of them was the use of palanquin; only big Maratha officers, kings and zamindars were authorised to use palanquin while the people of lower status were forbidden to do so.[99]

It was a general custom in the country that if a person desired an interview with a superior officer or a person of very high status, he should not approach him empty-handed. He had to make presents as befitting the status or rank of the person interviewed. Such presents were known as Nazarana. If a respected foreigner had to interview a Maratha Officer exchange of presents was also not uncommon. All the Subahdars of Orissa who went to Nagpur had to make presents to the Raja. Similarly all the people in Orissa who interviewed the Subahdar had to make like presents. Such practices were also not unknown in the feudatory states of Orissa where the kings interviewed were formally offered presents.[100]

Generally the hosts entertained their guests at their house by requesting them to seat on the mat spread for that purpose; but in case of rich ones they were seated on cloth spread on a carpet.[101] It was a usual practice that the guests were offered pan and attar as soon as they took their seats. In the like manner after the ceremony of the distribution of pan and attar was over the company broke up.[102]

Hunting was a favourite pastime with the higher section of the people. Orissa was considered as a natural zoological garden for its rich store of various animals.

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[99] *C. P. C.* Vol. V. Nos. 1977, 2070.

[100] *C. P. C.* Vol. VIII, No. 620.

[101] *Early English travellers in Nagpur territories*, p. 56.

[102] *Ibid*; C. P. C. Vol. VIII, No. 630; C. P. C. Vol. V, No. 1977.

Sometimes there was demand from the neighbouring states for supply of some animals like lion.[103]

Pan was commonly chewed by the people; people of higher status smoked tobacco[104] ; opium was also taken by many.[105]

Music and dance received patronage from the kings and rich people. Dancing boys appeared in the public to show their performances in royal ceremonies. Dancing girls also amused the kings and nobles by their dancing performances. Most of the songs sung by the dancing boys or girls related to the achievements of Vishnu in his several incarnations.[106]

There were story-tellers who could amuse the people by their interesting stories.[107]

People believed in supersitions. If a man suffered from fever occasionally five or six men held the patient in a sitting posture while the doctor spoke some enchanted words blowing in his face at each period. Sometimes people aggravated his rage by holding a burning horse's hoof so that all the smoke went up his nostrils.[108]

At Bhadrak weary pilgrims going to sleep in the mango groves woke up frequently stark-naked owing to an intoxicating preparation put into their noses in order to make them senseless for taking away everything from them. Such thing was generally attributed to some supernatural power.[109]

Due examination of documents including the religious grants reveals that three types of languages were

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[103] Vol. V. No. 1978.

[104] *Early European travellers in Nagpur territories*, p. 13.

[105] *Ibid* p. 5; H. R. Ghosal,—Economic transaction in Bengal Residency, p. 127.

[106] *Early European travellers in Nagpur territories*, pp. 39-40.

[107] *Ibid*, p. 13.

[108] *Ibid*, p. 41.

[109] *Ibid*, p. 10.

used in them. Both Persian and Maratha languages were used in Court and Public offices. Most of the records found in the Orissa Government Archives or in private custody of some old families of Orissa are written either in Persian or in Marathi or in both. Others are of trilingual character bearing Marathi, Persian and Oriya.

People used commonly quill pen and ink prepared locally to write chiefly on conuntry-made papers.[110]

The time-honoured practice of writing on bundle of palm leaves with the iron pen continued during the Maratha period. Paper was hardly used by the common man for his purpose. It was considered that palm leaves would last longer than the papers written over. So poems composed, translations made from Sanskrit works, account kept, were recorded in the palm leaves. While voluminous works appear to have been written on palm leaves during the Maratha period, yet palm leaves received scant regard from the Maratha Government to be used for official purposes.[111]

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[110] G. B. Toynbee, *A sketch of the History of Orissa*, p. 70.
[111] *Ibid.*

ON THE IMPORT OF A PAURĀṆIC VERSE

By Dr. Viman Chandra Bhattacharyya

The verse in question runs thus :

Eka āsīd yajurvedas taṁ caturdhā vyakalpayat /
cāturhotram abhūd yasmins tena yajñam athākarot //[1]

The verse means that there was one Veda—the *Yajurveda*. It was divided into fourfold in accordance with the fourfold priestly duties and by that (he) performed Yajña.

This is a counterblast to the inveterate belief that the *Ṛgveda* is the original Veda[2] and the *Yajurveda* appears late in the field by way of liturgical compilation. On the other hand, the facts that from a study of the metres and some sporadical instances of misrepresentation based on the *Ṛkprātiśākhya* it has been proved by scholars that the text-tradition of the *Ṛgveda* was undergoing through ages a process of steady stablilization which, when complete at a comparatively late date was put to writing only at a much later period at the hands of the final redactors[3] and that a number of *i*-stems and *u*-stems of Indo-European antiquity have been retained only in the *Ṛgveda*,[4] establish its antiquity over the other Vedas beyond question. We, therefore, face a curious contradiction and hence the scope of this article.

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[1] *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 3.3.11.

[2] Griffith, *Hymns of the Atharvaveda*, preface, p. 2.

[3] *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, Vol. 1, Ch. XVI, pp. 336—7.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 338. Ghosh has discussed the *i*-stems and *u*-stems in his *Linguistic Introduction to Sanskrit*, pp. 131—2.

Ludwig (*Der Rigveda*, Band III, p. 92), however, holds that some texts of the *Sāmaveda* have retained their original archaic forms much more closely than their corresponding ṛk-parallelisms. It should be noted that this theory of Ludwig has been severely criticized by Oldenberg (*Prolegomena*, pp. 288ff.)

The religious rites prescribed in the Purāṇas are of Gṛhya character and they do not require the three Śrauta fires for their accomplishment. Elsewhere,[5] I have discussed that the Vedic Yajñadharma, for some obvious reasons and inherent drawbacks, gradually recedes back or is relegated to a subsidiary position in the new social set up of the Purāṇa period when religion emerges in a new garb differing from its pre-Purāṇic counterpart in point of domesticity. The *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*[6] gives us a story according to which the household (Gārhapatya) fire is the original one and the introduction of the other two is made by Aila Purūravas at a much later epoch and I observed in my last article that 'by the introduction of the aforesaid myth (and by declaring that the *Yajurveda* is the original Veda) the authors of the Purāṇas were able to convince the society that the Gṛhya rituals preceded their Śrauta counterparts in the evolution of ritual history and, therefore, a relegation, if not rejection, of the latter would only mean a go back to a practice sanctified by both originality and antiquity.'[7] The *Vāyu Purāṇa*[8] reads :

asvatthād araṇiṁ kṛtvā mathitvāgniṁ yathāvidhi /
mathitvāgniṁ tridhā kṛtvā hy ayajat sa narādhipaḥ//
eko'gniḥ pūrvamāsīd vai ailas trīṁstānakalpayat ///

In the light of the aforesaid myth it becomes impossible to deny a chronological priority of those mantras in the *Ṛgveda* that are originally composed even in that age for being used in domestic rites.[9] We can reasonably conjecture that the Vedic Aryans develop at their

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[5] See my article 'Paurāṇic Tradition—Is it Vedic ?' (Journal of the G. N. Jha Research Institute., Vol., XV pp. 109—33).

[6] 4.6.35—46. Comp. *eko'gnir ādāvabhavat ailena tv atra manvantare tretā pravartitā-ibid.*

[7] My article referred to in f. n. 5, (p. 132.)

[8] 91.46—7.

[9] Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda* (H. O. S., vol., 31), p. 256.

religious commencements elaborate system of domestic rites before working up a highly complex structure of Śrauta ceremonials. Such a conjecture involves the admission of the existence of a Gṛhya literature even before the Brāhmaṇas which view we are scarcely qualified to accept without bringing forward a theory of wholesale destruction to explain the disappearence of this Gṛhya literature preceding the Brāhmaṇas. Nor is there convincing proof at our disposal to state with confidence why the agencies of destruction should have singled out this particular branch of literature. On the contrary, circumstancial evidence does not permit us to declare convincingly t'at systematised treatises on Gṛhya rituals in the pre-Brāhmaṇa period were waning. The Sūtra literature, as a class, is composed in mnemonic catchwords, highly artificial and enigmatic, and this peculiar style is generally held to have been necessitated, with all probability, by an urge to devise means for easily memorizing the entire exposition of the intricate Vedic rituals in an age when teaching being mainly oral, the intricacies of Vedic ritual tradition demand a transmission from teacher to student and from generation to generation as well with meticulous care.[10] An overnight appearence of Gṛhya Sūtras without a hypothesis of a literary background representing, in phases, the traditional expositions of Gṛhya rituals, remain logically inexplicable. In other words, Saṁhitā> Brāhmaṇa > Śrauta Sūtras in the Śrauta field should logically correspond to a like order in the Gṛhya field too.

[10] Comp. tataś ca coditānām karmaṇāṁ sukhāvabodhāya bhagavān baudhāyanaḥ kalpam akalpayat yato brāhmaṇānāṁ ānantyaṁ duravabodhatayā. . . . ato na taiḥ sukhaṁ karmāvabodha iti kalpasūtrāṇīmāni pratiniyata-śākhāntarāṇy aṅgīcakruḥ pūrvācāryāḥ kalpasya vaiśadya-lāghava-kārtsnya-prakaraṇaśuddhyādibhiḥ prakarṣair yuktasya—Sāyaṇa's commentary on the *Baudhāyana Sūtras*.

If it be held that the division of the Veda into the distinct collections (Saṁhitās) is needed by the growing complexties of rituals and that this is done to facilitate the performance of the respective duties of the four chief priests, it must be admitted after due consideration of the aforesaid Aila-Purūravas-myth that the *Yajurveda* referred to in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*[11] is the Veda for the Gṛhya rituals and is the earliest forerunner of the whole Vedic literature we possess to-day.

The story of Aila Purūravas introducing three fires in place of one, stripped of the Purāṇic grafts and overgrowths, simply means that Gṛhya rites around the domestic hearth (Gārhapatya Agni) prevail first and the development of a complicated and elaborate ritual of 'Triad of Fires' (the Vaitānika or Śrauta sacrificial ceremonial)[12] is only a late introduction., According to the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Purūravas Aila is the son of a ruler migrating from Bahli in Central Asia to mid-India. According to *Matsya Purāṇa*,[13] Ilāvṛta Varṣa in Central Asia is the realm of the parent of Purūravas. Roychoudhury holds that Bahli refers 'doubtless to Balkh or Bactria in the Oxus valley.'[14]

Burrow says[15] that 'Aryan invasion took place in succ-essive phases, and not in one simultaneous movement.' It may not therefore be an improbable conjecture that use of three fires in sacrificial ceremonial makes its headway in Indian soil along with the advent of a later party of in-vading Aryans coming from the Oxus valley of which Aila Purūravas happens to be a leader-member, and before

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[11] 3.3.11. [12] VII. 103. 21-2. [13] 12.14ff.

[14] *Political History of Ancient India*, (sixth ed.) p. 25, f.n. 17. See also *IHQ*, 1933, p. 37—39.

[15] *The Sanskrit Language*, p. 31.

[16] 'One Veda' is referred to in many other passages : *vedaś caiko caturdhā tu vyasyate dvāparādiṣu—Matsya Purāṇa*, 144. 11; *sa vedaṁ ekaṁ bahudhā vibhajiṣyati te sutaḥ—ibid.*, 14.16; also *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, 3.2.56—7.

this, performance of Gṛhya rituals is the normal practice with the Indo-Aryans. It may allowably be regarded that the 'One Veda' of which the Purāṇas speak is[16] the Veda that prevailed in the then Indo-Aryan society as a basic guide-book of Gṛhya ceremonies before the Śrauta rituals were introduced by Aila Purūravas. We may assume a hypothetical name for this Veda and call it 'Gṛhya Yajurveda'[17] for the purpose of our discussion. Even when the ceremonial structure is transformed to the Śrauta pattern by Aila Purūravas, let us further assume, a section of the people cannot adapt to this new system wrought overnight and, continues, as before, maintaining only one fire—the Domestic hearth. Or, in other words, this section still remains loyal to the *Gṛhya Yajurveda*.[18] The Purāṇas refer to a class of brāhmaṇas known as Ekāgni.[19] This reference may be taken as a corroboraion of our hypothesis of the *Gṛhya Yajurveda*. It means that even during the Purāṇas a class of brāhmaṇas exists outside the fold of the Śrauta cult. The *Gṛhya Yajurveda* seems to retain its hold on its followers since the earliest period to so great an extent that even its strong rival—the Śrauta ritual system—cannot drive it to extinction.

Now, if the existence of Ekāgni brāhmaṇas be admitted, a Vedic basis for their creed cannot possibly be denied to them. Which and where is that Veda ?—is a moot point to decide. We can bring our hypothetical *Gṛhya Yajurveda* to our rescue at this point probably with satisfaction.

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17 Comp. *gṛhasthopaniṣat purāṇī—Matsya Purāṇa*, 40.3.

18 In the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, 62.45f. We are told that the Vaidik Dharma procedes the Saṁhitā Dharma. As the compilation of the three Saṁhitās is made with a view to the Śrauta ritual, the latter evidently stands for the Yajñadharma and its predecessor—Vaidik Dharma—most probably stands for the hoary Gṛhya cult conducted according to the *Gṛhya Yajurveda* of which the Purāṇas speak as the 'One Veda'.

19 Comp. *agnīṣomayamābhyāṁ tu kuryād āpyāyanaṁ budhaḥ, dakṣiṇāgnau pratīte vā ya ekāgnir dvijottamaḥ—Matsya Purāṇa* 16.33 ; and *ekāgner eka eva syān nirvāpo darvikā tathā—ibid.*, 16.40.

It is no wonder that with their growing supremacy as the highest caste of the Āryan society, the brāhmaṇas, at one time, drape a glittering mantle of Śrauta ritual with a corresponding monstrous literature—the three Vedas—around the phantoms of the Gṛhya ritual system which gradually becomes moribund and ultimately extinct under the pressure of the intruder cult. In fact, the Purāṇas believe not only in a dangerous tampering in the body of the Vedas but also in its reshuffling in all climes and all ages.[20] This is particularly true of the *Yajurveda* which being tampered and reshuffled at different hands assumes three different names—Śyāmāyanī, Ālambī and Āruṇī—in the northern, eastern and the central part of the country respectively.[21] Hint of the wrong method pursued by Śākalya in course of his splitting up of the Vedic mantras into their constituent Pada-units is also dropped.[22]

It should be noted that the Purāṇas sometimes speak of the pauruṣeyatva of the Vedas. K. Nilakantaśāstrin produces evidence from the Purāṇas to this effect. He draws attention particularly to two passages of the *Vāyu Purāṇa* in this connection.[23] The *Vāyu Purāṇa* which by virtue of the nature of its contents is generally regarded as a genuine Mahāpurāṇa[24] says that sacrifice was instituted at the beginning of the Tretā age[25] and originally a Yajña

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[20] Comp. *pratimanvantaraṃ caiva śrutir anyā vidhīyate—Matsya Purāṇa*, 145.58. The *Brahmāṇḍa purāṇa* tells that mantras grow again and again due to the transitoriness of the Devas (67.78).

[21] *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, 66.23 and 67. 8—9. This chapter gives a fairly long list of the different sages and the prodigious number of Saṁhitās composed by each of them.

[22] In the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*, it has been told that Śākalya called Padavittama or Vādakartā dies of his being defeated by Yājñavalkya in a controversy with the latter (Chapter. 66).

[23] Indian Historical Congress, Lahore, 1940, pp. 77—79.

[24] S. B. Choudhury, *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Patna, XV, pp. 183—194. Comp. Pargiter, *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, p. 24; Pusalkar. *Journal of the Univ. of Bombay*, X, pp. 148—155.

[25] *Vāyu Purāṇa*, 57.61, 86f.

was Ahiṁsātmaka.[26] These two views of the Purāṇas—the Vedas are human compositions and the Yajña is ahiṁsātmaka—deserve serious attention. The first one is only a natural corrollary of the Purāṇas believing in the reshuffling of the Veda in successive stages and the second corroborating a chronological priority of the Gṛhya ritul.

A dim corroboration might come also from another direction. In the *Matsya Purāṇa*, Manu asks Janārdana to tell him the history of his predecessors.[27] Therefrom we learn that the Manu of the *Matsya Purāṇa* is the seventh Manu belonging to the Vaivasvata Manvantara.[28] A list of all the Manvantaras with their corresponding Devatā and Ṛṣis is given in this chapter. There we are told that in the era of the Auttami Manu the gods are named Bhāvanā and Auttami Manu gives birth to ten sons, the first two being Īṣa and Ūrja.[29] In the Manvantara immediately following—the Tāmasa Manvantara—the gods are styled Sādhya.[30] In the *Ṛgveda*[31] performance of Yajña as the first institution is connected with the Sādhya gods whom the *Matsya Purāṇa* places in the Tāmasa Manvantara. The first mantra of the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*, on the other hand, opens with the two names Īṣa[32] and Ūrja who are the sons of the Auttami Manu preceding the Sādhya gods by one Manvantara. The retention of the two names in the very first mantra of the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*, the Veda for the ritualists, may not be fortuitious.

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[26] *Ibid.*, 57. 97f; Comp. Pargiter, *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, p. 315. Comp. *adhvara iti yajñanāma dhvaratir hiṃsākarmā tatpratiṣedhaḥ—Nirukta*, 1·8.

[27] *Pūrveṣāṁ caritam brūhi manīnāṁ madhusūdana—Matsya Purāṇa.*, 9.1.

[28] The Sāvarṇya Manvantara, the eighth in the order, is referred to as a future era : *sāvarṇyasya pravakṣyāmi manor bhāvi tathāntaram—ibid.* 9.31.

[29] *Ibid.*, 9.11—13.

[30] *ibid.*, 9.16.

[31] 1.164.50.

[32] As opposed to Īṣa in the *Matsya Purāṇa*.

The *Vāyu Purāṇa*[33] says that a group of gods called Jayā is created from the mouth of Brahman and their bodies are made of mantras (Mantraśarīrāḥ). Two gods belonging to this *Jayā*-group are named Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa. This probably hints at the fact that these two Iṣṭis are original Gṛhya rites and that is why they form the model of all the Pākayajñas of the Gṛhya cult. The illuminating remarks of Apte may be quoted in this connection. He says, 'The truth seems to be that though the Gṛhya (or domestic) worship was earlier, its elaboration through the multiplication of ritual acts and rubrication of Mantras is later than the development of the Śrauta (or public worship of the Fires, as is confirmed by the fact that as a class, Gṛhyasūtras are later than the Śrautasūtras. This is of course, true in a general way and in individual cases, the borrowing from the one to the other will have to be carefully established. The points of contact between the two cults are numerous. For example, all ritualistic acts like purifying, cleansing, pouring, washing, atoning for sins, uniting, girding, casting off, anointing, placing, gazing etc. have similar contexts and Mantra-rubrics in both the Śrauta and Gṛhya cults as Dr. Pillai has shown. The Darśapūrṇamāsa becomes the model for the Pākayajña of the Gṛhya rites. The Madhuparka ceremony is so appropriate and essential to both the types of contexts, that its original character—whether Śrauta or Gṛhya—cannot now be determined. Some common items like the Praṇītā-praṇayana (the ritual act for carrying forward the praṇītā waters), the very stereotyped Jaya, Abhyātana and Rāṣṭrabhṛt oblations and the very important Dīkṣā and Tānunaptra ceremonies seem to have been copied in the Gṛhya ceremonial from the Śrauta. On the other hand, simple ritual acts like 'rinsing the mouth with water' or 'entering

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[33] 66.4-7.

one's house' seem to be borrowals from the Gṛhya sphere".[34] The above excerpt shows the place of the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsa Iṣṭis in the field of Hindu religious rites—Śrauta as well as Gṛhya—and may speak for my thesis that they are the earliest ritual forerunners in the entire domain of sacrificial ceremonial. In the expression *iṣṭimaya ṛṅmayo yajurmayaḥ sāmamayo'tharvamayaḥ*, the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*[35] gives the Iṣṭis a distinct position over the four Saṁhitās revealing thereby that originally the Iṣṭis are rooted above the extant Saṁhitās. The *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa*[36] tells that an eternal place can be attained by performing the Darśa and the Pūrṇamāsa Iṣṭis :

darśaṁ ca pūrṇamāsaṁ ca ye yajanti dvijātayaḥ/
na teṣāṁ punarāvṛttir brahmalokāt kadācana//

while, on the other hand, the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* declares[37] that merits accruing through the performance of Śrauta sacrifice is transitory.

To sum up, the Purāṇas believe in the Pauruṣeyatva of the Vedas, that is, of the extant Saṃhitās which, according to them, are late compositions only after the Śrauta cult (the cult of three Fires) is introduced, and not of the *Yajurveda* of which the extant Saṁhitās are offshoots. This *Yajurveda* is not the same now known under this appellation. From a passage of the *Matsya Purāṇa* we learn that Aila Purūravas was a Mantravādin and a Kṣatriya as well.[38] This information combined with the fact that he was also the introducer of the (system of Śrauta ritual to be accomplished with) three Fires leads us to the one and only con-

[34] *Dr. C. Kunhan Raja Presentation Volume* (The Adyar Library) Madras, 1946), p. 240.

[35] 4.1.10 [36] 20. 7. [37] 2.14.23.

[38] *Manur vaivasvataś caiva aile rājā purūravāḥ*
kṣatriyāṇāṁ varā hy ete vijñeyā mantravādinaḥ
Matsya Purāṇa, 145. 115—16.

Pargiter, *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, p. 10.

clusion that the system of Śrauta ritual round which brahmanical legerdemain and craftsmanship have worked up monstrous literatures through centuries, has been the momentous contribution of a Kṣatriya. It is strange that the enormous Vedic literature remains notoriously silent about so great an information. Just as a similar deleberate suppression of information by observing a 'conspiracy of silence' as Pargiter calls it, is found in the non-mention of Vyasa as the compiler of the Vedas for fear of fatally impairing the sacrosanctity and unassailability of the Vedas, so here also, a fact of the greatest moment has been passed over by the upholders of the Brahmanic tradition for fear of losing the very ground on which the orthodox theory that the Vedic mantras are originally composed for being applied to Śrauta ceremonies stand.

THE CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIAN AESTHETICS

By Sri H. L. Sharma

(Continued from Vol. XVI, Pts. 1-2 p. 244.

V. Beauty As Fitness

1. *The Meaning of Fitness (Aucitya).*

In what has preceded we considered beauty in art as a simple neucleus, such as emotion, form or ornament. Kṣemendra proposes a theory in which they are organised into a unity as elements. The central[1] organising principle is 'fitness' of each element with the rest and the whole. The fitness of each element with the whole is aucitya. Now aucitya[2] is a positive and pervasive quality from which each element derives its meaning and claim to belong to the artistic whole. No Rasa[3] or ornament or collocation is beautiful in itself and by itself. It is beautiful because, and to the extent to which it fits with the whole. A Rasa, if it is out of place somewhere, will only mar the beauty-effect[4]. An ornament decorates the artistic form, and an excellence (गुण) raises it above dull monotony of the commonplace only when it combines with the whole suitably. When the artist, either by means of a word, patch of colour, line or mass or musical tune, suggests an eternal verity, it brings the work in harmony with the soul by strengthening[5] our consciousness of truth in it. This is so with each element aspiring to affect us artistically.

The view as stated above arises from a deeper consideration. A work of art has to affect and stimulate the whole man, and not a part. It must, therefore, contain

not only the sensible or emotional elements but also the intelligible, even intellectual and real elements, such as meaning (अर्थ), description of historical events and the like[6]. A large number of non-aesthetic elements are converted by the power of aucitya into a rich source of beauty-experience. This view may be named as the Composite Theory of Beauty. Kṣemendra insists that each element—and there are many elements in a work of art—*goes beyond itself* in a harmonious whole, and richly contributes towards the totality of aesthetic effect. Even a red vermilion mark on the forehead of a woman, fitly placed, is not only beautiful in itself but beautifies the whole[7]. Similarly, a refractary[8] element may produce a negative effect by not obeying the law of propriety. An element thus goes beyond itself positively or negatively either by intensifying or spoiling the intended impression, as the case may be.

We are now very close to grasping the meaning of *aucitya*. In so far as an element *goes beyond itself and contributes towards the total effect*, the part becomes an active participant in a community. An element must live but not for itself. Kṣemendra thus defines aucitya as the quality of being fit (ucita), which means, when one is Sādṛsa[9] to another. Sādṛsa means con-similar, whereform we may conclude that the elements may be said to be fit to one another when they are inspired by the same purpose. The purpose in our context is only artistic. When the elements move towards effecting an artistic fulfilment, they are fit if, and to the extent to which, they are imbued with a 'community-sense'. The result of a fit combination is harmony (हृदय संवाद) and its opposite is dis-harmony (हृदय विसंवाद). In this Kṣemendra betrays that the final test of beauty is the subjective effect on the aesthetically alive soul.

Kṣemendra is the poet-philosopher gifted with lively beauty-sense. In another[10] place he gives a proof of it

by bringing out psychological and aesthetic value of each metre in poetry. Metre as the powerful emotionalizing agent is an element in literary art. Its fitness with central theme, motif and emotional tempo is important. About Upajāti[11] metre he tells us that it enters our ears and mind with its thin end of unaccented syllables. If its opening is made a thick end by accenting the syllables, it pains the ear. Totaka[12] is another metre which, by its swift movement and measured rhythm, makes our heart dance. Mālini[13] is at its best if its second half contains compounded words; it becomes dull and flat in its effect if its first half contains them. Even a man not versed in the art will feel pain, which he cannot describe in words, hearing the discordance like that of the Vina thrown out of tune.[14] Kṣemendra thus indicates the psychological texture of each metre, and, in the next chapter, discusses the fitness of each as the vehicle of aesthetic charm.

The *Composite Theory of Art*, as we may name the *theory of aucitya*, can be extended much beyond Literature. It applies to all Compositions, and, objectively all arts are various forms of compositions. The elements in an art are not strewn over irrationally, but they are gathered up in a living whole. Something must pervade them all like their moving spirit; something must create a sense of harmonious 'togetherness'. And this is their mutual fitness.

VI. The Principle of Sonus

1. *The Advent of Dhvani.*

The discovery of Dhvani[1] may be regarded as a 'crisis' in the development of Indian Aesthetics. It summed up, and went beyond, both the views of art-quality regarding it as positive mutual fitness (aucitya) and as negative deviation from the commonplace (Vakrokti). It necessitated re-thinking and re-defining of all art-elements, vir-

tually creating a need for revaluation, by raising several fundamental issues which it successfully tackled. These issues were :

(i) How is it that a work of art is an inexhaustible source of aesthetic charm and newness ?

(ii) In artistic enjoyment, transcendence of art-experience is as essential as its immanence in the sensible material. What psycho-aesthetics lies behind this transcendence—immanence of art-experience ? In the formulation of the Principle of Sonus, there was a search for the most natural idiom of art-creation and recreation, and a comprehensive point of view. In what follows we intend to formulate the main issues and the solution which it suggested.

At the outset, Ānanda, the author of Dhvani, states that essence of poetic art consists of two elements,[2] viz., primary and suggested meanings. The primary is the direct and immediate meaning of words which are the constituent materials of literary art. In other arts, graphic or auditory, colour, volume, line, movement, posture and tune, are the primary plastic material. Words in literature and colour etc., in non-literary arts are the sensuous basis in which art-quality is immanent. The artist directly deals with the sensible element and moulds it into a significant and symbolic form. The sensible element being his primary care and concern, the artist graces it with such qualities as excellences (गुण), embellishments (अलंकार) and configuration (बन्ध). The excellences, energy, sweetness and Felicity, are, as already noted, the modes of creative expression in art. They are internalized, but they also characterize the external lay-out of art and become index of the inward vision of beauty. So is the case with beautifying devices and gestalt processes common to all arts. The sensible element forms the body of art and so must possess the grace of it.

"But that which raises the mind into the realms of ecstasy and spiritual existence is other than the sensible element." It is a super-individual quality transcending parts and yet lending them an ineffable charm. Abhinava tells us that this 'going[4] beyond' the sensible material or the primary meaning can be ordinary as we find in wit, humour etc. and poetic. The artistic function of suggestion is to create a state of Rasa, which has been defined as rhythmic and creative flow of life at higher planes of existence. Coomaraswamy has rendered it as 'overtone of meaning'. The fact of the matter is that Indian Aesthetics recognizes only the sonorous character, and not the pictorial, of art-experience. All art-experience is musical and rhythmic. Even in graphic and dynamic arts, the musical harmony is mentally realizable, if not actually audible, above the apparent element of art as an echoing voice. In fact the creator and critic of art being both living, moving spirits, cannot create or enjoy art without converting the immobile into mobile, visual harmony of form into musical rhythm of movement. Art-philosophy in India, therefore, named the highest form of aesthetic realization as dhvani or sound. Art-experience may be regarded as a continuum of blissful illuminations supervening over the presentational continuum of sensible elements.

These flashing[5] moments of rhythmic and creative state rise above the sensible elements as echoing resonance from a gong.[6] Beauty of a work of art is to be judged by how much it is able to bring about a rhythmic resonance of emotions and thought by the dynamo of its perceptible elements. The artist, in an extraordinary flash of beauty-impulse, invents a symbolic-form, which can raise and illumine the mind. Ānanda[7] is emphatic that every form cannot do it. The original art-genius shows itself only in the invention of proper and powerful forms. The conscious[8] concern of the artist is the significant forms though they

emerge from the unconscious fulfilment of beauty-impulse. "It is like the man who, aiming at illumination, concentrates on preparing the wick of lamp." This unconscious fulfilment by a conscious process of sense-experience invests the objects with inexhaustible aesthetic charm. Ānanda with other art-philosophers insists on this character of beautiful objects that their charm never fades,[9] that their appeal is ever fresh and refreshing. Abhinava[10] reinforces the master by stating that "beauty of thea work of art like the love-frolic of beloved is unfathomable and knows no satiety by repetitions."

The unfathomable and infinite character of beauty in art is due to its power of affecting the conscious self by harmony of perceptible elements, and, more, its power of emotionalising the unconscious self by resonance of their musical rhythm. The conscious is only the finite organ of action and adjustment. The unconscious as the submerged bedrock of our life is infinite. Dhvani as the form of reverberation in the mind is the starting of movements in the infinite self, resulting in the boundless joy of beauty-experience. Its newness and thrill are not due to satisfaction of curiosity instinct, but they directly arise from the loosening of individuality bonds when the Infinite is stirred up to realise itself through the finite conscious self. Jagannātha[11] most explicitly defines Dhvani as a form of manifestation. It is when "the self tears off its finite covering. As the lamp lights up itself and all that is in its neighbourhood, so the self illumines itself and other causes of aesthetic experience. As aesthetic experience is coterminous with contemplation of the causes, so that when it is over, we do not experience the infinite core of our own existence."

There is thus, Jagannātha tells us, the ground for comparing aesthetic experience with mystic self-merger[12] in Samādhi state. "The joy there is not the ordinary joy

of life, for it does not result from the psycho-organic apparatus." This explains how and why the rose of the artist goes beyond the natural rose of the botanist or the imitative rose of the pictorial painter. The artist's rose must work upon the conscious finite self, so that it rests in the realms of limitless spiritual bliss. This also explains why an excessively emotional art without affecting the deepest core and touching only the outer fringe of life is condemned as "sensational" and cheap. Patmore calls a purely emotional art 'an alluring harlot.' Indeed, the principle of Sonus answers a vexing problem of psycho-aesthetics, namely, the question of limit and justification of each art-element without excess or default. When any of the elements is glorified, as is done during the decadent ages, it only proves the weakening of the creative will.

2. *Aesthetic Paradox.*

Indian Aesthetics expresses the paradox[13] of aesthetic experience in a way of its own : Female beauty of breast is not appreciated either when it is too much concealed from view or when it is too much exposed to it. Beauty of a work of art reaches the pinnacle of perfection only when, like the maiden's breast, it is half-revealed and half-concealed. Art consists in revealment of the deep facets of internal or external nature. It is no art unless it illumines and articulates the inmost recesses of the soul or maps out the uncharted beauties of colour and form. Art has been defined as Expression, as efferent movement of the mind. And yet there is no art whatever when everything is brought over the surface, made patent and exposed to vulgar view. More art lies in concealment. The art of Realism, the pictorial art with its emphasis on 'representational literalness' falls flat in taste and exhausts its charm, because it conceals nothing from direct communication, leaves nothing for chewing over, and is too much simpli-

fied for the exercise of our higher faculties. Thus we face the Paradox in art-experience between expression and impression, concealment and revealment of what is beautiful in art.

Incidentally we may say that it is so much like the Paradox of Inference in the realm of knowledge. Thought-movement is the act of rational creation when there is the passage from the old to the new. This passage is illumined by the light of Reason. Rational activity consists of the comprehension of implications. The conclusion in a reasoning is the rational illumination starting from the premises. In beauty-illumination of the mind, the unrevealed which is realizable in a state of contemplative self-merger is its novel and essential part. The perceptible elements revealed to our senses start the process. They are the patent part of our experience. The passage from the perceptible to the imperceptible is brightened by the flashing light of imagination. In Rasa-experience there is short-circuiting, so that the passage from one to the other is felt as immediate. In other forms of art-experience, it may be long. Sometimes the delayed starting of the beauty-thrill is welcomed as highly valuable as in experiencing the charm of a metaphor, noble thought or some other non-aesthetic constituent of art, for in that case sufficient time is allowed for chewing and contemplating. The passage should not be too long from the perceptible to the imperceptible. Indian Aesthetic thinkers are unanimous in holding that immediacy of beauty-illumination, which is the characteristic of Rasa-experience, is the supreme quality of art.

Jagannātha lays it down as the dictum[14] of aesthetic experience : "There is no primary meaning or the perceptible element in art which by itself, without being touched with even slight suggestiveness, can bring about beauty-thrill." At another place he teaches that aesthetic enjoyment consists in the sudden and swift revelation of a vast

wealth of suggestions, and not in making things too plain for the exercise of imagination.[15] Here it is pertinent to ask : Why is it that a large core of aesthetic meaning should be kept unrevealed, which the imagination of the enjoyer realizes in the moment of appreciation? Abhinava[16] clearly formulates the questions : "What ugliness would result if we disclose everything? How do we enhance beauty-thrill by concealing something from open view."

Several answers to the above queries may be given, each correct as far as it goes.

1. One explanation is based on the conception of neural energy. Exercise and expenditure of energy stored in the neurones are pleasurable. The more complex, diffused and intense is the stimulation, the greater is the stir of joy in the mind. When everything is plain, the higher faculties of imagination are not exercised, and, hence the higher brain centres are not called into action. Concealment and suggestiveness in art, therefore, are checks to over-simplication. 2. Allied with this view is that of Vernon Lee,[17] who tells us that aesthetic perception differs from ordinary perception in being active rather than passive. We take pleasure by contemplating an aspect of thing, not that the object gives it to us. Active perception in the form of contemplation of form is a characeristic of visual art. Passively looked, a painting is an ordinary colour-work. To active contemplation, the same colour-work reveals a wide vista through suggestion. The colour-suggestions, sometimes, of such difficult but vital notions as Infinite Peace or Action, is the wealth hidden behind configuration or linear rhythm. Artistic joy is the sudden lightening up of vast subliminal treasures of those sublime and intense experiences, which discursive thinking singularly fails to realise. In sculpture we realise pulsation of life in marble; in music, we are face to face with the idea of eternity; and so on. Lee concludes that aesthetic joy is caused by activi-

ties of our own. We can thus hold that concealment in art is for the purpose of intensifying self-activity. If there is no unrevealed core, there is no chance for it. Hence naturalistic art falls flat and wearies the mind.

2. Yet a third answer we have already considered partly before. It is that if anything affects our conscious finite self, it touches only a fringe of our life. Art-joy is an immeasurable experience, resulting as it does from the subterraneous stirring. The concealed core of art is for the purpose of awakening the subliminal life. Rasa-experience is, according to Indian Aesthetics, the fulness[18] of blazing conscious activity, which appeals to the *whole* man. The Principle of Sonus lays emphasis on the inexpressible element in art, and not so much on the obvious and the patent. The purpose of aesthetic contemplation (carvaṇa) is to create rhythm in the unconscious depths of the soul.

3. Another answer clearly stated by Ānanda[19] is that in poetic art each word and its meaning go much beyond their immediate implication. In other arts also, the obvious constituent means more than meets the ear and the eye. The line, *e.g.* of face in a work of sculpture may speak of firmness of determination or other mental spiritual qualities. For whatever mysterious reasons a spiritual significance has come to be attached to the immediate and obvious contents of consciousness. Art banks upon, and builds its effectiveness with the help of, the spiritual suggestions of the perceptible qualities. Each word and meaning has an energy of awakening in us and starting a train of imagery. There is, as has been said, an extensive and intensive 'stimulation' of the entire psycho-somatic system, as there is the 'apperceptive stimulation' in the rational activity of the mind. In solution of a problem, there is a general stir and awakening of the 'apperception mass' in the mind, which is the real joy of thinking activity.

In the same way, in artistic enjoyment there is a general emotional resonance, induced by the dynamo of a word, which is the essence of beauty-thrill. Ānanda[20] tells us that the beauty of art-creation is due to the fact that in no other way but that one the moving and resonant thrill can be brought about. If it could be achieved in some other way, there is no beauty in it. This is why what a word expresses in art is beautiful but what it does not express is still more charming.

4. We consider the last answer: "The concealed[21] core of beauty is its essence like shyness of a young maiden." Abhinava commenting on this holds that shyness of a young lady is born of her desire to conceal erotic surge within her. She feels within her a large experience, new, embarrassing and intense, to which she is not reconciled. "In her very efforts to conceal it she makes the most charming revealment." Her shyness adds grace to her beauty a thousand times. So is the case with art. The artist uses the same device. He uses a covering in order to intensify our emotional rapport, and leaves open the avenues for imaginative upbuilding of forms. It creates a vagueness so that we insert our self into art, and define its beauty in terms of our own aesthetic sensibility. A completely defined form, insulated within a hard crust, circumscribed by exact adjuncts, leaves no room in it for contemplation and self-merger, which is the main spring of beauty in art. Concealment in a work of art is done so that we may reveal ourselves in it, so that the self may flow out into it. This merger of the self in the object is the climax of art-feeling.

3. *Einfühlung and Soul-dynamics.*

We said: An artist leaves a good deal undefined in his art so that the onlooker may find an opportunity for 'filling in' the form with 'fire' and 'colour' by his own imaginative activity. The self-activity induced by objective

qualities of art sustains beauty-emotion, which, intensified by imagination, creates an 'oceanic feeling'. We feel tendency to merge, and become one with the object of beauty. But complete merger will be suicidal to the feeling itself. So there is a backward surge of life, as it were, in order to recover itself. There is thus continuous swing and surge in the vital stream, backward and forward, 'off-and-on beats' of a process that breathes joy in self-assertion and self-annihilation. Modern Psychology has discovered a primary pervasive function of human consciousness which seeks to explain this reiterative phenomenon of art-experience. Before we consider the philosophical and linguistic approach of our Aesthetics, we stay to take up the psycho-aesthetic view of Modern Psychology.

We may refer, in passing, to Freud and Jung who substantially agree on the point that the dynamics of human nature can be resolved into birth and death seeking tendencies. In beauty-experience both of them are satisfied without actually calling upon the organism to use its store of energy for fulfilment. Hence there is no exhaustion of nerves, resulting in repetitive perception. The contemplation of the beautiful is one way of sublimation of Libido, an escape from its incessant pleasure-seeking and consequent clash against the Reality-principle. Whatever its defects, which are serious and many, the theory confirms our introspective analysis of aesthetic consciousness.

In the main, it is the discovery and definition of Einfühlung or Infeeling which marks a definite advance in our understanding of the Beautiful. Wundt reduced the question to artistic perception of form. The perception of the Beautiful differs from ordinary perception in degrees of intensity or massiveness etc., not in kind so much. All perception involves memory.

"Now memory, paradoxical as it may sound, practically implies *expectation* : the use of the past is to become that visionary thing we call the future. Hence, while we are measuring the extension and direction of one line, we are not only remembering the extent and direction of another previously measured line, but we are also expecting a similar act of meaurement of the next line; even as in "following a melody" we not only remember the preceding tone, but expect the succeeding ones. Such interplay of present, past and future is requisite in every kind of meaning, for every unit of thought; and among others, of the meaning, and thought which we contemplate under the name of shape. It is on account of this interplay of present, past and future that Wundt counts feelings of tension and relaxation among the elements of form-perception. And the mention of such feelings, i.e., rudiments of emotion, brings us to recognize that the remembering and foreseeing of our acts of measurements and orientation constitutes a microscopic psychological drama—shall we call it the drama of the Soul-molecules—whose first familiar examples are those two peculiarities of visible and audible shapes called Symmetry and Rhythm."[22]

Thus aesthetic perception is a complex presentative-representative mental process. Accumulated memories from past and associations in every nook and corner of the mind are awakened and applied and a forward-looking attitude is generated. The present moment which, in its 'presentational immediacy', is a bare form becomes a lively experience by the fusion of past and future into it. Or, as Bergson[23] would like to put it : The present is the peak-point of a tidal wave of conscious life trying to insert itself into Reality and has behind it all the pushing force of it emerging from the past and heading, breathless, towards the future. This task of articulating the present and perceptual datum by all the resources at mind's disposal at a time is due to the primary function of human consciousness, called Empathy or Infeeling. The self feels itself into the object. Thus when we look at the mountain-peak and feel it is 'rising', it is not the mountain actually rising, but our self which transfers its experience to the object.

"The rising of the mountain is an idea started by the awareness of our own lifting of our eyes etc., and it is an idea containing the awareness of that raising or lifting. But it is far more : The present and particular raising and lifting is merely the nucleus to which gravitates our remembrance of all similar acts of raising or rising which we have ever accomplished. And not only the thought of past rising but also the thought of future rising. All these risings, done by ourselves or watched in others, actually experienced or merely imagined, have long since united together in our mind, constituting a sort of composite photograph whence all differences are eliminated and wherein all similarities are fused and intensified the general idea of rising... It is this universally applicable notion of rising which is started in our mind by the awareness of the particular present acts of raising involved in our looking at the mountain, and it is this general idea of rising, i.e., of upward movement, which gets transferred to the mountain along with our own particular present activity of raising some part of us, and which thickens, enriches and marks that poor little thought of a definite raising with the interest, the emotional fulness gathered and stored up in its long manifold existence. What we are transferring (owing to that tendency to merge the activities of the perceiving subject with the qualities of the perceived object) from ourselves to the looked at shape of the mountain, is not merely the thought of rising, but the thought and emotion which have been long accumulated in our mind. And it is this complex mental process, by which we invest that inert mountain with the stored up and averaged and essential modes of our own activity. It is this process whereby we make the mountain raise itself, which is Einfühlung or Empathy."[24]

The conception of Empathy enlightens our introspection of soul-dynamics involved in aesthetic perception. There is a constant outflow and inflow of the mind, from and to, the beautiful object. Looking at a perfect statue, our attention is engaged by solidity and mass, which we realize, in a moment of contemplation, by a steady mental and muscular recall of the past experiences. Then the mind is engaged in realizing 'energy' and 'repose' of the figure. Next, the 'idea' embodied may capture the mind. The mind, again and again, returns to the object and feasts on it and goes back to its own place where it, sometimes

feels, sometimes thinks and always chews the cud and enjoys. In music also, there is the constant afferent and efferent movement of the mind, which is now ravished by pathos of a dying note, now enraptured by vital harmony and concordance, now turned to text of the song, now sublimated by its noble theme. In art-experience there is no satiety or exhaustion, because there is always a call upon new forms of cerebrations. The greater is the sustaining power in a work of art, the greater is its merit as a work of art. Vernon Lee writes about Michelangelo's work (an architecture with Adam and Eve figures) which never wearies but ever refreshes :

"Backwards and forwards the eye is driven by that living architecture, round and round in its search now for completion of visible pattern, now for symbolic and narrative meaning, and ever back to the tale of Creation so that the remote historic incident of the Ancestors, the tremendous and tremendously present lyric excitements and despair of the prophetic man and woman, the pagan suggestion of the athletic genü all unite like the simultaneous and consecutive harmonies of a titanic symphony, round the recurrent and dominant phrases of those central stories of how the universe and man were made. . . . "

In order that there may be backward and forward movement of sustained attention between the object and the mind, the artist mingles with his work non-aesthetic elements, such as theme, emotion, thought, events etc. He draws them into 'contemplation's orbit', and, to use a phrase of Ānanda, 'internalizes' them so that the scope and volume of aesthetic emotion are enlarged. This technique is employed by the artist to keep the beholder's attention inside the work of art while suggesting 'things beyond it.' There is first the centrifugal flow of the mind towards the object. It is exploratory in nature. During exploration the mind looks at the art-elements, their structure and arrangement. The emotion of wonder swells

and returns enriched to the source. This is the centripetal movement. Both these alternate and sustain aesthetic contemplation. They are the virtual life-beats of art-experience.

The merit of the conception of Einfühlung is that it adequately explains the reiterative nature of art-experience, its massiveness and power for soothing and sublimating the mind. And more, it unravels a new form of art-activity, we may call Irradiation. It means that in art-experience there are sparkling flashes of beauty which illumine the different contents of our consciousness, broaden the horizon and make us see things which we never saw before and in a new light altogether.

Indian Aesthetics became distinctly conscious of the Principle of Einfühlung as Dhvani (Sonus) in Ānanda. Only his approach was philosophical and not psychological. But the conception is almost universal since the first exposition of Theory of Aesthetic Causation by Bharata. Vibhavas are the aesthetic causes, which evoke psycho-organic reverberation, an echoing of the whole personality. Rasa is beauty-emotion which organizes them into artistic unity, and, by a process of self-suffusion, transforms each element into its own quality. Ānanda[26] clarified the point further. He says that poet's wonderful language (Vāṇī) invests objects with new light, so that even things seen before become charming to our vision. Abhinava in Locana commentary explains that in poetic enjoyment the mind does not stay at one point and exhaust the charm in a single glance. The object of beauty, he teaches us, becomes an unfathomable source of joy and light. The infinite variety and unflagging charm of the beautiful objects in art are due to Dhvani function of aesthetic consciousness. In this respect alone, the creative artist excels the Creator.

4. *The Vedānta Theory of Perception and Einfühlung.*

Philosophy saw speculative possibility of subject-object meeting in the same locus before Psychology, in the recent past, could evince that this meeting, even merger, was the primary and universal function of human consciousness without which perception could not take place. Schopeuhauer told us that

"the union, or the apparent union, of the perceiving subject with the object may in certain cases almost nullify the subject-object antithesis in experience of beauty that is typical and profound."

The Vedānta takes a step farther and declares that the subject-object antithesis is only ad hoc to serve practical ends and not real at all. The separating wall between the subject and object does not exist *really*, and every act of perception proves its truth. Without outstepping the limits of our enquiry we shall show the bearing of this view on the nature of beauty-experience.

Indeed a sharp dualism cannot account for perception. The critical philosophy of Vedānta takes up the problem of perception both at metaphysical and psychological levels. At the metaphysical level, there are planes of existence, and relative to each plane there is a form of perception. At the empirical plane, sometimes there is preponderance of inertia (Tamas) in human nature.[27] The vision there is blurred, hesitant and vascilatting. At other times, the tendency to extroversion predominates. Under its duress, the mind is rivetted to the view of practical utility.[28] We see the world divided into so many things and do not catch the thread running through them all. We have true vision of things at the creative and manifestive (Sattva) level of existence.[29] It is then that we have appropriate attitude for Rasa-enjoyment. We overcome the meum-teum distinction. New horizons are flung open to view. We realize an unbroken

effulgence in all things about us. Viśvanātha[30] tells us that in that moment the soul becomes suffused over with Rasa-emotion induced by the object of beauty. Thus in beauty-experience we receive the object into our self as a part of the same undying and undivided brilliance.

The main contribution of Vedānta is towards psychology of perception. The percipient subject is as much fit to perceive as the object is fit to be perceived, for they are two poles of the same creative spiritual energy. Perception is 'trans-subjective' process, which is also spiritual. Under the finetizing tendency, the objects and subjects are individuated, which otherwise are waves in the same ocean of creative spirituality. Hence, Vedānta regards the subject and object and their union in the moment of perception as equally spiritual. The objects scattered over the earth are all points of light, and are illuminated when the percipient subject comes to contact them.

> "Just as water running out of the reservoir takes the shape of rectangular or triangular fields, so the mind, in trans-subjective process of perception, gets out of its subjectivity, goes to the object and in knowing it, it becomes the object."

The process of knowing it is the process of becoming it. The object is, as it were, spiritualized in being perceived as the subject is objectified in the act of perception. The subject and object can only be distinguished as the limiting poles of the bipolar process, and there can be no actual demarcation in the indivisible process.

In perception thus, according to Vedānta, we realise the unity[33] of subject and object, and their antithesis, if there is anything like it, is transcended. The subject feels (Fühlen) itself into (ein) the object. But practical and logical activities start soon after it and limit this tendency to merger. Vedanta distinguishes the first moment of pure

spiritual experience and the later one when individuation starts. Croce in our times has advocated a much similar view. In intuitive and first moment of our contact with Reality, we have a pure aesthetic experience. It is a child-like experience of wonder and beauty and is over before 'economic' and 'logical' points of view press forward. Einfuhlung therefore as the primary function of human mind is both a psychological and philosophical certainty. In beauty-experience, the logical[34] and economic view-points are at their lowest ebb. Consequently, therefore, the mind's absorption in its activities induced by the object's qualities is intense. There is the rhythmic beat of absoporption and recovery, forgetfulness and awakening, in aesthetic experience. This is due to the centrifugal and centripetal currents of attention started and sustained by the beautiful object.

5. *Dhvani as Function of Language.*

Historically the Principle of Dhvani was formulated from speculations in Grammar. The main question was : What is the relation between the intelligible meaning and audible sound of a word? Indeed, there is no likeness between *sound* which consists, on the physical plane, of air-vibrations and, on physiological plane, of cerebrations in the auditory area of the brain, and *meaning* which is a form of spiritual illumination. How do we pass from one to the other when sound and its meaning are not commensurate, and possess different dimensions on different orders of existence? Sound is measureable with foot-yard scale in terms of frequency and amplitude or in terms of intensity of cerebral and nerve action; while the meaning measured purely in mental terms is not conditioned by any of the above qualities. The second question is : At what stage of utterance of the word does its meaning spring up in the mind? Suppose I utter the word,

'lotus'. It consists of distinct sounds. Shall I realise the meaning at the initial sound, medial or final, which will act as stimulus to the 'meaning consciousness'[35]? Even then there is no commensurability between stimulus and response.

The question discussed in mediaeval India with all the scholastic zeal and speculative niceties is fresh today. We select that part of its full treatment which bears on 'Dhvani'. As has already been said, we developed in India a conception of Language which is dynamic and centrifugal—meaning thereby that tendency towards articulation starts from the centre (not towards the centre), which is the self-luminous and undifferentiated mass of consciousness. A word when it comes to be pronounced has behind it not a single poor idea, but a mass of articulated consciousness, and perhaps, a larger mass of unarticulated self. Thus when we hear or pronounce a word, there is a sudden *detonation* in consciousness, much like when we apply a spark to some combustible material. Philosophers in India compared the articulation of meaning in mind to detonation, and, actually called it 'explosion' (Sphoṭa).

Of the doctrine of Sphota the part that concerns us is that in aesthetic experience in Literary Arts, the collocation of words serves the special purpose of awakening in us pleasant currents of thought and feeling. A poem, say a sonnet, may use such devices as Figure, theme, a noble idea, description of a scene etc., with a view to bringing about an explosion of meaning in the mind. The greater the range and massiveness of this explosion the greater is the profundity of Art and its capacity to produce beauty-thrill (camatkāra). We can feel the 'explosion' of meaning in our mind and throwing open of new horizons in life with detonation and flash. The literary thinkers adopted the Sphota theory of the Philosophy of Grammar

to explain the reaction of the mind to a work of art in the form of Dhvani.

We may remember that Sphoṭa is a common phenomenon in all cases where meaning of a sensible material is comprehended. The natural trend of consciousness in meaning is towards its complete integration, for when explosion takes place it cannot stop half-way. In artistic enjoyment, therefore, the response is many times more intense than the stimulus. In ordinary life the words and ideas behind them are instruments of action. Therefore if every word leads to explosion of consciousness, practice would be difficult and action delayed. Thus, we make the word succinct and handy by circumscribing it about, or, by inscribing it within, its primary meaning.

Literary Criticism in India divides the distance from the circumference to the centre into four stages. We regard the Primary meaning or the instrumental import of a word as the circumference, while its aesthetic import as the centre. It is a dynamic matrix of beauty which radiates charm along radial lines all round. Before we define the central meaning, which is the centre of aesthetic irradiation, the sun of artistic delight, we shall take up its other forms.

The first form is the primary meaning known as Abhidha. It has been defined in various ways. It is regarded as the obvious or traditional meaning of a word. A word with its primary and immediate import is a social product. It is both the vehicle of thought and instrument of action[36]. As a social phenomenon, a word has some convention behind it. According to Mammaṭa, Abhidhā[37] is the conventional meaning of a word. A word though it indicates a particular object, yet goes much beyond it to the universal class-essence. It is this universal[38] implication of the word which defines its immediate and exact meaning. It is obvious that this sort of meaning, indis-

pensable for life and science because of its concise and clear connotation, is, for the same reason, not of any poetic value.

Abhidhā cannot convey deep and delicate shades of meaning. In art we avoid literalness that would result if we rely on Abhidhā only. Implication is the secondary meaning of a word. It is Lakṣaṇā, the implied meaning rather than the defined one. There is some joy and beauty felt in implicative import of a word, as there is a little release to imagination from its bondage of the perceptual plane. When we say, 'Camel is ship of the desert', we can neither understand nor enjoy the meaning if we are not able to rise above the literal plane of understanding. The condition is similar in painting if we see nothing beyond colour in it, and in music if we hear nothing beyond notes and numbers. In the same way we enjoy the immense meaning in, "architecture is frozen music", by understanding the implied meaning of the word 'frozen'.

Indian theorists have framed distinct questions : How and why do we get to the back of Abhidhā and grasp the implicative import ?

There is one condition laid down as sine qua non of Lakṣaṇā. That is, sometimes the literal meaning does not go far and returns to its poor self by being contradicted.[39] In the examples above, the literal meanings of 'ship' and 'frozen' are absurd. The mind first automatically starts towards their immediate sense but bounds back as if repelled by a sense of absurdity in search of a new meaning. The discovery of new meaning, from aesthetic point of view, is full of imaginative charm. It has been called the tail[40] of Abhidhā, as it comes after Abhidhā exhausts itself in conveying the immediate and primary meaning. It is mediate meaning and results from reflection. We may also note in passing that nowhere

has Lakṣaṇa been regarded as a finished product, but always a dynamic process.[41] The whole approach seems to be activist in nature, where 'meaning' of a word is only a form of activity of the mind. In apprehending the meaning of a word, the mind naturally grows towards its primary, conventional and customary sense. Meeting an obstruction in collating the sense to its present context, the mind moves on a higher plane of growth and grasps a *new* meaning which is its implication.

It goes without saying that the new meaning cannot be absolutely new, or, unattached to its primary sense. It should be old and new at the same time, and from aesthetic point of view, full of thrill. As has been already hinted, there should be a definable relation or reference[42] between them. At this stage, Indian Aesthetics develops its theory of Associationism. Five Laws of Association[43] have been formulated explicitly, which explain the passage from the old to the new meaning. (1) The first is the *Law of contiguity*. For example, we say: The hamlet is in the Gaṅgā. In fact a hamlet cannot be in the Gaṅgā, but it can be so *near* it as to be thought to be in it. Hence *in* the Gaṅgā, therefore, means *on* the bank of it because of its *nearness* to the Gaṅgā. The mind thus apprehends a new meaning spatially contiguous to the old, when the latter fails to carry us far. There is no example to indicate the relation of contiguity in time.

(2) The second is the *Law of Similarity*. Its example is: The ploughman[44] is bullock. The example is like tnat of Carlyle who said the members of Parliament were 'talking asses.' The charm in this assertion might have been zero if the members in question were actually 'asses'. Not actually asses, they behave no better. The new meaning here is discovered by a similarity of behaviour, and perhaps, mental equipment. As has been already pointed

out, the use of metaphoric language is derived from the *Law of Similarity*.

(3) The third is the *Law of Concomitance.*[45] Two things may be said to be concomitant if they go together as cause and effect, part and whole, possession and possessor etc. When we say : the spears are entering (the gates of a city etc.), we actually mean that men with spears are doing so. When we assert : Milk is life, we mean milk is conducive to life, and so on.

(4) The fourth is the *Law of Contrast.*[46] In statements of irony and taunts, the tone or emphasis of our voice puts an opposite complexion on the textual meaning.

(5) The last is the *Law of Function.*[47] When we declare : We do not require Churchills to manage the world affairs, we give to the word 'Churchill' its functional meaning.

Lakṣaṇā or Implication has its several other forms. As it is not to our purpose, we shall not enter the troubled sea of scholastic wrangling here. Suffice it to say that the primary sense of a word is its spear-point; at its back lies the wide and penetrating meaning—we call implication. This is the source of metaphoric language, and the secret of charm in the journalistic style of our times.

We have a third function of language known as Tātparya[48] (Purport) advocated mainly by Mīmāṁsā, in particular, by the Kumārila School. According to this School, each word has its individual meaning, but in order to actively participate in a sentence, it should have a context-meaning besides. Tātparya is the meaning of the whole sentence, which is not connoted by each word in its individual capacity. It may be called the total or contextual meaning as against the individual or textual meaning of a word. The difference between Abhidhā and Tātparya is that the former gives the *common* and *conventional*[49] meaning to *individual* components in a sentence; the latter

signifies the *specific* and *total* meaning of the *whole* sentence. Tātparya is the knowledge of relation, under which we subsume each word. Here, a new function has to be postulated because this School of Philosophy accepts a dogma,[50] that is, once a word completes its circuit in signifying a sense, it goes no further to signify another sense. To specify the same dogma, it further says that Abhidhā goes as far as signifying a general adjectival sense, and goes no further to indicate the relational and specific sense of a word in context.

Now the author of Dhvani (Vyañjanā) and the advocates of the Dhvani school assure us on logical and other grounds that none of these functions is capable of conveying the 'poetic meaning' of a sentence. Let us examine the logic of rejecting Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and Tātparya as functions of artistic communication in Literature, as that would go a long way in understanding the fourth function, Vyañjanā.

Viśvanātha[51] holds that when each of the three functions exhausts itself in conveying its respective meaning, we accept the fourth in order to communicate Rasa and other artistic qualities. Abhidhā is the obvious meaning and patent content of a word. Whatever is obvious has no charm for us. The artistic meaning of a word, say, Gaṅgā, is purity, holiness, her cool sandy banks, clear current of rippling water, her shady fruit-laden trees and so on, all at one stroke, and more, the emotional rapport produced by her sight and those thousands of associations which have made her holy in our eyes and grand as a phenomenon of Nature. In a scientific treatment or practical context, the word 'Gaṅgā' may mean a stream of water in the Northern India, but in a suitable poetic context, the aesthetic causes (Vibhāvas) are so arranged that they call up to the mind a large panoramic meaning. Unless this is done, there is no Dhvani or echoing of the personality.

How this is done is explained by means of Empathy. Vibhavas start in us and sustain lively currents, both mental and neural, of sweet experiences of the past which bear on the present emotional experience and orientate the mind to a vast vista of future. Thus, the emotional meaning indicated by Abhidhā becomes overshadowed by the dynamic sense created by the process of Empathy.

Thus Abhidhā fails to create an enriched beauty-sense because of its restricted capacity. Rasa or aesthetic experience does not fall within the ambit of it, in the same way as the aesthetic meaning of a colour is not covered by its perceptual meaning. Even Lakṣaṇā cannot do it, for, though it rises a little above the dry-as-dust factual plane and puts the mind on a track to discover a 'new' meaning, the new meaning itself is too weak to start empathic currents in the mind. Moreover, the new meaning is also restricted, bound as it is by the laws of Association as stated above. Viśvanātha refutes Tātparya also as insufficient to convey the full artistic sense. The champions of Tātparya function plead that we should not confine its activity to conveying single sense. In support they cite the pragmatic[53] theory of Mīmāṁsā, which holds that a word is an instrument of purpose. A sentence that conveys a sense, whether scriptural or non-scriptural, must lead to action and fulfilment of purpose. The use of words in poetry aims only at realization of bliss, and, therefore, a word cannot stop till the end is realised : *A word is what it does.*

The main point of the reply given is the same old dogma, that is, a word cannot be trusted to hold several offices at the same time. A word is not multi-functional, and so it winds itself up as soon as it has performed its single office. Tātparya subsumes the words in a sentence under one sense, but the sense is only literal and not poetic. In a painting, Tātparya is the subject matter which can

be expressed in the words of a dictionary. This enables us to understand, correlate and unify several aspects and parts on the canvas meaningfully. If we are told that a certain dance performance is named '*Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa*' or '*Bakāsura-Vadha*', as the case may be, we are in this way intellectually prepared to understand the performance better. This naming in order to subsume the whole performance under a single notion is its Tātparya. But that is too cold to yield any aesthetic meaning of a dance or painting to us.

Thus a clear case for a fourth function is made out. In going from the sensible and patent content of a word etc. to the enjoyable aesthetic meaning, we are moving on a different plane of spiritual existence. Viśvanātha dealing his *coup d' etat* to the reactionary school lays down his reasons for positing Vyañjanā as the fourth function. A linguist,[54] versed in the deep lore of grammar etc., fails to enjoy beauty-sense in a poem, which sends a man of culture and taste into a rapturous state. This indicates, according to Viśvanātha, that there is a fundamental difference of outlook and mental condition for appreciation of beauty in a work of art. Indeed, a serious student of colour chemistry will see only colour patches where the artist may feel a rush of emotions and thoughts, 'too deep for tears' sometimes.

Another point is that there is no commensurability between the visible content of art and the meaning behind it : Almost the meaning is immeasureable and its charm inexhaustible. With the deepening of outlook in art, what happens is that even "one impulse from vernal wood may teach you more of man, of moral evil and of good than all the sages can." The painter's 'vernal wood' is infinitely more inspiring than the one we see on land. Vyañjanā is the opening up of a stream of impulses which 'confuse our heads and comfort our souls.'

The receptive power, Viśvanātha tells us, is conditioned by the purity of creative genius we possess. A mere utterance of a word falls flat on the insensitive ear. He gives other reasons also which we leave out in the interest of simplicity. The conclusion of this school of thinkers is that the meaning that moves us to the very depths of our life, brightens even the distant horizons of our soul as in a flash and builds us a new visionary future for the moment, cannot be the ordinary meaning of a word. It is the extraordinary function of the word, or for the matter of that, of any sensible element in a work of art, that we call Dhvani.

6. *Reactions against Dhvani School.*

It is a long way from the perceptible to the imperceptible in Art. The way is by no means easy. It requires a genuine act of creation on the part of the artist to embody the supersensible through the sensible and to relish it through a process of rapturous self-forgetfulness. Many an unfortunate being, bound by the necessity of psycho-organic make-up, fails to pass beyond the primary sense-datum in a work of art. A Vedic Ṛk[55] poetically expresses the idea of such a failure. "A man looks at Vāk (language) and yet he may not see it; he listens to it, but he may not hear it. She, like loveful well-clad lady, reveals her body to her lover." Modern Psychology explains the power and process of revealment by its hypothesis of Einfuhlung. The power indeed is more mysterious than what Empirical Psychology can explain. It is the gift of appreciating 'the heard melodies' which are sweet, and yet a greater gift of appreciating 'the unheard melodies' which are sweeter. We have also discussed India's viewpoint in this connection which is philosophical-cum-linguistic. The main point of the view is that the tendency to merger, and thereby to transcend the limits of empirical

existence, is derived from original unity of subject and object.

The advent of Dhvani School raised some weak reactions which died out for want of a following. Mahima Bhaṭṭa[56] did not relish the mystic character of Dhvani and reacted by assimilating it to more familiar process of inference (Anumiti). He admits that there must be movement of the mind in aesthetic experience as it is in a process of reasoning : We pass from 'premises' to 'conclusion.' The poet or the artist also lays down the premises in the form of Vibhāvas etc. and leaves the conclusion to be drawn by the enjoyer. The conclusion here is Rasa-experience. Each Rasa has its own set of causes and conditions. There is a relation of invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) between them. Mahima thus, subsumes Dhvani under the general process of Inference, and brings aesthetic experience in line with rational experience by turning down the innovation of Ānanda.

Mahima is aware of his weak stand, it seems, for he regards Dhvani only as a special form of inference and not quite inference. Dhvani is poetic inference (Kavyānumiti). Mahima's critics pointed out to him that Dhvani, in the sense of logical inference, is fallacious. The only element of truth in his position is that, as in inference, so in aesthetic experience, the mind grows to new realizations of beauty and delight. Both the activities, rational and emotional, are on par in their creative moments, one flashed by the vision of truth and the other by beauty. But the difference is also important : It is the difference between cognition and emotion. In one the mind grows to new understanding; in the other, new emotional currents are started. This difference, we hold, Mahima ignored in likening Dhvani to inferential process.

But the main objection to Mahima's thesis of Poetic inference is anticipated by Ānanda. The mental activity

we call inference is founded on the primary and defined meanings or notions. A notion is an intellectual growth and its effectiveness in reasoning depends on its accuracy and definiteness. The meaning of a notion must be 'uni-sign', that is, indicating a single sense on a clearly defined track. The opposite is true in art. The sensible material must be not only full of meanings, but must be a mine of meanings. It should be 'pluri-sign', covering many tracks in the mind. The primary meaning on which discursive thinking depends is, Ānanda says,[57] limited and fixed (Niyata), while the poetic meaning is unlimited and wonderful (Aniyata, Vicitra). It is so because the meaning in art is aupādhika[58] and not autpattika. Meaning is said to be aupādhika when it arises from associations and suggestion. In the course of experience, the primary meaning which forms the nucleus is enriched with the wealth of suggested meaning under varying conditions. The meaning under those conditions (upādhi) becomes 'pluri-sign' and creates a halo of suggestions about it. The very vagueness and breadth of poetic meaning become the reasons of its enjoyability.

Ānanda asks a pertinent question[59] at this stage: If the poetic meaning is so vague and undefined, what good on earth will it do to examine its form? Having nothing definite to convey, anything can be imagined into it, Abhinava says—commenting on it. The reply given is: It is its vagueness[60] that distinguishes the poetic meaning from the primary meaning. Both of them differ in form and function.[61] While the primary meaning has its 'own' meaning, the poetic meaning invariably goes beyond it. Even in music where the sounds are not articulate words, an artistic meaning is conveyed by the same process of Vyañjanā. The musical sounds are suggestive (Vyañjaka) in so far as they create a state of rhythm. The function of Dhvani is realised from vocal and non-vocal sounds, and

even from the movements and actions which are not verbal at all. The only point[62] is that by the way of Dhvani, things grow in artistic beauty.

Mammaṭa[63] sums up the conditions (upādhi) which enrich and divert the primary sense towards its poetic meaning. These are the sources of suggestions which initiate in the mind trains of imagery. We may remember here that these conditions are only external. The real working of Dhvani will depend on the aesthetic sensibility of the person enjoying it. They are, for instance, (1) the character and history of the person into whose mouth a statement is put. In a drama, a statement does not mean much in itself. But the statement becomes the mine of rich meanings as soon as we are put in mind the personality to which it is attributed. (2) Similarly, the history of the addressee which is a rich source of suggestiveness, (3) accent, (4) structure of a statement, (5) peculiarity of the primary content, (6) contiguity to some other meaning, (7) context, (8) time and (9) place are the sources of enrichment and re-direction of the mind from the perceptible datum to the enjoyable aesthetic meaning.

7. *Nature of Aesthetic Cognition.*

As is wont to be the case, the creative epoch of Dhvani was succeeded by a period of intense elaborative activity. From a mass of jumbled thought, however, a few luminous contributions stand out with a rare force of inventive boldness. They enlighten us on some intriguing problems of aesthetic experience, such as, aesthetic cognition and modus of artistic realization. We consider them below.

(a) *Śankuka's Theory of Aesthetic Illusion.*

That a work of art differs from a real thing is obvious. The crux of the question is : How does it differ ? Śaṅkuka[64] takes the example of a dramatic performance which repre-

sents the central problem of all arts. A Naṭa appears on the stage to play 'Rāma'. How is he able to create beauty-thrill by his appearance? In the same way a painted horse is not the same thing as the real horse. Yet the 'painted horse' succeeds in creating beauty-experience which the real horse may not. At least the artist's horse should go beyond the Zoologist's. Yet the painter's horse is not real; it is not unreal either. We do not say: 'This Naṭa on the stage is Rāma', nor do we aver, 'He is not Rāma at all.' It is not doubtful even, for our mind is not assailed by doubt. It cannot be a consciousness of similarity, for what similarity can there be between the real Rāma and Rāma on the canvas or on the stage? The question, therefore, is: What is it that we *cognize* on the canvas or the stage?

Śaṅkuka says it is a wonderful illusion. We suffer it joyfully because[65] (i) we possess a poetic sense, (ii) and, because of the amazing execution of it by the artist. Like McDougall, Śaṅkuka also teaches that admiration for the artist's executive skill goes half way towards forming aesthetic experience. The horse on the canvas is only two-dimensional, but the painter succeeds in bringing about the 'cubic suggestion', and thereby creating illusion of a real horse. It is artificial, yet for the moment we happily believe it to be real. We allow ourselves to suffer from illusion in our blessed ignorance for the moment. Further, though there is an inferential movement in the mind in cognizing the work of art, yet, because it satisfies the conditions of beauty, we experience aesthetic thrill immediately. Also the Naṭa feels the semblance of Rāma's emotions; the spectator feels the art-emotion or Rasa through aesthetic contemplation.

Jagannātha refers to a School of thinkers who have a leaning towards Neo-Vedānta. We first comprehend[66] a relation of love between Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta in the poet's or the dramatist's creations through the functioning

of Dhvani. Then through the power of emotional tendency sublimated into aesthetic responsiveness, we superimpose the erotic urge of Duṣyanta on our benighted self for the time being, thus giving rise to a mysterious state of illusion, as it happens when we mistake conch-shell for a piece of silver. Aesthetic experience results, according to this view,[67] from a particular illusory state of the mind. Before Rasa[68] state is generated, we identify our own erotic desire with that of the persons represented to us by the artist. The process of identification has been called Sādhāraṇī-karaṇa. The mind acts in default here, for identification has been regarded as dośa or defect.[69] It is no other than self-delusion. Like an illusion, it is inexplicable. For it is neither true nor false. When we mistake a rope for a snake, we do so by identification, which is other than false or true. The same mysterious illusion overpowers us in aesthetic experience.

The position as stated above arouses two touchy questions which it handles with signal failure :

1. How can an illusion bring about a state of joy?

2. If identification is the way of art-enjoyment, then should not the same process bring about grief in the presentation of unfortunate aspects of life ? The first question[70] is answered by saying that even the rope-snake-illusion creates shudder and trembling in the first moment, the second, by an appeal to the inexplicable nature of poetic functioning. The enduring contribution of this school remains in the fact that aesthetic cognition is extraordinary experience, which Empirical Psychology cannot explain. The chief error of this position is : What it calls 'Illusion' (Bhrama) is the upbuilding process of aesthetic imagination. All ideational processes right up to intellection and reflection where we leave the sensuous element a little behind, there is an element of 'illusion'. Only the word is an unlucky misnomer. A real illusion, Śāradātanaya tells us,

in an aesthetic experience will linger into memory and will only spoil it.

(b) *Pragmatic Perception of Śāradātanaya.*

Śāradātanaya recounts all arguments of Śaṅkuka[71] against regarding aesthetic perception on par with ordinary perceptions to which the ordinary tests of true, false or doubtful can accrue. He does not agree to Śaṅkuka's theory of Illusion (*Citra-turaga theory*), as it does not resolve the question. Therefore, he proposes a pragmatic test of aesthetic perception. The creator's purpose in producing the work of art is the accrual of beauty-joy from it, and that of the critic is to enjoy the same. So long as an artist may be said to be creating beauty-joy and others enjoying it, the question of epistemological truth and falsity does not arise at all. A work of art does not possess these qualities of knowledge for that is not its aim. It should be true to its own standard of beauty-in-art in its own sphere. Hence, Śāradātanaya tells us that truth of a work of art is its beauty and the measure, how far it achieves it. We call this test pragmatic because, firstly, it is extra-rational, and, secondly, the norm here is set up as the achievement of aesthetic aim.

This application of pragmatism to art-creations is bold and original as it carves out a new career to perceptible element in art. Mere existential judgment about the obvious element in art does not go far at all. We can never get any way towards symbolism in art without subordinating, however consciously, the obvious and expressed to the inexpressible. This subordination is the essence of Dhvani principle. Pragmatism of Śāradātanya is direct corollary of Dhvani. The sensible element in art is what it does (Artha-Kriyā). And it *does* two things to play its role as an element :

1. It subordinates itself to aesthetic meaning.

2. It brings about Rasa-enjoyment (Rasāsvāda). In doing its function it fulfils itself and becomes true, even without satisfying, or, in spite of, the logical and epistemological standards of truth.

(c) *Bhaṭṭanāyaka's Discovery of Bhāvaka and Bhoga Functions.*

Bhaṭṭanāyaka is he founder of *Bhukti School*[73] in Aesthetics. According to it, we apprehend direct and immediate meaning of the obvious content of art by Abhidhā. We see before us the actor and the actress in the guise of Rāma and Sītā. Now, actual Rāma and Sītā or their dramatis personae as such cannot bring about Rasa experience, the one set being too high above the level and immoral for enjoyment for the common men and the other too false for it. An aesthetic cause[74] should be other than false and within limits of decency and moral beliefs. A work of art must satisfy Reason and Moral Sense besides being beautiful. Our author rejects Śaṅkuka's suggestion that identification (Sādhāraṇya) is the source of art-joy. He thus comes to propose a new function peculiar to art only : It is known as Bhāvaka. This is a function of generalization. 'Sītā' does not remain the venerable consort of Rāma but, by means of Bhāvaka, is reduced to a generic sense of a loving and lovely devoted wife. 'Duṣyanta' and 'Śakuntalā' are no longer enjoyed in art as the great ancients. We are too much 'distanced' from them to be able to enjoy them as such. Nor can we enjoy them when the 'distance' is too little. Hence, before any artistic experience begins we reduce them to their universal and generic essence. Rather we reduce ourselves to pristine purity and become our true selves as God made us and not as we have made of ourselves, in the moment of aesthetic experience. Thus, by means of Bhāvaka[76], the obvious content indicated by Abhidhā is wonderfully transformed and aesthetic causes reduced to their universal form. But it does not end there.

Besides Abhidhā by which we apprehend the immediate data of art, and Bhāvaka by which we generalise, we have in us a spirit of enjoyment (Bhogakṛtva), a spirit by which we enter into an emotional rapport with objects outside. Bhaṭṭanāyaka[77] is emphatic in denying the likening of *Bohga* function to memory or any other form of knowledge., It is not even blind instinctual emotion. *Bhoga* is not the natural emotional reaction of man to his environment. It is that spirit of joy which overlooks petty gains and griefs of our small individual being, looks upon tragedies as divine enactments with a joyful calm, and comedies without a burst of hilarity. This happens, says Bhaṭṭanāyaka, because the mind in beauty-joy becomes shorn of Rajas and Tamas tendencies. As already indicated, Rajas is the principle of action and extroversion. Under its impulse we are our psychological selves interested in our narrow ends. Under the empire of Tamas, we go down to the animal plane, and feel dull and inert beings. With emergence of Sattva[78] in our nature, we return to the fountain of pure joy which is ours in our right as sparks of divine being. It is in this state of the mind that we look at objects of art. They are transfigured because we ourselves are transformed. The greatest catastrophes in art are reduced to flashing moments of new vision and delight. It is a treasureable 'oceanic' emotion.

(*To be continued*).

SURVEY AND CARTOGRAPHY IN THE ŚULVASŪTRAS

By MAYA PRASAD TRIPATHI, M.A.

So far both the oriental and occidental scholars of Indology have studied the Śulvasūtras and the science of Śulva* as an early treatise on Hindu Mathematics, chiefly on geometry. But as a matter of fact they are primarily the earliest systematic and codified treatises on Hindu survey and cartography which mark out a specific age and compilation of a long conventionally pre-existing scattered rules, regulations and literature on the two branches of the most practical learning. They were specifically composed in book-form for sacerdotal, liturgical and building purposes, There must have been much in common in the survey and cartography of the sulvas and those for the land revenue system, geopolitical or geographical purposes, and also there must have been much impact between them for the improvement of the two sciences irrespective of the fact in which domain they originated first, though the orthodox precision must nave started first in the realm of sacrificial constructions. And as such the Śulvasūtras necessitated and pre-supposed a knowledge of mathematics, though they themselves often treat of concise mathematical and geometrical postulates, theorems and methods. Śivadāsa (posterior to Sāyaṇa—1320-1380), commentator on the *Mānavaśulvasūtra*' observes "The study of the Śulva should

* Etymologically the word "Śulva" is derived from the root "Śulv" or "Śulb" meaning to measure. Traditionally, however, it had come to have four meanings—(i) actual mensuration and its processes; (ii) the line or surface resulting from such measurement; (iii) a measure—the surveying or measuring instrument; and (iv) surveying or the art of measuring and concomitant cartography.

be begun after having finished the science of mathematics, otherwise there cannot be a thorough knowledge of the Śulva." So it is only secondarily that they are or should be considered mathematical works. Similar is the case with the modern surveying and cartography also.

Different Sulvasūtras

Related to the different Vedic schools there are nine texts in all of the Śulvasūtras. Bibhutibhūṣaṇa Dutta[1] mentions seven—Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Kātyāyana, Mānava, Maitrāyaṇa, Varāha and Vāḍhula. Louis Renou[2] names two more—Laugākṣī and Hiraṇyakeśī. In wide features the contents of the different Śulvasūtras are the same, except a few occasional innovations and expositions. The present investigation is mainly based on the most important and oldest ones, namely, Baudhāyana, Āpastamba and Kātyāyana Śulvasūtras, though here and there some references to others also would be found.

A word about the time of the Śulvasūtras. On the ground of external and internal evidences, the three most important ones—Baudhāyana, Āpastamba and Kātyāyana (Kātyāyanaśulva Pariśiṣta or Kātīyaśulva) can definitely be placed earlier than 400 B. C. and their chronological order is also the same as their enumeration in these lines. Baudhāyana śulvasūtra is the oldest one and belongs to C. 1000 B. C., though some scholars are prone to assign it a date of 2000 B.C.

The older Perspective

The history of the survey and cartography dilated in the Śulvaśūtras begins far back in the ages anterior to them. Oldenberg[3] has shown tnat the three most primitive *Vedis*

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[1] *The Science of the Śulba*, p. 1.

[2] *Vedic India*, Table of Vedic Schools, pp. 50-51.

[3] Oldenberge, *Religion des Veda*, p. 348, n. 2; *S.B.E.*, Vol xxx., p. ix.

—Gārhapatya, Āhavanīya and Dakṣiṇāgni—are older than the Ṛgveda. They can safely be taken back to the era near about 3000 B. C. (on the right or the left of the same). There must have been only a small haitus of a few centuries between their age and that of Harappa and Mohenjodaro civilization. Since in tne latter culture some sort of sacrificial system[4] prevailed and now consensus of opinions of majority of scholars has drifted to a positivity that there is a link between Harappa and Mohenjodaro civilization and the Vedic one. Rather there are very strong grounds to believe that in the former there was a definite element of the latter or the Aryans[5]. Hence from the point of view of the evidence of sacrificial system there appears to be a very undeniable ground to surmise that primitive survey work and plan drawing on the ground or stone or the like must have prevailed in 3000 B. C. by the latest.

Again, there is very close similarity between the town planning of Harappa and Mohenjodaro and the Vedic *Vedi* (altar) construction and the town planning of the *Mānasāra* (near about vitruvius era—25 B. C.[6]) and other Śilpaśastras. And it is established without any doubt the Indian Aryana town-planning as found in the Śilpaśāstras or gleaned from other sources was merely developed or modified patterns of *Vedi*-construction. E. B. Havell says[7] "The close connection of the geometrical system (denoted by the mystic figures Paramasayika, Swastika, Sarvatobhadra etc.) with the vedic scrificial lore, and the position of the master builder as a high priest or sacrificial expert, are in-

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[4] *The Vedic Age* edited by Dr. R. C. Majumdar and Dr. A. D. Pusalkar, p. 186.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 195. New excavations at different places (e.g. Kauśāmbī and others) every day are corroborating further and further this averment.

[6] "*Architecture of the Mānasār*" by Dr. P. K. Acharya, Preface p. LIX.

[7] *History of the Aryan Rule* in India, p. 25.

direct proof of the great antiquity of the Indian science of town planning". . . . "The laying out of the Indo-Aryan village is treated in the Śilpaśastras as tne preparation of sacrificial ground."[8] Binoda Bihari Dutta remarks further, "The plan of the towns and their dimensions were indentical with those of the geometrical figures, that had to be, and even now, drawn on the sacrificial altars. These figures suggested the plans and the names."[9]

This planning and plan-drawing presupposes and must have had some survey system and cartography. The sum and substance of the preceding paragraph implies that the modes of survey and cartography described in the śulvasūtras might have originated in the lap of Harappa and Mohenjodaro, or in the age prior to the Ṛgveda by the latest. And it must have been developed and cultivated assiduously and scrupulously in the period preceding to the compilation of priestly rules with contemporary additions and alterations or composition of the Śulvasūtras when they had assumed an "advanced form", if we say so with reference to the chronological perspective and other purposes of survey and cartography, for example land holding land revenue and road making and the like, where extreme religious rigidity was not required. Thus the *Vedis* were the earliest or at least one of the earliest necessity and impetus to the survey and cartography in India.

As already said the survey and cartography depicted in the śulvasūtras must be marked for its precision and advanced state, which must have influenced or from which were derived the principles and methods of survey and cartography prevailing in other spheres of individual or community life. This is supported by the followingevidences

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[9] *Town-planning in Ancient India*, p. 7.

(i) There is clear mention of the field survey or field measurement in the *Ṛgveda*.[10]

(ii) In the *Rāmāyaṇa* (800 or 600 B.C.) we find mention of road building, road survey[11] and bridge construction[12] and town pattern---Padmaka (of the lotus shape), Swastika and Vardhamāna[13] resembling the *Vedis* in Padavinyāsa (division of the ground).

(iii) In the Kurudhamma Jātaka (c. 500 B.C.) we come across an anecdote emphasising exceptional accuracy in land survey.[14]

(iv) A monstrous barrage accross the Raivataka mountain was built in the 4th century B. C.[15]

(v) Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra (c. 400 B. C.) definitely mentions land survey and points to mapmaking and cartography.[16]

(vi) Magasthenes also says that the Mauryan government had a very organised survey department and officials.[17]

Content Proper of the Śulvasūtras

In all survey and cartographic work determination of cardinal points is the primary thing. It cannot be said with certainty when Indians came to evolve methods for determining cardinal points. But this much is certain that Harappa and Mohenjodaro people[18] and the Ṛgvedic Aryans[19] knew very well methods for determining quarters.

10 *Vedic Index by* Macdonell and Keith, vol. I, pp. 210-11.

11 *The Rāmāyaṇa* II. 80. 12 *Ibid* VI. 22.58. 13 *Ibid.* V. 4. 7-8.

14 *The Jātaka or the stories of the Buddha's Former birth*, edited by E. B. Cowell, Vol. II. p. 257.

15 *Ancient Towns and Cities in Gujerat and Kathiawar* by Dr. A. S. Altekar, p. 22.

16 Chap. XXXV, part I. समाहर्ता चतुर्धा जनपदं विभज्य etc.

17 *The Age of Imperial Unity* edited by Dr. R. C. Majumdar and Dr. A. D. Pusalkar, p. 64.

18 *The Vedic Age*, edited by as above, p. 169.

19 *The Ṛgveda*, I, 95. 3.

But during the Ṛgvedic age and afterwards for a very long period the sun was the chief medium for finding out the quarters. Perhaps this was the case with Harappa and Mohenjodaro people as well.

Kātyāyana gives the method of determining cardinal points from the sun.[20] The *Mānavaśulvasūtra* gives four methods of determining cardinal directions.[21] The Śulvasūtras speak of eight compass directions—the four main and the four sub-quarters as occasionally shown on the modern maps.

The first purpose of finding quarters was the orientation of all construction, building and drawing work. Perhaps Harappa and Mohenjodaro people had the practice of orientation towards the east or north, though this much is sure that their orientation was based on the correct compass directions. From the *Ṛgveda* onwards the orientation was always made towards the east,[22] it continued in India upto the age of Maratha cartography,[23] in spite of the wide uses of compasses everywhere in the world by that time. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (not later than 1000 B.C.) gives the reason for it: "East is the gate of heaven."[24] The gods have their birth place in the east, and men in the west."[25] Similar reason is also advanced by the *Ṛgveda.*[26] The Śulvasūtras always stuck to it. *Tattirīya Saṁhitā*[27], for the first time, speaks of the fundamental line of survey and cartography called Prācī or Pṛṣṭhyā corresponding to the modern North-South line used for the same purposes.

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[20] *KS.* Kandikā I, 2-3.

[21] The *Science of the Śulba*—Dutta, p. 5.

[22] Vide my paper "*Science of Geography in the Ṛgveda*" G. N. J. R. I. vol xvi, no 1-2 (Nov.-Feb. 1958-59).

[23] Vide my paper "*Solution of a Riddle or Maratha Maps*" Allahabad University "Studies in Humanities", Vol. II, 1958.

[24] *S.B.* Trans. J. Eggeling, p. xxi, part iv.

[25] *Ibid.*, vii, 4.2.40. [26] *The Ṛgveda*, vii. 99.2. [27] vi. 2.4.5.

It is a curious similarity that Christians also had the same religious veneration for the east and the Christian maps between 700 and 1100 A.D. were oriented to the east.[28] The very term orientation points to the eastern quarter.

The above mode of eastern orientation was a natural development and most scientific in that age, when ancient Babylonians and Egyptians resorted to south west and northern orientation respectively. Later Romans and Arabs oriented their maps towards south.

Concept of Representation.—The *Vedi* construction and various methods of piling of bricks described in the Śulvasūtras had a concept of representation of the sky, atmosphere and earth, its various regions and the oceans. Though it is not mentioned in the Śūlvasūtras specifically, it is very clearly stated in the literature which forms the fountain source of those treatises, '*Vedi* is the representation of the earth' is first mentioned in the *Tattirīya*[29] *Śaṁhitā* which is definitely older than the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*. Bibhutibhūṣaṇa Dutta has assigned it a date of 3000 B.C. This sort of idea is repeated several times in the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*. Representation of the various parts of the universe is given thus in detail, "The first three (bricks) are this (terrestrial) world, the second three the air, and the third (three) the sky, the fourth the eastern, the fifth the southern, the sixth the western, and the seventh the northern regions."[30] *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*, ix. 1.2.3 and x. 5.4.1 unequivocally speaks of the shape and rotundity of the earth engirdled by ocean. XI.3.1.18-19 seem to refer to some sort of representation of rivers.

In this connection VII.5.1.2—10 of the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* are most important, as they influenced or at least

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28 *General Cartography* by Raisz, p. 25.

29 *T.S.* II. 6.4.1; II. 6.4.2-3 says "The earth is of the size of the altar."

30 *S.B.* Eggeling—viii. 5.3.5; vide viii. 5.2.12-13-15-16; ix.1.2. 11-19-20.

brone analogy to the conception of the world map and its cartography all over the world for a very long interval. It says that the universe is of the form of a tortoise—the upper shell is the sky, lower one the earth, and what is between the shells is the atmosphere. Regarding this the Book of Ser Marco Polo translated and edited by Sir Henry Yule remarks, "It may be said with general truth that the world maps current upto the end of the 13th century A.D. had more analogy to the mythical cosmography of the Hindus than to anything properly geographical. Both, no doubt, were originally based on the main or real features. In the Hindu cosmography these genuine features are symmetrised as in a kaliedoscope; in the European Cartography these are squeezed together in a manner that one can only compare to a pig in brawn. Here and there some features strange, compressed and distorted is just recognisable. A splendid example of this kind of map is that famous one at Hereford, executed about A. D. 1275, of which a fascimile has lately been published. . . . "[31] Again the above world map conception of Hindus wonderfully resembles in shape the mosaic map of Madaba.[32]

A word more about the brick like or rectilinear representation of the countries in the circular Hindu *Vedis* curiously enough in the earliest Chinese map of Pei Hsui[33] (224—273 A.D.) we have the same type of representation, and rotundity of the whole map is also the same as mentioned in one of the preceding paragraph (that is, that of a Hindu *Vedi*). Thinking in chronological channel, are we entitled to warrant any influence of Indian cartographical ideas on those of the Chinese, only further researches can ascertain the reality. From Yule's above work it would be further found that the Chinese plans of towns (6th century

[31] Vol. I, p. 132.

[32] *General Cartography* by Raisz, p. 25, table II.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

A.D.) closely resembled the *padavinyāsa* (division of ground into squares and rectangles) of the Hindu town plans and were perhaps copied from the latter.[34]

Thus apart from the local mapping and survey and cartography for the administrative purposes of the country, the Indian Aryans of about 2000 B.C. or near about era had liturgically evolved some motion of the mapping or representing the entire earth, occasionally even including the sky and intermediate space. When the *Vedi* was of the form of a quadrilateral, or a square or a wheel, its divisions resembled the modern graticules of the Mercator and gnominic projections respectively. The figure of tortoise (also of one of the *Vedis*) in the later period served as a sort of projection for representing the whole of India. A diagram[35] of the same is appended (*Vide* page 478).

Concept of Scale.—In all sacrificial procedures, the shape of *Vedis* was fixed. Their sizes, however, on different occasions varied tremendously. This gave rise to a very accurate conception of similarity of figures. The latter naturally necessitated a knowledge of some sort of concept of scale. When the altar was enlarged Ekaśatavidha 101 fold), the new unit of measure became $\sqrt{14}$ times of the unit of the measure employed for the primitive fire-altar.[36] In other words, new Prakrama, Aratni, Pada, Yuga, Śamyā and or others (unit of length) equalled $\sqrt{14}$ times these for the primitive altar.[37] Measurement of administrative areas and revenue-

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[34] *Trans of Book of ser Marco Polo*, vol II, p. 209.

[35] It is based on the *Swarodaya*, a work earlier than the *Bhāgawata* from the History Antiquities by M. Martin, Vol. II. p. 19. The idea of the Kūrma-Niveṣa (tortoise representation) is first found in the *SB* (vide Eng. Trans. of the same by J. Eggeling, vii. 5.1.2. and introduction, part II, p. xxviii.)

[36] *The Science of Śulva*, p. 160.

[37] *Vide B.S.S.* Chapt. I, Sūtra 18.

lands and its representation on something must have also necessitated some sort of scale.

Division of Bhavatkhanda into 9 Kingdoms, according to the book called Swarodaya.

London 1838. W. H. Allen & Co. 7 Leadenhall St.

J. Netherclift Lithog.

The very fact that the entire earth could be represented in the form of *Vedi*, explicitly implied that those Aryans had the clearest conception that a big

thing could be shown for convenience on a reduced size, that is, they had some idea of scale. Further they understood that scale was necessary for enlargement and reduction both of the shapes.

Reduction and enlargement of the *Mahā-vedi* (in the shape of an isosceles trapizium) points to the fact they had realised the need of and actually used the concept of modern R. F. (Representative Fraction)[38]. In reduction of the area to one-third and enlargement to twice the original area they employed the R. F. $1 : \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}$ and $1 : \sqrt{2}$ respectively. (Of course here the two second numbers of the ratios are not whole numbers).

It can be easily seen that the enlargement and reduction of the plans or maps of *Vedis* are very much similar to the modern pantographic methods and processes.

Survey and Measurement.—How the actual and practical survey work was carried on and how the measurement and cartographical drawing on the ground proceeded can be made clear like a picture by the following descriptions, "From that (the largest post on the east side) one proceeds three vikramas (a unit of measure) to the east and there fixes a pole, this is the middle hindpole (autaḥpātaḥ). From the middle hind pole, he goes 15 prakramas (a measure) towards the south and fixes a pole there; this is the south-west corner (of the Mahāvedi). From the middle hind pole, he proceeds 15 prakramas towards to the north and fixes a pole there; it is the northwest corner. From the middle hind pole he goes 36 prakramas towards the east and fixes a pole; this is the middle front pole. From the middle front pole, he strides 12 prakramas towards the south and fixes a pole; this is the south-east corner. From the middle front pole, he goes 12 prakramas towards the north

[38] The *Science of the Śulba*, p. 153-4.

and fixes a pole there; this is the north-east corner. Such is the measurement (survey) of the (*Maha-vedi*)".[39]

"Add to the length of thirty-six (i.e. to a cord of the length of thirty-six either padas or prakramas) eighteen (the whole length of the cord is then 54), and make two marks on the cord, one at twelve, the other at fifteen, beginning from the western end; tie the ends (of the cord of the Pṛsthyā line (the pṛṣthyā is the same as the prāchī, the line directed exactly towards the east and west points, and going through the centre of the *Vedi*. The fixing of the prācī was the first thing to be done when any altar had to be measured out. The methods devised for this end will not be discussed here, as they are based on astronomical observations; for our purpose it is sufficient to know that a line of 36 padas length and running from the east towards the west had been drawn on the ground. On both ends of this line a pole was fixed and the ends of the cord of 54 padas length tied to these poles) and taking it by the sign at 15 draw it towards the south; (at the place reached by the mark, after the cord has been well-stretched) fix a pole. Do the same off the northern side (i.e. draw the cord towards the north as you have drawn it just now towards the south). By this process the two Śroṇis, the south-west corner and the south-east corner of the Vedi are fixed. After that exchange (the ends of the cord; i,e. tie that end which had been fastened at the pole on the east end of the prācī to the pole on its west and vice-versa), and fix the two Aṁśas ("shoulder" of the *Vedi*, i.e. the south-east corner and the north-east corner). This is done by stretching the cord toward the south having taken it by the mark at fifteen and fixing a pole

[39] *S.B.* III. 5.1.1—6 (quoted from *The Science of the Śulva*, pp. 31-32. In the original text, however, the word "vikrama" is used everywhere for Prakrama occuring in this English Translation. But it is immaterial.

on the spot reached by the mark at twelve; and by repeating the same operation on the northern side. The results are the two Aṁśas. This is the measurement of the *Vedi* by means of one cord."[40]

Here the prāchī line or the line joining middle hind pole (Sālāmukhī or Antaḥpātaḥ Śaṅku) and the middle front pole (Yūpātīya Śaṅku) form a sort of base line of survey corresponding to the modern base line AB in the plane table survey for triangulation.

On baked clay bricks they drew diagrams like those of the Babylonians found in Gaisur and in the vicinity and this is proved by Baudhāyana Śulvasūtra.[41]

Raisz[42] says that modern division of circle into 360 degrees is due to the duodecimal system of the Babylonians. But in India the division of circle into twelve parts was known earlier than the *Ṛgveda*, as in the preparation of Gārhapatya Vedi (which is definitely earlier than the Ṛgveda) a circle was divided into twelve parts. The earliest Śulvakāra Baudhāyana refers to it clearly.[43] And this was independent of any foreign influence and perhaps was earlier than the idea of the Babylonians.

From this and the construction of Rathacakra-citi (wheel-shaped pile of *Vedi*) it is evidenced that these Āryans had some conception of angles and angular measure also. The clear mention of Āgneya (south-east) Nairṛtya (south-west), Vāyavya (north-west) and Īśāna (north-east) Koṇas (angles) also point to the validity of the same. There are devices for drawing rhombus, and parallelogram which indicate that they had an idea of angular measurement. It was called Nata.[44]

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[40] *Āpsl*, II. 5, (quoted from "on the Śulvasūtras by Dr. Thibaut *J.A.S.* Bengal, 1875).

[41] Chap. II, *Sūtra* 43. (The *Pandit*, Vol. X, p. 143).

[42] *General Cartography*, *Raisz* p. 11.

[43] B. Sl. Chap. II, sūtra 71. (The *Pandit*, Vol. X, p. 166).

[44] *The Science of the Śulba*, pp. 67-70.

Triangulation, Squaring and Rectangulation.—Various forms of *Vedis* and their preparation or piling with bricks proves the division of areas into triangles, squares and rectangles. This triangulation resembles the modern triangulation. Later townplanning also followed this method of division of areas.

This method of division of land was followed upto very late times (c. 18th century) in surveying the country. The following quotation will prove this assertion :

"The indigenous method of land measurement by simple geometry is commented on by Macrabie, brother-in-law and private secretary to Philip Francis—

'We drove out again to the gardens. I have been talking all round and showing the Boundaries to a black surveyor. How the plague these people measure land, I cannot conceive. They neither use the compass nor take sights as our people do, and yet they get the contents of ground with tolerable accuracy. It is by means of square, I believe."[45]

Though Europeans already had arrived in India and begun to influence the country in various ways, still the indigenous method of survey was continuing without being affected at all. Their accuracy, simplicity and suitability has already been testified to in the above quotation.

Concept of Levelling.—In all survey work concept of leveleing is indispensable. In the Kātyāyana śulvasūtra we find the mention of the same. The Āpastamba śulvasūtra also knew it as is clear from यावानग्निस्सरन्ति सा नित्या प्रयुगम् and तावदेव दीर्घचतुरस्रम्"[46]

For the survey and cartographical work, śulvasūtras had definite sets of measures which were wonderfully subtle

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[45] *Historical Records of Survey of India* by R. H. Phillimore, vol I, p. 134.

[46] *K.S.L.* I. 2.; *Āp. SL.* p. 202 and 20 Mysore edition vide *G.N.R.E.I.* Vol. IV, 1947 pp. 262-3,

and clearly defined. The smallest unit could measure nearly a one-third of the mileimetre.[47] Kātyāyana gives still smaller unit which could measure nearly one-fortieth of a mileimetre.[48]

Instruments of Measurements.—In this surveying and cartography, the following instruments were used :—

1. Ox-hides (Aukṣṇa Carma)—some sort of linear or spatial measure for measuring ground[49].
2. Bamboo-rod,[50] sticks and canes.
3. Rope or cord.
4. Poles.
5. Gnomon.
6. Śamyā (a ruler of 36 or 32 Angulas, one Angula $=\frac{3}{4}''$ nearly).
7. Sphya—wooden sword for drawing lines etc.

The Aryans of those days performed geometrically what the Romans did with Groma.

In Harappa a broken rod with graduation mark has been found.

The cord used for these purposes had different marks like measuring tape of the modern times. The Mānava-Śulvasūtra says it had five joints (Pañcāṅgī) two ties and three marks.

Kauṭilya, perhaps almost contemporary of the Kātyāyana Śulvasūtra mentions a measure Rajju which was nearly 60 ft. resembling the modern Gunter chain.

Those well-versed in the science of Śulva were quite expert in plotting and drawing the very complicated figures of various types of Vakrapakṣa-śyenaciti (a falcon or hawk shaped pile)[51] Kaṅkaciti (kite or heron-shaped pile)[52] and Rathacakra-citi (wheel-shaped pile) and also knew the

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47 *B.Sl.* Chap. I, Sūtra 4.

48 Verses 22—26.

49 *S.B.* I. 2.5.2.

50 *M.S.* III. 2.4.

51 *Pandit*, Vol. X, p. 211—13.

52 *Ibid.*, New Series, Vol I, p. 323.

drawing of triangle, rhombus, parallelogram, rectangles, squares and circles[53] and the determination of the areas of these, it proves that they could perform survey of any plot of land[54] howsoever complicated and irregular and calculated its area.

But division of ground into squares and plotting of details in them had become a more general practice in later times.

A Comparative Study—*Encyclopaedia Britannica*[55] says "It is very probable that surveying had its origin in ancient Egypt." Raisz[56] observes "For purposes of taxation the land was carefully measured and registered and the boundaries marked. Ramses II (1333—1300 B.C.) initiated a systematic land survey of the empire." Similarly Babylonian art of cartography is also considered to be of great antiquity. Some assign it a date of even 2500 B.C.[57] Whatever be the antiquity of survey and cartography in these lands, if we make comparative study of the former two with India, it would be found that these two branches of practical sciences are still older in the latter country. Harappa and Mohenjodaro plannings (of at least 3000 B.C.), measurement and construction of the *Vedis* coming down from an age prior to the *Ṛgveda* and accurate measurement of land mentioned in the *Ṛgveda*[58] obviously and very easily prove this.

The survey, planning and cartography of very large *Vedis* like Aśwamedha and others were conclusively superior to those required and performed in the construction of the biggest pyramid (Khufu's 2898—2875 B.C.) of

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[53] *The Science of Śulba*, Chap. IV.

[54] *Ibid.*, Chap. V.

[55] Vol. 21; page 609.

[56] *General Cartography*, p. 11.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 12; *Antiquijy*, September, 1935, Ancient Babylonian maps and plans by Eckhard Unger.

[58] *Vedic Index*, Macdonell and Keith, Vol. I, pp. 210-11.

Gizeh in Egypt covering a volume of 85,000,000 cubic feet and height 481 feet.[59] In laying out the Aśwamedha Vedi survey of no less than $\frac{85,000,000}{481} = 180,000$ square feet had to be carried on very accurately. And most probably this was carried on in India near about the same date as in Egypt.

About these sciences of Śulva, Prof. Louis Renou remarks that these,"... constitute the most ancient document of India Geography". (namely practical geography—survey and cartography).[60]

In conclusion it is obligatory to observe that no actual cartographic specimen of the period under consideration has been found, nor is perhaps expected to be found, since the ancient Hindus had little propensity to put the history or geography systematically on record. This was still more emphatically applicable to maps, plans, diagrams or other cartographic specimens. Whatever was drawn or made was destroyed; or carelessness and cruel time engulfed their existence. Naturally then it is only through the description and references to these in the śulvasūtras that we have to build our entire edifice of investigation.

Abbreviations.

SBE=Sacred Books of the East.
KSl=Kātyāyana Śulvasūtra.
BSl=Baudhāyana Śulvasūtra.
ĀpSl=Apastamba Śulvasūtra.
SB=Śatapathabrāhmaṇa.
T.S=Tattirīya Saṁhitā.
J.G.N.R.I=Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute.
M.S=Maitrāyāṇīya Saṁhitā.
General Cartography by Raisz (1938 edition).

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[59] *History of the World*, J. A. Hammerton, Vol. I, p. 509.
[60] *Vedic India*, p. 41.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

THE INDO-GREEKS by Dr. A. K. Narain, Reader in Ancient Indian History and Culture, Banaras Hindu University, published by Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. XVI-201 with three maps and six plates, price Rs. 26/-.

The present book deals with the political history of the Indo-Greeks, also known as the Graeco-Bactrians or the Yavanas, who dominated the land from the Jaxarates to the Ganges in the second and first centuries B.C. It substantially represents the author's thesis for the Ph. D. Degree of London University, prepared under the guidance and consultation of some of the greatest living scholars of ancient Indian history, not only in this country, like Drs. A. S. Altekar and R. C. Majumdar, but also in some other countries, like Dr. A.L. Basham, Dr. R. B. Whitehead, Dr. John Allan, Prof. E. H. Warmington and others. The author of the book has taken full opportunity of his stay at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London for thoroughly examining all the sources of Indo-Greek history, and, as such, his work serves as a model for critical revision of a chapter of ancient Indian history, haphazardly shaped in a long course of time, by a fresh examination of its sources.

The history of the Indo-Greeks, no doubt, suffers badly from the paucity of source-material. But this suffering has been still more aggravated by speculative thinking of some of its writers, which seems to be at its best in the writings of two great masters of learning namely, Dr. K. P. Jayaswal and Dr. W. W. Tarn. Dr. A. K. Narain deserves our thanks for bringing the Greek period of Indian history out of the clutches of the fertile imagination of

some of these scholars notably those of Dr. Tarn. Unfortunately, however, Dr. Narain himself has indulged in conjectures at certain points. In the 'Preface' of his book he himself admits, "I have been forced to make surmises." He thinks that these surmises "have been made with caution." But it is possible that others do not think so. To us it seems that Dr. Narain has been forced to make these conjectures because of his 'numismatistic' approach to the Indo-Greek history. His "reconstruction of the history of the Indo-Greeks is primarily based on numismatic evidence", and the literary sources have been used only to "strengthen" "very important conclusions" (p. viii). This seems to us putting the cart before the horse. Naturally we may best learn history only from the literary (including epigraphic) sources and coins can generally be used, by their scrappy nature, only to corroborate this history. It appears to us that all the two or three "very important conclusions" in Dr. Narain's book, drawn from the numismatic evidences, are hardly untenable, and the learned Doctor's attempts to get support for them from the literary sources are not very convincing.

Perhaps the most important discovery in the whole of Dr. Narain's thesis is apportioning of some work, attributed to Demetrius I by almost all other historians to another king of the same name (Chap. II). Dr. Narain takes some points of differences between the Bactrian and the cis-Hindukush coins of Demetrius I indicative of the existence of two Demetrii—one king of Bactria and the other king of 'India'—completely disregarding the possibility of these differences due to geographical conditions (pp. 29—33). Dr. Narain applies his idea of two Demetrii even to the literary sources for the history of Demetrius, in my opinion, caring little for what naturally follows from them. We learn from Polybios that king Euthydemus of Bactria had a son named Demetrius, who "was worthy of royal power"

Then Strabo quite unambiguously informs us that, with Menander, this Demetrius, son of Euthydemus, king of the Bactrians, "took possession, not only of Patalene but also, on the rest of the coast, of what is called the kingdom of Saraostus and Sigerdis." Justin and Chaucer have most probably referred to this Demetrius as "King of India" in contrast with Eucratides, who, having seized Bactria from Demetrius, left him only as a king of India. But quite contrary to the clear statement of Strabo that Demetrius, the son of Euptydemus, conquered Pāṭala, Surāshṭra etc., with Menander, Dr. Narain tries to differentiate Demetrius, son of Ethydemus, from Demetrius, the king of India, even on the basis of literary sources (pp. 34—39). It is on the basis of the following passage of Strabo, as given by M' Crindle (Ancient India As Described In Classical Literature, p. 209), that all the historians have conclusively accepted Demetrius, the son of Euthydemus, as the conqueror of some parts of India :—

"The Greeks who occasioned its (Bactri's) revolt became so powerful by means of the fertility and advantages of the country that they became masters of Ariana and India according to Apollodorus of Artemita. Their chiefs, particularly Menander (if he really crossed the Hypanis to the east and reached Isamus) conquered more nations than Alexander. These conquests are achieved partly by Menander, partly by Demetrius, son of Euthydemus, king of the Bactrians. They got possession not only of Patalene but of the kingdom of Saraostus and Sigerdis, which constitute the remainder of the coast. Apollodorus, in short, says that Bactriana is the ornament of all Ariana. They extended their empire even so far as the Seres and Phryne."

Inspite of the defect of not giving the Indian conquests of Menander and Demetrius separately, the general import of this passage is quite clear. In the first sentence,

F. 29

it says that the Graeco-Bactrians became masters of Ariana and India. In the last two sentences it says that not only this, the Graeco-Bactrians had conquered even Seres and Phryne. Between these two statements, giving extention of the Graeco-Bactrian dominions, this passage gives some details of the Graeco-Bactrian conquest of India. In this connection it says that the Graeco-Bactrian chiefs, Menander and Euthydemus's son, Demetrius, conquered all lands upto Pāṭala and Surāshṭra. Menander is said to have made still more conquests in the east—if he really crossed the Beas (which was the returning point of Alexander) and reached Isamus (now generally identified with the Jamunā or the Kālindī etc.), then he conquered more of India than even Alexander the Great did.

To me Dr. Narain seems a bit confused about the interpretation of this passage when he says that this passage attributes the conquests of "Saraostus and Sigerdis in India, and the Seres and Phryne towards Ferghana" to Demetrius and Menander jointly (pp. 36—37). Probably the above passage assigns to Menander and Demetrius only Indian conquests upto Isamus in the east and Patalene, Saraostus and Sigerdis in the south in contrast with comparatively smaller Indian conquests of Alexander. Then Dr. Narain distributes this joint conquest by assigning Seres and Phryne to Demetrius and Saraostus and Sigerdis to Menander, although the passage says quite clearly that "they" (not Menander alone) got possession of Patalene, Saraostus and Sigerdis. Dr. Narain has taken all pains to show that some area to the north-east of Bactria (most probably comprising of Seres and Phryne) was conquered by Demetrius (pp. 25—28), but hardly to any conviction.

Another important conclusion drawn from the numismatic evidences by Dr. Narain, unlike his theory of creating two Demetrii out of Demetrius I, is the merger of two

Apollodoti into Apollodotus II (pp. 64—69 and 122—127), although, as he himself says, "No one seems to doubt the existence of two Apollodoti" (p. 64). In opposition to all other numismatists and historians, Dr. Narain says that "there is hardly any evidence for the existence of an early Apollodotus I as a king of the Indo-Greeks" (p. 69), and once more that "we have hardly any evidence to suppose the existence of an Apollodotus I" (p. 122). Dr. Narain comes to this very big conclusion from certain little peculiarities of the coins attributed to Apollodotus I, which are, according to him, indicative of a late date, such as absence of tetradrachms among his issues, non-appearance of king's portrait on his coins, occurrence of some types and monograms etc. A sneaking doubt of some numismatists about the authenticity of one coin of Eucratides I of the 'Kavisiey Nagar' type overstruck on a piece of Apollodotus, which has been accepted by almost all numismatists and historians as an evidence for more or less contemporaneity of Apollodotus I with Eucratides, has been turned by Dr. Narain into a well established fact of unauthenticity of this coin without much evidence commensurate with the ir portance of this point. For supporting his theory Dr. Narain tries even to disparage the authority of some literary sources referring to an early king named Apollodotus (pp. 64—68). He quotes the following passage from the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea about Apollodotus with emphasis on some parts of it (p. 68): "The country in land from Barygaza is inhabited by numerous tribes, such as the Aratti, the Arachosii the Gandarii and the people of Poclais, in which is Bucephalus Alexandria. *Above these is the very warlike nation of the Bactrians who are under their own king.* And Alexander setting out from these parts, penetrated to *the Ganges*, leaving aside Damirica and the southern part of India; and to the present day ancient drachmae are current in Barygaza, *coming from this country; bearing inscriptions*

in Greek letters, and the devices of those who reigned after Alexander, Apollodotus and Menander".

Most of the historians have naturally inferred from this passage that, among the successors of Alexander, Apollodotus was a well-known king like Menander. As the Periplus places him before Menander, he might be a predecessor, at any rate more or less a contemporary, of Menander. This Apollodotus must have ruled over the extensive "country inland from Barygaza" from where his coins came. But it is most probably in connection with such simple inferences that Dr. Narain says, "Much has been made of this passage without justification" (p. 68). Dr. Narain himself draws the following conclusions from this passage: "The passage clearly implies that these coins came from some outside area, probably from where the warlike nation of the Bactrians ruled. Or it may be that the author of the Periplus had seen the coins of a certain Apollodotus and Menander and noticed similar coins in Barygaza not necessarily of their own minting. The name of Apollodotus mentioned in the Periplus evidently refers to the later kings of that name" (p. 68). The readers may judge for themselves the strength and validity of these conclusions. The author of the Periplus clearly says that the coins of Apollodotus came from "this country" meaning most probably "the country inland from Barygaza", that is, the Indo-Kābul valley; but Dr. Narain makes them come from Bactria which is referred to as a "nation" in this passage. Similarly the Periplus refers to the coins of Apollodotus as genuine "ancient drachmae" "bearing inscriptions in Greek letters" and "the devices" of Apollodotus, but Dr. Narain seems to think that these coins struck as forgeries to the author of the Periplus. The Periplus places Apollodotus before Menander, but to the mind of Dr. Narain it "evidently" (?) refers to a later king of that name.

It is perfectly certain from the Periplus that there was a great Indo-Greek king with the name of Apollodotus who most probably lived before Menander. This makes Bayer's emendation of Apollodorus (which is not known to be the name of any Indo-Greek king) into Apollodotus in Trogus' reference to the conquest of India by Apollodorus and Menander. Dr. Narain, however, tries to disparage this simple emandation without much justification (pp. 66—67) and proposes his own emendation involving much more tampering with the whole sentence in Trogus' Prologue (p. 67).

Dr. Narain's historical reconstruction of the Miṭra coins of Pañchāla, Mathurā, etc. also does not seem to us to be wholly convincing. He is quite right to think with all other historians that these coins are indicative of the existence of local states of Miṭra kings at Ahichhatrā, Mathurā, Kauśāmbī etc. But his acceptance of John Allan's date for the beginning of these dynasties from before the time of Pushyamitra Śuṅga (pp. 86, 91), which is to some extent only a guess, will hardly find universal acceptance. Dr. Narain goes still further and identifies the Miṭra kings of Sāketa, and Magadha with those of Pañchāla and Mathurā (p. 86—91) against the opinion of some great numismatists and historians. He furthermore thinks that the inscriptions of Brahmamiṭra and Indramiṭra on the Bodhagayā railings were engraved by the Miṭra kings of the same name and that they were not engraved in some pilgrimage etc., but after their conquest of Bodhagayā region (p. 86). Dr. Narain tries to adduce support for his theory of invasion of Magadha by the Miṭra kings of Pañchāla and Mathurā by accepting Prof. D. R. Mankad's restoration of a doubtful passage of the *Gārgī-Saṁhitā* meaning that Sāketa and Pāṭaliputra were invaded by the Pañchālas, Mathurās and Yavanas—not by the Yavaṇas alone as accepted by other historians

(pp. 82-83 and also Appendix IV). A critical examination of the relevant passage of the *Gārgī Saṁhitā* would require a separate article. Suffice it to say here that Dr. K. P. Jayaswal's reading, based on Kern's manuscript, which has been accepted by almost all historians but rejected by Dr. Narain, comes almost perfectly from a manuscript, no matter the manuscript is lost, and so it is preferable to the imperfect reading of even four other Mss. which come to a sensible reading only after conjectural restorations of Prof. Mankad. Even if we do not believe Kern, in absence of the Mss. consulted by him, to have given a true reading, there is hardly any justification for completely ignoring Jayaswal's reading for that of Mankad's. Moreover, the Yavana (not Pañchāla and Mathurā) invasion of Sāketa and Magadha is strongly corroborated respectively by the *Mahābhāṣya* (not to mention even Abhayānandī) and the Hāthīgumphā inscription of Khāravela. Of these two, though in vain, Dr. Narain tries to impeach the testimony of the Hāthigumphā inscription mainly on two grounds; firstly, the reading Yavanarāja in this inscription is not certain, and secondly, the word Yavana may here mean Śaka—not Greek (p. 43). So far as the reading Yavanarāja is concerned it has been ultimately accepted by almost all epigraphists and historians and Dr. Narain himself does not suggest anything more than meaningless possible alternate readings of one or two letters of this word. The term Yavana was being used for the Graeco-Bactrians definitely about the time of Khāravela as evidenced from the epithet 'Śaka-Yavana-Pahlava-nihudanasa' in the Nasik cave inscription used for Gautamīputra Śatakarṇī who must be supposed to have been more or less a contemporary of Khāravela. About Patañjali's reference to the Yavanas as the invaders of Sāketa to complete exclusion of the Pañchālas and Mathurās, who were associated with the Yavanas in their invasion of

Sāketa and Pāṭaliputra, according to Dr. Narain, the learned Dr. Says, "It would be very natural for the Yavanas to receive undue prominence in the account, since they must have been quite conspicuous, because this was probably the first time that a Greek army penetrated as far east as Pāṭaliputra" (p. 175). To say the least all this is mere presumption without any evidence.

Dr. Narain thinks that "the Mauryan empire must have begun to break up nearly a quarter of a century before the usurpation of Pushyamitra" (p. 9). In this connection he advances the following arguments :—'Already. . . a son of Aśoka named Jālauka, had taken possession of Kashmir (according to Kalhaṇa's Rājataranginī). From the late and confused evidence of Tārānātha, Gandhāra was apparently ruled by Vīrasena, another descendant of Aśoka; and from Polybius we know that Antiochus III renewed his alliance with Sophagasenus, the Indian king" (pp. 8-9). But hardly any of these arguments is conclusive. Kalhaṇa and Tārānātha are not known always to give historical information. Dr. Narain himself finds faults with them. Antiochus III had met Sophagasenus just after crossing the Hindukush, and for showing isintegration of the Mauryan empire on this evidence it has to be proved that the Mauryan emperors ever ruled directly, not through sub-kings, over all the lands upto the Hindukush. Eminent historians, like R. C. Majumdar, K. P. Jayaswal, R. P. Chanda, P. C. Bagchi, H. C. Raichaudhary and others, have held on several evidences that the empire of Pushyamitra included the Indus valley. But Dr. Narain does not appear to take these evidences worthy of even passing reference.

According to Dr. Narain Menander was the Yavana invader of Pāṭaliputra (p. 81). For this Dr. Narain relies upon the chronological evidences which are perhaps the

weakest elements of ancient Indian history (pp. 82-83). He places the reign of Menander, the Yavana invasion of Sāketa, mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, and victory of Vasumitra over the Yavanas on the banks of the Sindhu at the same time near about 150 B. C. However, as a matter of fact, none of these events is known definitely to have taken place about 150 B.C. This also is by no means certain that they are in any way connected with one another. Menander's invasion of Pāṭaliputra goes against the testimony of Strabo also who has expressed doubt even on Menander's crossing the Beas. Dr. Narain thinks that "Strabo's doubts may be due to the fact that he knew something about the unsuccessful nature of the Yavana advance in the Madhyadeśa" (p. 83). This is a conjecture pure and simple. Had Strabo known of Menander's advance upto Pāṭaliputra, successful or unsuccessful, why should he have doubted his going beyond the Beas even ?

We know with certainty only this much that the Greeks who came to India were the off-springs of the Bactrian or Hellenistic Greeks. But Dr. Narain says that "the people with whose history we are concerned included not only late arrivals on the scene, the veterans of Alexander or colonists of the Seleucids, but also many settlers from Greek cities of Asia who had dwelt in the region for some generations" (p. 6). For supporting this theory of the existence of the Greeks near about Bactria before Alexander, Dr. Narain relies upon the unreliable myths of Dionysus, Branchos etc. in the Graeco-Roman literature, and those of 'Yavana' or 'Yona' in Pāṇini's Grammar, and *Majjhima Nikāya* of Indian literature (pp. 1—3), which may well be later interpolations or vague allusions to the Achaemenids or some other foreigners. Even if correct, these casual references are hardly adequate enough to postulate

a theory of Greek colony close to the north-west of India before the time of Alexander. For the sake of argument even if we accept this colony, it has to be proved that the Graeco-Bactrians, who came to India, were connected with it.

The history of the Indo-Greeks has yet to be cleared off surmisings.

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VIṢṆUDHARMOTTARA-PURĀṆA, THIRD KHAṆḌA, VOL. I, Edited by Dr. (Miss) Priyabala Shah, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. CXXX, pp. 411. Price Rs. 20, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1958.

Scholars would welcome this edition of the *Viṣṇudharmottara* Khaṇḍa III, for the first time critically edited with the help of four manuscripts. The work is important for the study of fine arts in ancient India. In fact, it is a treatise on the Fine Arts of Ancient India. The learned editor is the Head of the department of Ancient Indian Culture, Rāmānanda Mahāvidyālaya, Ahmedabad and should be congratulated for this excellent edition so critically edited. The text *inter alia* consists of 15 chapters on नृत्तसूत्रम्, 9 on चित्रसूत्रम्, 42 on प्रतिमालक्षणम्, and 32 on प्रसादलक्षणम्. The Director of the Baroda Oriental Institute states in his foreword that the editor's critical discussion and interpretation of various topics covered by the text will follow in the second volume which is in the press, and hence, we eagerly await the release of that volume and reserve all our remarks when that is taken up for review.

The Director notifies in his foreword that the Nepal manuscript could not be utilized as the State policy in this respect seems to be undecided. Without appearing to defend Nepal, it is our duty to point out that India is not entitled as of right to the free use of manuscripts when Nepal gets in return the printed edition. When the India Government gives financial help for learning the languages of Spain, Brazil, etc., and wants to send India's Cultural ambassadors to those countries, is it not our duty to adopt a similar measure for Nepal which is and had been culturally one with India from time immemorial. Even in the editing of a text, the अध्यापन is the real meaning of अध्ययन as Prabhākara states in his Mīmāṁsā commentary. When this is done and not till then could we legitimately satisfy Nepal. This is a matter not of mere political reciprocity, it is *cultural justice*. There is a manuscript in Dacca which was not procurable. Ways and means for getting such Mss. should be devised.

INTRODUCTION TO THE VYAVAHĀRAKĀṆḌA OF KṚTYA KALPATARU of Lakṣmīdhara by K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. CXXVII, pp. xvii & 129 in English and Index of half verses in Sanskrit, pp. 108. Price Rs. 10·50. Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1958.

The Sanskrit text of the Vyavahāra Kāṇḍa of the *Kṛtyakalpataru* of Lakṣmīdhara was edited in 1953 by the present editor. In view of the bulk (834 pages) of the Sanskrit text, the English introduction was reserved for a separate volume viz., the one under review. Lakṣmīdhara devotes the 12th section (out of 14 on the whole) to a treatment of *Vyavahāra* which is the adjectival and substantive law. The section which immediately precedes this is the *Rājadharma*. The two duties of a king are protec-

tion in the widest sense (प्रजारक्षणम्) and seeing to the settlement of disputes between men (दर्शनम् व्यवहाराणाम्). The elaboration of this second duty is the *Vyavahārakāṇḍa*.

Lakṣmīdhara's special value in this volume is that he was the minister of Govindacandra of Kanouj who ruled over the greater part of northern India and as judge he tried suits which came up to him. The intrinsic merits of the work invoked the reverence of later writers on the subject and even entire passages were absorbed. The learned historian and editor has given in English in 129 pages a succint account of the entire law of Vyavahāra as laid down by Lakṣmīdhara and the world of scholarship is indebted to him. The editor has *inter alia* explained the four bases of Vyavahāra including *Rājaśāsana* laid down by Nārada and others; and the erroneous motion that Nārada exalts the power of the king to absolutism is exposed. What was the state of the Law prior to Lakṣmīdhara and how it has changed, if at all, during the time of Lakṣmīdhara questions bristling with difficulty are left to future research scholars. We look forward eagerly to the publication of the other volumes at an early date.

SEVEN WORDS IN BHARATA—What do they Signify by K. M. Varma, xv 144 pp, Orient Longmans Rs. 5/-.

Nāṭya Śāstra of Bharatamuni is considered to be the basic work on Indian dramaturgy and the earliest available commentary on this work is the *Abhinavabhāratī* by Abhinava Gupta. *Nāṭyaśāstra* with its commentary has been published under the Gaekwad's Oriental Series edited by the late M. Rama Krishna Kavi. In the preface to this edition it is stated that the manuscripts of the commentary were highly imperfect and fully corrupt in their contents and that in spite of the best efforts of reputed scholars to improve the commentary there still remain a number of places where

the text of the *Abhinavabhāratī* does not yield a sensible and satisfactory construction which agrees with the text. The present thesis under notice is another effort to improve the text of the *Abhinavabhāratī* firstly with reference to two sets of questions put by the Munis to Bharata mentioned in the 1st and the 6th Chapters (Ch. 1. Ver. 4 and 5 and Ch. 6. Ver. 2 and 3) and secondly to the meaning of the seven words occurring in the text. 1. Sūtra, 2. Bhāṣya, 3. Saṅgraha, 4. Kārikā, 5. Nirukta 6. Ānuvaṁsya and 7. Nidarśana. Regarding the two sets of questions, Abhinava takes the view that they are not separate as the second set comes out of one of the previous set. But the present author rightly points out that the two distinctly separate, indicating that the first set is fully answered in the first chapter itself and that the second set in the 6th chapter raises fresh points. With regard to the seven technical terms the author has given very apt meanings which exactly fit in with the context in the original text. In the last part (Part III) of the thesis the author has dealt with some topics pertaining to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* such as chronology of works of the Pre-Bharata period method of quoting Ānuvaṁsyas etc. In the exposition of the subject there is much repetition of ideas and even of sentences. The author admits this and says that he had to do it for the sake of emphasis. Among the modern scholars who have interpreted Bharata's text, the author makes mention of Mm. P. V. Kane and Dr. S. K. De and disapproves their approach. *Nāṭya Śāstra* has assumed much importance now-a-days and the students of this śāstra should feel thankful to the author for throwing light on points which had remained un-noticed till now.

—V. Hanumanthachar

THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ as a Philosophy of God-realisation by Prof. R. D. Ranade, XV, 321 pp. Pub. Nagpur University. Price Rs. 10/-.

In five parts, divided into twenty one chapters, with minor divisions this book deals with the *Bhagavadgītā* and its teachings. This is in the nature of a symposium on the teachings of the *Gītā* explaining the views of various writers, Indian and Western and giving the author's interpretation on some important topics. Chapters 1–3 are devoted to explaining the relation of the *Bhagavadgītā* to the upaniṣads, the systems of Sāṅkhya, Yoga and the *Brahmasūtras*. Chapter IV deals with the Vedāntic interpretations of Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja, Mādhva and Vallabha while chapter V is assigned to explaining the mystical interpretation of the *Gītā* according to Jñānesvara. Then follow Chapters VI to XIV dealing with modern interpretations e.g. interpolationism of Garbe etc. Devotionalism of Bhandarkar, Christianism of Weber etc. who hold that the *Bhagavadgītā* was influenced by Christianity, Buddhism of Buddhirāja who says that the *Bhagavadgītā* has borrowed from Buddhism, Activism of B. G. Tilak, detachment theory of Gandhi, Divinisation of Aurobindo and a host of interpretations by other modern prominent interpreters. In Chapters XV to XX the author draws attention to some antinomies in the *Gītā* and his solutions for them such as God-Personal or impersonal, activity or passivity, immanence or transcendence, world real on unreal, Videhamukti or Kramamukti etc. Moralism, Super-moralism and beatiffcism are next explained followed by the problem of God, methods of meditation and an exposition of what is sublime vision of God. The last Chapter deals with the sublime and the Divine besides these. Several connected topics have been discussed and comparisons have been drawn with the views of western philosophers.

In connection with the interpretation of the conception of liberation according to the great Ācāryas, the author quotes two verses, 54 and 55 from the 18th Adhyāya. Therein he points out four stages in the process of final liberation as implied in the words, (1) ब्रह्मभूत, (2) मद्भक्ति, (3) मामभिजानाति and (4) मां . . . विशते and thinks that the first stage is absolutely unnecessary as he sees no necessity of attaining to Bhakti or Jñāna after there is Brahmabhāvanā. He further says that if the devotee began with Bhakti it would have been quite understandable (p. 54). Here, the author has evidently equated ब्रह्मभवन with ब्रह्मप्रवेश which is the last stage itself and hence, the confusion. Śrī Mādhva, on the other hand, has explained ब्रह्मभवन as ब्रह्मणि स्थिति : सर्वदा तन्म स्कता which is distinct from ब्रह्मप्रवेश. This meaning is quite consistent and according to this, the first stage becomes quite necessary leading on to the second stage, Bhakti, since Bhakti cannot spring all on a sudden without constant thinking about God (सर्वदा तन्मनस्कता as a pre-requisite to Bhakti.

Bhagavadgītā is verily the fountain head of philosophical thoughts lending itself to be interpreted according to the view which one holds. The teachings of the *Bhagavadgītā* are so complex and apparently conflicting that there is no finality in their interpretation as may be seen from the different views explained in the chapter under "The labyrinth of modern interpretations" although there may be some element of truth in each of them just like the description of an elephant by a set of blind men, one describing its leg, another its trunk, the third its tail and so on. This book containing different views on the subject will provide a basis for those who are in quest of fresh light on the teachings of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

—V. Hanumanthachar

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ṚGVARṆAKRAMALAKṢAṆA of Narasiṁha Sūri, ed. by Pandit V. Krishnamacharya, 43 pp., Pub. Adyar Library, Madras.

As the title indicates this is a treatise bearing on the order of letters that make up words in Vedic texts, in 44 verses with author's own commentary. In the very 1st verse the author says "tanoti pūrvaśāstroktamṛgvarṇa-kramalakṣaṇaṁ" and in the 1st line of the 3rd verse he states "tallakṣaṇaṁ prātiśākhyājjñeyaṁ Vyākaraṇāt kvacit" i.e. the author is writing what has been already explained in earlier works and what is said herein can be known from Grammar and also from Prātiśākhya. So the justification for writing what has already been said by earlier writers, seems to be that the present author wants to put together for the sake of convenience what is found diffused in various texts. The various grammatical points which are explained here in such as duplication augmentation, elision etc. of syllables are indicated in verses 3 to 6 followed by detailed explanation in the remaining verses. From the style of the work the learned editor has come to the conclusion that it is not earlier than the beginning of the 19th century. This clearly shows the great importance that is attached to the preservation of the Vedic texts to the very letter even to the present times. Pandit V. Krishnamacharya who has to his credit good number of works edited by him is to be congratulated for editing this work from an old injured manuscript without the aid of second copy for collation.

—V. Hanumanthachar

SAṄGĪTARATNĀKARA of Śāraṅgadeva, edited by Pandit S. Subrahmanya Sastri, revised by Pandit V. Krishnamacharya. x, 434 pp., Pub. Adyar Library, Madras.

This book under notice is the revised edition of the classical work on music. *Saṅgītaratnākara* of Śāraṅgadeva, Vol. II containing Adhyayas 2 to 4, namely, Rāgavivekādhyāya, Prakīrṇakādhyāya and Prabandhādhyāya with the two commentaries, *Sudhākara* of Siṁhabhūpāla and *Kalānidhi* of Kallinātha. The fact that the first edition of this volume went out of print necessitating a reprint shows the great popularity of this book among the students of music and we congratulate the authorities of the Adyar Library for printing it a second time on account of the impact of what is known as light music, the traditional music is now experiencing a slight set back especially among the younger generation. In order to check this trend and to restore the traditional music to its place, the publication of such books is quite welcome. But the subject being highly technical and the texts and commentaries written in Sanskṛit their usefulness is at present limited to a few scholars only. If, however, such books are followed also by translations and illustrations in some popular languages, they would certainly benefit more people. A beginning was made in that direction by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja who translated the first Adhyāya of the *Saṅgītaratnākara* with its two commentaries. Translation of the other Adhyāyas is awaited.

ṚGARTHASĀRA of Dinakara Bhaṭṭa, vol. I, ed. by Dr. Aryendra Sharma and K. Sitaramaiya, iv, 70 pp., Pub. Sanskrit Academy, Osmania University, Hyderabad, Decn. Price Rs. 2.50.

Among the commentators of the Vedas who are accepted to be traditionalists, Sāyana is the latest who has

interpreted the Veda's from a ritualistic point of view. His commentary has given a strong foot hold for others who have attempted to comment on the Vedas, perhaps with the object of improving upon Sāyana's commentary. The book under notice is one such commentary on the same model as Sāyana's on 207 ṛks selected at random from different Aṣṭakas. The learned editors have clearly brought out in their short but critical introduction the merits and defects of this commentary. On a perusal of this work, a doubt naturally arises whether Dinakara Bhaṭṭa wrote the commentary in full on all the Aṣṭakas, otherwise what is the object in writing it in the manner it is now available? The Director of the Academy deserves all our praise for starting the series and publishing important works.

THE VĀLMĪKI-RĀMĀYAṆA. Critical Edition, vol I, Bālakāṇḍa. Fascicule 1, edited by G. H. Bhatt and illustrated by the Faculty of Fine Arts, M. S. University of Baroda. Published under the authority of the Maharaja Sayajirao, University of Baroda, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1958. Price for the critical and illustrated edition of the Rāmāyaṇa. Rs. 250 cloth, Rs. 200 paper. Fascicule 1. Bālakāṇḍa, pages xxxiv and 80. 2 plates containing facsimile of the Nepal manuscript and 2 tri-coloured illustrations.

This is the first part of the critical edition of the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki. The model, of course, is set by the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*, now nearing completion, edited by the Bhandarkar Research Institute of Poona. In addition, we have the factor that the present editor Prof. G. H. Bhatt, the ex-Director of the Baroda Oriental Institute, was a disciple of Dr. Sukthankar, the talented editor of the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*; and after imbibing the principles of textual criticism of the *Mahābhārata*, G. H.

Bhatt is applying by Atideśa (अतिदेश) the same principles to the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki.

The undertaking of the critical edition is one of great national importance and the M. S. Gaekwad Oriental Institute has taken time by the forelock in launching upon this venture; and all the States in India including the Union Government are contributing their mite towards this national cause.

The following suggestions may be given for the publication of this great work :—

(1) The three main recensions of the *Rāmāyaṇa* are those of (i) the North-West, (ii) Bengal and (iii) South India including Bombay. But there is a fourth as well, the Mithilā recension known only to a few scholars; and rare manuscripts are still available in Mithilā and in the Darbhanga Raj Palace Library and in the State libraries of Nepal. Cultural contacts with Nepal are now in the increase and it should be very easy to send a team of scholars to work at the manuscripts in Mithilā and Nepal. And a critical edition of the Mithilā version of the *Rāmāyaṇa* should form a separate publication and an integral part of the work of the Institute.

(2) Again, we have to emphasise that the separate critical editions of the three recensions North-Western, Bengal and South Indian should be published serially and separately; and then only the present critical edition which is the result of the collaboration of the three recensions should be published. This alone would enable one to understand how the present critical text is worked into and to appreciate the inter se relation of the recensions.

(3) Several commentaries are available on the *Rāmāyaṇa* and a few of them are still unpublished. For example, the *Kataka* purports *interalia* to be the clearing-nut for the text of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. No doubt, this commentary in manuscript would be used to the fullest advantage by the

editor. But the scholar requires the text of the *Kataka* on which any conclusion has been based, to ascertain whether the conclusion of the editor could be the only one. Hence, the publication of the chief unpublished commentaries should be one main part of the undertaking of this critical edition. Any useful information imbedded in other manuscripts may also be given. Thus there will be a variorum edition of all the commentaries on the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The commentary styled धर्माकूतम् which discusses the legal and Dharma aspects of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the editing of which began in 1911 with the Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam and is now taken up by the S. M. Library Tanjore, has come up only to four Kāṇḍas. If this publication of the chief commentaries and the essence of all the other commentaries is not taken up now and that by the editors of this critical edition, we may well state that it may not perhaps be taken up at all by any one else.

With these suggestions we may conclude that the world of scholars is anxiously expecting the future instalments of this Himalayan undertaking at a very early date.

—A. S. Nataraja Ayyar, M.A., M.L.

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VEDA-PURĀṆAKĀVYE PṚTHIVI O BHĀRATER ITTHĀSA (in Bengali) by Sri Ramprasad Majumdar, M.A., Munsirhat, Howrah, West Bengal, pp. 1—10 with fwo big Chronological Charts. Price Rs. 2/-

This is a fresh attempt to arrive at some sensible conclusions regarding the History of the World and of India in particular based on Vedic and Pauranic materials. The author in a nutshell has given here the results of his researches which require elaborate treatment. He has given a more plausible explanation of the Parikṣita Janamejaya problem. We will expect more light from the young scholar who seems to be a genuine student of Indian History.

BHĀṢĀTATTVA MANJARĪ—Philology Primer on a model method (in Bengali) by Sri Ramprasad Majumdar, M.A., pp. 1—23. Price Re. 1/-.

The tract under review is also a new attempt in the field of comparative philology. The author objects to many time-honoured theories, for example, he does not subscribe to the view that the Aryan and the Non-Aryans form two different races. He has substantiated his conclusions by citing numerous examples from different languages, ancient and modern. He wants to establish the fact that '*Pratnavaidika*' or earlier Vedic language is the parent stock from which all the Aryan languages sprang forth.

—A. Thakur

Ganganatha Jha
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